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Abstract
What are the main causes of bank failure? This thesis contributes to answering this
question by focusing on the city of Chicago during the Great Depression, which experi-
enced one of the country’s highest urban bank failure rates. Focusing on the long-term
evolution of state banks’ balance sheets, it finds that what greatly mattered for their
survival was the inherent liquidity of their pre-Depression portfolios. Indeed, all banks,
including survivors, suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals. Yet those that ended
up failing could be identified as weak ex ante. Such weaknesses were linked to the in-
herent liquidity of their portfolios: the higher their amount of long-term illiquid assets
(in particular, mortgages) before the Depression started, the more likely they were to
fail ex post.
The first paper identifies mortgage holdings as the most important predictor of
bank failure, and explains how their intrinsic lack of liquidity came to matter more
than their low quality. The second paper zooms in on mortgage contracts themselves,
and finds that debt dilution due to the “second mortgage system” led to a lower
probability of repayment. Nevertheless, this second paper shows that increased default
rates affected banks only insofar as foreclosure was a long drawn-out process that lasted
more than eighteen months in Illinois – a great impediment to bank survival in case
of a liquidity crisis. The third paper asks whether mortgage securitization would have
solved the liquidity issue, and uncovers the extent of actual securitization taking place
at the time in Chicago. However unbinding commitments and the lack of a regulated
exchange created inefficiencies not unlike those of today.
Together these results reassert banks’ responsibility in liquidity risk management.
While credit risk continues to be an essential feature of banking, and has been recog-
nized as such, renewed attention needs to be paid to the ways in which banks manage
the inherent liquidity of their portfolios.
JEL Classification: G01, G11, G21, G32, N22
Keywords: Banking Crisis, Great Depression, Portfolio Choice, Reserves, Financial
Risk, Mortgage and Foreclosures
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Introduction
Motivation
The recent financial crisis of 2008 has raised important questions about the origins
of bank failures. While many had thought that deposit insurance would significantly
reduce the risk of bank runs and thus induce only insolvent banks to fail, banks in fact
did face massive runs on their uninsured liabilities, which contributed to the worsening
of the financial crisis. The question as to what primarily causes a bank to fail – whether
a deterioration in asset quality or funding illiquidity – has thus taken centre stage once
again, with strong implications for government policy (Bordo & Landon-Lane, 2010;
Brunnermeier, 2008; Calvo, 2013; Gorton & Metrick, 2013; Kacperczyk & Schabl, 2010;
Reinhart, 2011; Shin, 2009; Schleifer & Vishny, 2011; Stein, 2013).
On the one hand, it is often thought that if a bank’s loans and investments are of
low quality (implying a low probability of repayment on such loans), there is no good
reason for the government to provide any kind of support. Providing it with emergency
liquidity will not solve its solvency problem, and bailing it out will likely lead it to take
more risks than is collectively desirable. Bank managers should be made responsible
for their institution’s failure. On the other hand, if a bank faces a sudden run from
creditors who cannot know the precise quality of that bank’s investments, it is believed
that it may fail unjustifiably, suggesting a role for the government in providing it with
liquidity to help it meet creditors’ demands. In this case, bank managers who invested
in loans and securities with high probabilities of repayment and fail nonetheless are
1
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allegedly not to be blamed.
This thesis started out as a project to answer this question in the context of one of
the deepest economic crises in the modern world: the Great Depression. In particular,
it aimed to focus primarily on the city of Chicago, which had one of the highest urban
bank failure rates in the U.S. during this period.1 While Chicago has been the subject
of a number of studies (Calomiris & Mason, 1997; Esbitt, 1986; Guglielmo, 1998;
Thomas, 1935), none of these studies undertook to analyze the evolution of Chicago
bank portfolios over time, from 1923 to 1933. Likewise, few differentiated between
banks that failed earlier in the Depression from those that failed later. In doing both
of these things, I hoped to uncover unknown facts about the causes of bank failures
in Chicago.
Seminal work on the Great Depression claimed that most banks in the U.S. Great
Depression failed unjustifiably, due to the occurrence of widespread deposit with-
drawals. Friedman & Schwartz (1963), for instance, posited that “a contagion of fear”
among depositors spread throughout the country after the failure of Bank of United
States in New York City in December 1930. According to this view, mass withdrawals
in a series of banking crises led to security fire sales, a severe contraction of the money
supply, and eventually to the unwarranted failure of thousands of banks, up until Roo-
sevelt called for a national bank holiday in March 1933. The Federal Reserve’s role
was seen as crucial in this interpretation. Handicapped by the recent death of former
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Benjamin Strong, the Federal
Reserve found itself with no charismatic leader to manage operations and influence
other Reserve Districts away from the real bills doctrine.2 Consequently, the Banks
failed to reach consensus and often refused to expand the way the Bank of New York
would have wanted (see also Wheelock (1991) and Wicker (1996)).
While Friedman and Schwartz concentrated on monetary and banking aggregates
1Out of 193 state banks in June 1929, only 35 survived up to June 1933.
2The real bills doctrine was a pervasive ideology at the time according to which commercial banks
should only engage in short-term commercial business.
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in their study of the contraction, researchers started looking into individual bank
balance sheets as what they considered the most promising tool of investigation into
the causes of bank failures. The idea was that if a number of balance sheet items were
– together – good predictors of a bank’s failure well before the start of the downturn,
this bank should be seen as fundamentally weak ex ante. A contrast was thus drawn
between a bank’s unwarranted failure due to runs and a bank’s more justified failure,
this time due to its own weaknesses.3
White (1984), for instance, compared the national banks that failed during the first
banking crisis (November-December 1930) with those that survived,4 and found that as
far back as 1927 many financial ratios determined banks’ survival.5 He concluded that
the similarities between coefficients from year to year meant that the causes of failure
did not change significantly as banks entered the Depression, thus lending support to
Temin (1976)’s view of the first banking crisis, according to which the banks that failed
then were not so different from those that failed in the 1920s due to a fundamental
economic crisis in agriculture.6
Calomiris & Mason (2003) analysed a panel of 8,707 member banks (out of 24,504
banks in total) throughout the U.S. from 1929 to 1933, using data on individual banks
3Note, however, that in the latter case it was not always clear whether banks’ failure was deemed
to be mainly the result of bank mismanagement in setting certain ratios (eg. of loans to total assets)
or the result of a general fall in these assets’ values, or both. In all of these situations, however,
banks’ weaknesses were seen as “fundamental.”
4National banks accounted for only 12.4 percent cent of all suspensions, whereas state member and
non-member banks made up 2.4 percent and 85.2 percent of all suspensions, respectively. Member
banks are members of the Federal Reserve System, and a bank suspension occurs when a bank is
temporarily or permanently closed, as opposed to a failure which occurs when a bank will permanently
close and receivers take control of it to dissolve it. White excluded suspended banks that reopened
as they represented only a small proportion (White, 1984). Note also that White affirmed that the
causes of failure of state and national banks were generally similar, as they competed strongly with
one another in almost all parts of the country (ibid.).
5Although White did not examine their differential predictive power in detail, these ratios were:
loans and discounts to assets, cash items to total deposits, and bills payable and other liabilities to
assets.
6White also drew attention to “swollen loan portfolios” and their link to agriculture. Although
he did this informally, he explained that the banks that failed in 1930 were in agricultural areas
which suffered from the post- World War I agricultural land boom and bust. This is certainly true
at least for November 1930 failures, which occurred mainly in agricultural areas. The links between
the failure of Caldwell and Company, a Southern banking giant, and the agricultural failures that
followed still needs to be assessed. For more information on this bank see McFerrin (1939).
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at two points in time, namely December 1929 and December 1931. They applied
a survival duration model which allowed various variables (including aggregate and
regional economic indicators) to determine chances and length of survival for each bank
at various points in time. They concluded that the financial ratios indeed determined
the length of survival, at least for the first two Friedman-Schwartz crises (late 1930
and March-August 1931). The only real exception was the fourth banking crisis (early
1933) which “saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk” (ibid.).
The majority of regional balance sheet studies (four in total) have concentrated
on Chicago due to the outstanding magnitude of the Chicago failure rate. The two
oldest studies used very similar methods and obtained similar results. Both Thomas
(1935) and Esbitt (1986) found that, in general, failures had more loans on real estate,
had accumulated smaller surpluses, had fewer secondary reserves and had invested
more in bank building. More recently, Calomiris & Mason (1997) found that banks
failing during the summer 1932 crisis had more in common with other banks failing
earlier in 1932 than with survivors, thereby suggesting that widespread depositor fear
was not the primary cause of failure. These banks, in particular, had lower ratios of
reserves to demand deposits, lower ratios of retained earnings to net worth, and higher
proportions of long-term debt in December 1931. Finally, Guglielmo (1998) compared
the June 1929 balance sheets of both Chicago and Illinois survivors with all Depression
failures, using similar methods, and drew very similar conclusions.7
An important feature common to many of these studies was that banks’ weaknesses
were not always clearly defined. They usually included a range of possible acts of neg-
ligence on the part of bankers, from the setting of low capital ratios to overinvestment
in long-term loans to the maintenance of low cash reserves. This was a natural conse-
quence of these studies’ main purpose, which was to find out whether pre-Depression
7Guglielmo (1998) provided much more detail on the history of Chicago banking in the 1920s, for
instance describing at length the rise in mortgage lending, but he drew no explicit and quantitative
conclusions about the role of real estate in banks’ failure.
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balance sheet items could together efficiently predict bank failure.8 Yet concentrating
on the comparative importance of each such item seemed important to me.
One reason for focusing on the relative importance of balance sheet items was that
some of these items were in fact linked to banks’ liquidity, not just to the quality of their
investments in terms of credit risk or default probability. For example, the importance
of cash holdings in predicting bank failure was obviously linked to banks’ capacity to
meet cash withdrawals. Likewise, long-term loans could be riskier from a liquidity
point of view, because of the increased maturity mismatch. Some balance sheet items
were indeed intrinsically more liquid than others, regardless of their quality.9 In other
words, it became clear to me that if the best predictors of failure ex ante happened to
be assets whose intrinsic liquidity mattered, banks’ weaknesses in such cases could be
more clearly specified as resulting from liquidity mismanagement.
Differentiating between credit risk mismanagement and liquidity risk mismanage-
ment seems important when tackling Friedman and Schwartz’s argument that the
banks that failed were “simply” illiquid. According to Friedman and Schwartz, banks
failed unjustifiably. But if banks face depositor runs, aren’t those that are the most
prepared for such runs, that is, those that have most attended to their portfolio’s
inherent liquidity, more likely to survive? Conversely, aren’t those that have kept few
liquid assets more likely to fail? Thus, if one considers that banks should as much
as possible be able to face runs from creditors, then the question of liquidity risk
management arises.10
8As noted earlier, in some cases it was not always clear whether banks’ failure was deemed to be
mainly the result of bank mismanagement in setting certain ratios or the result of a general fall in
certain asset values, or both. For example, if the variable “other loans to total assets” was significant,
it was sometimes unclear whether banks should be blamed for having too many of such loans, or if a
general recession caused a fall in the value of those loans regardless of banks’ actions, or both.
9Of course, higher quality usually increased an asset’s liquidity if it could be sold in the secondary
market or rediscounted at the Federal Reserve, which is still the case today. Note however that
many loans at the time could not be sold in the secondary market and were not securitized, while
the Federal Reserve was notoriously reluctant to rediscount many types of different assets during the
Depression.
10Because of the natural mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities, any kind of run will
constitute a major threat to their survival (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Nevertheless, the very fact
that some banks survive runs shows that some banks can be in a better position than others to
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The question may not arise in a world of deposit insurance, where runs are sup-
posed to be unlikely. Nevertheless, the recent crisis has shown that runs can occur on
uninsured parts of the credit system (Brunnermeier, 2008; Gorton & Metrick, 2013).
Moreover, deposit insurance can increase moral hazard by inducing banks to take on
more credit risk, which itself could potentially lead to a greater risk of a run on unin-
sured items. The rise of the shadow banking system makes such runs even more likely.
Thus, taking into account the possibility of bank runs regardless of their origins, it is
important for banks to maintain as liquid portfolios as possible.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, making banks responsible for their liquidity risk
management – not just for their credit risk management – is an idea that has only
taken hold in the past few years. While it was considered an important aspect of bank
regulation from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century in the U.S., it
was then more or less abandoned, to be replaced since the 1980s with a much more
pressing focus on credit risk and, in particular, capital requirements (Calomiris, 2008;
Goodhart, 2008; Shin, 2009).
Determined to understand not just whether, but which items on Chicago banks’
balance sheets predicted their failure ex ante, I thus undertook a longitudinal study
of all Chicago state banks from 1923 to 1933. It is to the findings of my study that
I now turn. I will then move on to the implications of my results for the literature
on banking crises, for bank regulation, and for the literature on the Great Depression
more generally.
Methodology and findings
Using a range of methods and evidence, this thesis finds that all banks in Chicago
suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals. At the same time, it also finds that the
banks that failed could be identified as weak ex ante. But these weaknesses can be
withstand them.
Introduction 7
linked to the intrinsic liquidity of banks’ portfolios – indeed, the banks that failed had
significantly larger amounts of illiquid real estate loans. The proof that the illiquidity
of real estate loans, not their quality, was the real problem, lies in the fact that
mortgages had a 50 percent average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and that land values
in Chicago did not fall by more than 50 percent until 1933. These results suggest
that the banks that failed were partly responsible for their own failure, despite mass
deposit withdrawals: they had invested too much in less liquid assets.
In the first paper of the thesis I focus exclusively on Chicago state banks’ balance
sheets from 1923 to 1933, and find that illiquid mortgages were the most important
predictor of bank failure econometrically, together with deposit withdrawals. The
second paper looks more precisely into mortgage contracts, and finds that they were
conducive to low probabilities of repayment on some loans, but given the 50 percent
LTV this high default risk mattered only insofar as it took 18 months on average to
foreclose in Illinois, which made these loans particularly illiquid. In the third paper
I ask whether mortgage securitization would have solved the liquidity problem, and
find that mortgage securitization was actually conducted in Chicago to some extent.
I show however that the securitization process was inefficient. Below I provide more
detailed summaries of each paper.
Chapter 1: What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great
Depression? A Look at the 1920s
In this paper I analyze the balance sheets of all Chicago state-chartered banks from
1923 to 1933, dividing them into four ordered cohorts: the banks that failed between
January and June 1931, those that failed between January and June 1932, those that
failed between January and June 1933, and survivors. Examining banks graphically
over time, real estate loans appear to be the best predictor of failure as well as of timing
of failure. Cohorts are most clearly ordered in terms of their mortgage holdings: the
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higher a bank’s amount of mortgages, the earlier it failed. The ordering is not so clear
for other items (such as capital, reserves, stocks and bonds, and other loans). This
is confirmed econometrically through an ordered logistic model which suggests that
mortgages have the largest predictive power over time.
At the same time, all cohorts suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals through-
out the period, including survivors. What suggests that the liquidity of these loans
mattered more than their quality in predicting failure? First, it should be noted that
despite an average contract maturity of 3 to 5 years, most real estate loans were re-
newed in the 1920s, giving them a realized maturity of about 8 years. Thus, a portion
of mortgages during the Depression would not be due until a number of months or
years. Regarding mortgages that would come due, a high probability of default would
not have induced any losses on banks due to the 50 percent LTV and a fall in land
values that never exceeded 50 percent until 1933. Further evidence shows that bank
failure rates within Chicago were uncorrelated with differences in land value falls.
Finally, banks’ capital ratios are not good predictors of failure, thus indicating that
losses cannot have been the main cause of failure.
It is probable that prohibitions on branching played an important – though difficult
to quantify – role in the failure of these banks. Illinois laws only allowed unit banking,
which prevented banks from diversifying their assets both geographically and in terms
of the nature of those assets. In the paper I document the significant building boom
witnessed by Chicago in the 1920s, in which many unit banks were chartered simply
to take part in the boom. This part of the paper suggests that banks perhaps would
not have been so focused on real estate lending had they been allowed to branch in
other parts of the country.
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Chapter 2: Debt Dilution in 1920s America: Lighting the Fuse
of a Mortgage Crisis
In this second paper I zoom in on mortgage contracts themselves, drawing on docu-
mentation from the National Association of Real Estate Boards archives in Chicago.
Here I find that in spite of the 50 percent average LTV most first mortgage borrowers
could not make a 50 percent down payment, and took on a 20 to 25 percent second
mortgage from a different lender to help them make the high down payment. This
in effect increased the default risk on first mortgages due to debt dilution, itself ag-
gravated by a seniority reversal effect whereby second mortgages acquired de facto
seniority over first mortgages. The latter was the result of the better amortization
and shorter maturities of second mortgages.
This was problematic for banks only insofar as the foreclosure process in Illinois
took more than eighteen months on average – a great impediment for a bank facing a
liquidity crisis. Thanks to the 50 percent LTV, banks should not have incurred any
substantial losses on these loans. Nevertheless, it is notable that debt dilution was,
and still is, highly detrimental to credit. Albeit for different reasons than in the 1920s,
the 2000s witnessed a rise in “piggyback” mortgage lending, which allegedly led to a
similar debt dilution problem. Indeed, recent studies have shown that a large portion
of defaulted loans in the current crisis had piggybacks attached to them.
Chapter 3: Out of the Shadows: Commercial Bank Mortgage
Securitization in Great Depression Chicago
The first paper made clear that mortgages’ intrinsic lack of liquidity was what made
it most difficult for banks to be able to face deposit withdrawals. One reason why
mortgages were so illiquid was that they could not be rediscounted at the Federal
Reserve, nor could they be sold in secondary markets. Then the question arises as
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to whether the securitization of these loans would have substantially increased their
liquidity. While this in theory should have been the case, this third paper suggests
there were great inefficiencies in the way Chicago bankers experimented with mortgage
securitization.
Indeed the first thing this paper does, based on new archival evidence from various
sources, is to uncover the fact that a great number of Chicago commercial banks did
engage in some form of mortgage securitization. For instance, to lend on a large
building a bond would be issued and split into denominations as low as $100, designed
for both big and small investors. The aim was not exactly to increase the liquidity
of existing loans – rather it was to release new funds for additional loans, and, in
particular, very large loans.
Nevertheless, this paper suggests that even in this more humble securitization
endeavour conditions for efficiency were not met. Bonds were sold over the counter
and did not benefit from a regulated securities exchange. More importantly, there was
never a full legal guarantee on the part of the issuer, so that most bonds remained off-
balance sheets. The fact that these conditions were not met increased moral hazard
and induced the quality of bond issues to deteriorate over time. Perhaps for those
reasons, no secondary market for these securities ever developed in the 1920s. As will
be seen later on, those inefficiencies are not dissimilar to those affecting U.S. mortgage
securitization in the 2000s.
Implications for the literature on banking crises and
bank regulation
This thesis highlights the importance of a combination of deposit withdrawals and
illiquid investments as an explanation of bank failures. True, without any deposit
withdrawals, it is unlikely that any of these banks would have failed. Does this imply
Introduction 11
that their failure was unwarranted, and imposed unjustified social costs on the econ-
omy? This thesis suggests that the answer is no. Quite simply, it reasserts the role
of banks in managing the liquidity of their portfolios, not just their credit risk. This
is because, as the recent crisis has shown, funding illiquidity crises are likely to occur
even in the presence of deposit insurance.11
The concept of bank liquidity management is a relatively recent one.12 Although
implicit in many prewar accounts of banking crises, it has only become a research focus
in the past few years. In a world without frictions, there would be no need for banks
to manage the liquidity of their assets. The need for liquidity risk management arises
from frictions such as informational asymmetries about asset quality, which may give
rise, for instance, to bank runs (Cornett et al., 2011; Diamond & Rajan, 2011; Gatev
et al., 2009; Goodhart, 2008; LaGanga & Vento, 2009).
It is not the aim of this paper to find the origins of deposit withdrawals in Chicago
during the Depression. Two kinds of explanation have usually been put forward. On
the one hand, Diamond & Dybvig (1983) describe them as being caused by depositors
either observing a sunspot or suddenly needing an increased amount of cash. On the
other hand, Calomiris & Kahn (1991) see bank runs as a form of monitoring: unable to
costlessly value banks’ assets, depositors observing a specific shock to those assets use
runs to reveal the weakest banks.13 In Chicago, depositors in theory could know which
banks had the highest amounts of mortgages thanks to official publications of balance
sheet summaries every six months. This suggests that the cause of those withdrawals
is indeed still to be determined.
11The question of deposit insurance will be dealt with in more detail in the Conclusion of this
thesis. While some might infer from such results that deposit insurance should be extended to all
possible forms of bank liabilities, such an inference should certainly not be drawn too quickly. This
is mainly because deposit insurance provides incentives for banks to take on more credit risk, and
thus leads to increased moral hazard (Calomiris, 2010).
12The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System defines liquidity risk management as “(1)
prospectively assess[ing] the need for funds to meet obligations and (2) ensur[ing] the availability of
cash or collateral to fulfill those needs at the appropriate time by coordinating the various sources
of funds available to the institution under normal and stressed conditions.” See <http://www.
federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/liquidity_risk.htm>.
13By “weak,” they imply that banks suffered a shock to the quality and value of their assets.
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Nevertheless, in terms of the consequences of those runs, the interpretation pre-
sented in this paper contrasts with Diamond and Dybvig’s, in which bank runs are
usually undesirable phenomena causing even “healthy” banks to fail. Although in
their view “healthy” usually means “solvent,” I suggest that a solvent but particularly
illiquid bank ex ante is not necessarily healthy.
Now, of course a bank is by nature illiquid to some extent, due to its important
role in maturity transformation. Moreover, banks may find themselves particularly
illiquid due to freezing markets during crises in which asymmetric information makes
it suddenly more difficult for potential investors to buy certain products whose quality
they doubt. In the recent crisis, for instance, it became particularly difficult for banks
to sell mortgage-backed securities, let alone at a reasonable price. It is for these reasons
that central banks are often created with a mandate to provide liquidity against good
collateral in times of liquidity crisis.
Although central bank intervention in a liquidity crisis is essential, following Bage-
hot’s rule is not always an easy task. Good collateral is sometimes difficult to gauge,
especially if the underlying assets have longer term maturities, implying increased un-
certainty relative to repayment probabilities and values in the future (Goodhart, 1999,
2008). Some collateral may be good now but turn out bad in the future. Some of the
recent interventions by the Federal Reserve, for instance, have been controversial for
this reason (Bordo & Landon-Lane, 2010; Reinhart, 2011; Schleifer & Vishny, 2011;
Gorton & Metrick, 2013; Stein, 2013).
This thesis’s focus on banks’ pre-crisis weaknesses suggests a preventive role for
regulatory authorities in mitigating liquidity risk, thus making up for any lender-of-last
resort deficiencies. Possible implications for bank regulation include renewed emphasis
on cash ratios or other liquidity requirements, which were almost absent from the Basel
I and Basel II regulations (whose main focus was on capital ratios), and recently made
a comeback in the Basel III regulations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
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2008). However it is important to note that so-called liquidity coverage ratios can
lead to some confusion and to regulatory arbitrage due to their complexity. Perhaps
focusing on simple cash ratios would be a better alternative.14
Implications for the literature on the U.S. Great De-
pression
The implications of my research for the literature on the U.S. Great Depression more
generally are intimately linked to its implications for the banking literature. The
debate on the American Depression has focused to a large extent on the question as
to, put simply, whether banks deserved to fail or not. Most recent scholarship has
debated this question with relentless vigour (see, in particular, Bordo & Landon-Lane
(2010), Calomiris & Mason (1997), Calomiris & Mason (2003), Guglielmo (1998),
Richardson (2007), Temin (1976), and White (1984)). And this debate has in turn
informed the debate on the causes of bank failure more generally (Calomiris & Mason,
1997; Calomiris & Wilson, 2004).
Although this dissertation does not emphasize the importance of credit risk in the
failure of Chicago banks, it does highlight the significant role of the 1920s building
boom in providing incentives for banks to greatly invest in real estate loans (see, in
particular, Chapter 1). Unit banking may have also played a role in leading banks
to focus on the opportunities offered by the local market rather than a more regional
or even national one. In this sense, my research relates to an emerging literature on
credit booms (Eichengreen & Mitchener, 2003; Schularick & Taylor, 2012).
It is also closely related to the more recent literature on the role of real estate in
the U.S. Great Depression, which was spurred by the obvious role of mortgage lending
in the more recent crisis. Most of this research focuses on the government’s policy
14This has also been suggested by Calomiris et al. (2012), who also suggest that forcing banks to
hold extra cash may help curb their incentives to take on excessive credit risk.
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response to mortgage distress in the 1930s (Fishback et al., 2001, 2009, 2013; Rose,
2011; Wheelock, 2008).15 Nevetherless, both White (2009) and Field (2013) study the
relationship between housing and the Depression, and argue that the 1920s real estate
boom cannot have been an important cause of the following slump.
White (2009) focuses on the U.S. as a whole, and begins by documenting the
nationwide residential and commercial real estate building boom which peaked in
1926, comparing it to the 2000s boom in terms of size. Although commercial banks
were not the main lenders on real estate at the time – individuals, building and loans
(B&Ls), and mutual savings banks were – he examines in some detail the question as
to whether commercial banks may have significantly suffered from the boom and bust
too, given the importance of bank failures in the Depression. He stresses that laws
applied to nationally-chartered banks almost entirely forbade such banks to invest
in real estate, up until some time into the boom, in 1927. He concedes, however,
that since such laws did not apply to state banks, “real estate loans bulked much
larger in the portfolios of state banks.”16 Yet, he points out that most banks were
well-capitalized according to today’s standards. Moreover, citing data from Morton
(1956), he emphasizes the conservative features of commercial bank mortgage loans at
the time: their short (official) maturity and their particularly low loan-to-value ratio.
This, to him, implies both that most loans would have been repaid by 1930, and that
losses on such loans would have be quite small.
Field (2013) also tackles this question, and his arguments are quite similar to
White’s, although he lays more emphasis on the fact that the ups and downs in
real estate prices were milder than in the current crisis. Like White, he stresses
the conservatism of commercial bank mortgage loans at the time, whose LTV rarely
15Temin (1976) dwells very little on the real estate market and simply mentions that a fall in
construction may have been at the origin of the contraction. Note also that Snowden analyses the
mortgage market in the 1920s and 1930s, without attempting to determine the existence of a causal
link with the Depression (Snowden, 2003, 2010).
16Real estate loans accounted for 14 percent of assets and 23 percent of all loans in 1922, and
reached 16 percent of assets and 27 percent of all loans in 1926 (ibid).
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exceeded 50 percent and whose maturity was particularly short compared to today’s
loans. And like him, he points out that although the Chicago real estate boom is well-
known from general accounts of the Depression (see, in particular, Wicker (1996)),
Chicago probably had unique characteristics which set it apart from other cities in the
U.S..
While Chicago certainly had the greatest real estate boom and bust in the country
(along perhaps Florida), it also had one of the highest urban bank failure rates in the
country. Moreover, Chicago was only unique in its number of commercial banks taking
part in the building boom compared to other institutions. Indeed, although U.S. banks
on average were not the main mortgage lenders, Bayless & Bodfish (1928) point out
that Chicago was specific in that commercial banks supplied at least 50 percent of
the market. It is also important to note that Chicago banks’ mortgage lending terms
do not seem to have differed significantly from average lending terms in the country.
Their mortgages, like other mortgages in the country, also had a 50 percent LTV and
an official maturity of only five years or less (ibid.). In other words, if one accepts
that the Chicago bank failure rate was partly due to the city’s outstanding real estate
boom, one also needs to explain how this may have happened given the conservatism
of these mortgages.
This thesis suggests that focusing on the illiquidity of these loans provides an
answer to this question, and gives new insights into the role of mortgage lending in
banking crises. Real estate loans were illiquid because although their official maturity
was five years or less, their de facto maturity was much longer. In addition, these
loans required no amortization payments, only interest payments, and a “balloon”
payment at maturity. They could not be sold in a secondary market, nor could they
be rediscounted at the Federal Reserve. This intrinsic lack of liquidity made banks
holding a large share of mortgages particularly vulnerable to mass deposit withdrawals.
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Outline
Chapter 1 will focus on Chicago banks’ balance sheets. The focus of Chapter 2 will
be mortgage contracts. Finally, Chapter 3 will deal with commercial bank mortgage
securitization in Chicago. In the conclusion I will draw further parallels with the
recent crisis, focusing on the role of mortgage securitization as a liquidity-enhancer,
and will provide some suggestions for future research.
Chapter 1
What Caused Chicago Bank
Failures in the Great Depression?
A Look at the 1920s
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has raised significant questions about the causes of bank
failures. While many thought that deposit insurance would prevent the incidence
of bank runs and thus induce only insolvent banks to fail, bank runs did in fact
occur (on uninsured liabilities) and greatly worsened the crisis. The question as to
whether banks fail primarily because of reckless investments or because of funding
illiquidity has thus once again been at the centre of debates, with strong implications
for government policy (Bordo & Landon-Lane, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2008; Calvo, 2013;
Gorton & Metrick, 2013; Kacperczyk & Schabl, 2010; Reinhart, 2011; Shin, 2009;
Schleifer & Vishny, 2011; Stein, 2013).
On the one hand, it is commonly believed that if banks’ asset quality is low (giving
rise to low repayment probabilities on banks’ investments), there is no good reason
for the government to intervene. Providing them with emergency liquidity will not
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solve their solvency problem, and bailing them out will likely lead them to take more
risks than is collectively desirable. On the other hand, if banks face large withdrawals
despite high-quality investments (with high ex ante probabilities of repayment), their
failure is usually viewed as unjustified – suggesting a role for government intervention
in the form of liquidity provision by the central bank.
The aim of this paper is to answer this question with respect to one of the deepest
financial crises in modern times – the U.S. Great Depression. More specifically, it
focuses on the city of Chicago, which had one of the highest urban bank failure rates
in the country.1 Although other authors have focused on Chicago, this paper’s method
departs from previous research along three dimensions. First, I introduce a novel
way of examining Chicago state bank failures by separating them into three cohorts
ordered through time: June 1931 failures, June 1932 failures and June 1933 failures,
each corresponding to six-month failure windows containing both panic and non-panic
failures. Second, rather than focusing on banks’ 1929 balance sheets, I look at the
evolution of survivors and failures during the full decade from 1923 all the way up to
1933. Third, I specifically examine the relative importance of each financial ratio in
predicting failure.
This third methodological input seems particularly important, as recent balance
sheet studies of Depression bank failures usually have not specifically focused on the
comparative significance of each balance sheet ratio. Rather, they have concentrated
on examining whether any pre-Depression ratios could together successfully predict
bank failure. Such balance sheet studies naturally emerged in response to Friedman &
Schwartz (1963)’s work, which by analyzing banking aggregates suggested that banks
failed through no fault of their own, having to face mass deposit withdrawals in a series
of banking panics. The idea behind balance sheet studies was to ask whether any pre-
Depression balance sheet items could predict failure, in which case banks should better
be seen as “weak” ex ante (White, 1984; Calomiris & Mason, 1997, 2003; Esbitt, 1986;
1Out of 193 state banks in June 1929, only 35 survived up to June 1933.
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Guglielmo, 1998; Thomas, 1935).
Such studies have greatly advanced our state of knowledge on the causes of bank
failure in the Great Depression by showing that many banks indeed presented major
weaknesses prior to their failure. Nevertheless, an important feature common to many
of them was that these weaknesses were not always clearly defined. They usually
included a range of possible acts of negligence on the part of banks, from the setting
of low capital ratios to overinvestment in long-term loans to the maintenance of low
cash reserves.2
Some of these items are in fact linked to banks’ liquidity, not just to the quality
of their investment (ie. not just to their probability of default). For example, the
importance of cash holdings in predicting bank failure is obviously linked to banks’
capacity to meet cash withdrawals. Likewise, long-term loans can be riskier from a
liquidity point of view, because of the increased maturity mismatch. Some balance
sheet items are intrinsically more liquid than others, regardless of their quality. In
other words, if the best predictors of failure ex ante happen to be assets whose intrinsic
liquidity matters, banks’ weaknesses can be more clearly specified as resulting from
liquidity mismanagement.
Differentiating between credit risk management and liquidity risk management
seems important when tackling Friedman and Schwartz’s argument that the banks
that failed were simply “illiquid,” and thus failed unjustifiably. Of course, banks are by
nature illiquid to some extent, due to their important role in maturity transformation.3
But if banks face depositor runs, aren’t those that are the most prepared for such runs,
that is, those that most attended ex ante to their portfolio’s inherent liquidity, more
likely to survive? The question may not arise in a world of deposit insurance, where
2In some cases it was not always clear whether banks’ failure was deemed to be mainly the result
of bank mismanagement in setting certain ratios or the result of a general fall in certain asset values,
or both. For example, if the variable “other loans to total assets” was significant, it was sometimes
unclear whether banks should be blamed for having too many of such loans, or if a general recession
caused a fall in the value of those loans regardless of banks’ actions, or both.
3In addition, banks may find themselves particularly illiquid due to freezing markets during crises
in which investors doubt the quality of certain assets and refuse to buy them at their original price.
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runs are supposed to be unlikely. Nevertheless, the recent crisis has shown that runs
can occur on uninsured parts of the banking system (Brunnermeier, 2008; Gorton &
Metrick, 2013). Moreover, deposit insurance can increase moral hazard by inducing
banks to take on more credit risk, which itself would potentially lead to a greater risk
of a run on uninsured items.
This paper’s principal finding is that real estate loan holdings are the best predictor
of failure as well as of timing of failure. Examining cohorts of bank failures graphically
through time, it appears that they are most clearly ordered in terms of their mortgage
holdings: the higher a bank’s amount of mortgages, the earlier it failed. The ordering
is not so clear for other items (such as capital, reserves, stocks and bonds, and other
loans). This is confirmed econometrically by an ordered logistic model, which suggests
that mortgages have the largest predictive power.
At the same time, this paper also shows that all cohorts suffered tremendous de-
posit withdrawals throughout the period, including survivors. It therefore emphasizes
mortgages’ inherent lack of liquidity as a determinant risk factor. The quality of mort-
gages cannot have mattered significantly, for three reasons. First, most mortgages had
a 50 percent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, while land values did not fall by more than
50 percent in Chicago until 1933. This means that banks cannot have incurred any
significant losses on defaulting loans. Second, although mortgages had short contract
maturities (three to five years), most of these loans were renewed in good times, cre-
ating renewal expectations and increasing their de facto maturity. Long maturities,
the absence of secondary markets and the inability for these loans to be rediscounted
at the Federal Reserve meant that they were inherently less liquid than other types
of loans. Third, I show that sectoral differences in land values within Chicago did not
have a differential impact on bank failure rates.
The view that illiquid assets were the cause of the crisis is supported by evidence
that all banks engaged in fire sales. In this process, mortgages could not be liquidated.
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Indeed, real estate loans increased as a share of total assets for all banks during the
Depression, at the same time as assets as a whole were declining. Other types of loans,
such as loans on collateral security and “other loans,” were promptly liquidated.
It is not the aim of this paper to find the origins of deposit withdrawals in Chicago
during the Depression. Two kinds of explanation have usually been put forward. On
the one hand, Diamond & Dybvig (1983) describe them as being caused by depositors
either observing a sunspot or suddenly needing an increased amount of cash.4 On the
other hand, Calomiris & Kahn (1991) see bank runs as a form of monitoring: unable
to costlessly value banks’ assets, depositors observing a specific shock to those assets
use runs to reveal the weakest banks.5 In Chicago, depositors in theory could know
which banks had the highest amounts of mortgages thanks to official publications of
balance sheet summaries every six months. This suggests that the cause of those mass
withdrawals is indeed still to be determined.
In terms of the consequences of those runs, the interpretation presented in this pa-
per contrasts with Diamond and Dybvig’s, in which bank runs are usually undesirable
phenomena causing even “healthy” banks to fail. Although in their view “healthy”
usually means “solvent,” I suggest that a solvent but particularly illiquid bank ex ante
is not necessarily healthy.
Such findings suggest significant policy implications from a regulatory point of
view. While not excluding an important role for lenders of last resort as a within-
crisis solution, emphasis on banks’ long-term investments in illiquid assets implies a
role for regulatory authorities in crisis prevention. Such regulatory measures may
include, for instance, renewed emphasis on cash ratios or other liquidity requirements.
This is all the more important given that central banks cannot always precisely predict
the quality of banks’ collateral (especially in the case of assets maturing at a much
later date), making their task a highly complex (and thus possibly imperfect) one
4Note that this increased need for cash could be one of the consequences of the Depression.
5By “weak,” they imply that banks suffered a shock to the quality and value of their assets.
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(Goodhart, 2010).
Making banks responsible for their liquidity risk management – not just for their
credit risk management – is an idea that has only taken hold in the past few years
(Goodhart, 2008). While it was considered an important aspect of bank regulation
from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century in the U.S., it was then
more or less abandoned, to be replaced by a much more pressing focus on credit risk,
and, in particular, capital requirements, since the 1980s. Liquidity requirements were
indeed almost absent from the Basel I and Basel II regulations, and only recently made
a comeback in the Basel III regulations.6
The results of this paper also suggest a reassessment of the role of real estate in
the Great Depression. Chicago is well-known for its real estate boom in the 1920s,
one that resembled both in character and magnitude the suburban real estate booms
of some of the major cities of the American East North Central and Middle-Atlantic
regions.7 Given that the former region had one of the highest numbers of suspensions
in the U.S., the close connection between bank failures and the real estate booms seems
worth investigating.8 The link between real estate and the Depression is probably not
a direct one, in the sense that the direct contribution of real estate to the decline in
economic activity was small. A number of recent papers have demonstrated that, in
the aggregate, the role of real estate in the Great Depression was indeed minor.9 This
paper assesses the indirect, probably larger contribution that real estate made to the
deepening of the Great Depression via the banking channel. Analysis of the second
6However it is important to note that so-called liquidity-coverage ratios can lead to some confusion
and to regulatory arbitrage due to their complexity. Perhaps focusing on simple cash ratios would
be a better alternative.
7These were commonly used census regions. The Chicago boom can be compared in particular to
those of Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia (see Wicker, 1996, pp. 16,18), and Toledo (Messer-Kruse,
2004). See also Allen (1931).
8The East North Central region (which contains Chicago) had 2,770 suspensions in total between
1930 and 1933 (the term “suspension” refers to temporary or permanent bank failure, as opposed to
“failure” which refers only to the latter category). Only the agricultural states of the West North
Central region surpass this number with a total of 3,023 suspensions (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1937, p. 868). Note that the state of Pennsylvania also had a particularly
high failure rate (ibid.).
9See, in particular, White (2009), and Field (2013).
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largest city in the U.S. in 1930 points to a powerful relationship between real estate
lending and commercial bank failures in the Great Depression.10
Section 1.2 reviews the literature on banks’ fundamental troubles during the U.S.
Great Depression. Section 1.3 introduces the data and empirical approach adopted in
this study. Section 1.4 presents empirical results on the relative importance of financial
ratios and on deposit losses. Section 1.5 focuses on the role of mortgages’ illiquidity
in the crisis. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
This section provides a more precise overview of the literature on the Great De-
pression. The seminal work on the Depression was undoubtedly that of Friedman
& Schwartz (1963), who emphasized a “contagion of fear” among depositors, which
spread throughout the country after the failure of Bank of United States in New York
City in December 1930. According to this view, mass deposit withdrawals occurred in
a series of four banking panics until Roosevelt called a national bank holiday in March
1933. The money supply fell by one-third, due to a decrease in the deposit-currency
ratio, which led to fire sales of securities and eventually to the failure of thousands of
banks. The Federal Reserve’s role was seen as crucial in this interpretation, since it
generally failed to increase the amount of liquidity available in the system (see also
Wheelock (1991) and Wicker (1996)). In a similar vein, Richardson & Troost (2009)
found that the more expansionary policies characterizing the Atlanta Federal Reserve
Bank led to lower bank failure rates in its District than the more timid policies of the
St Louis District in the same state, Mississippi (see also Richardson (2007)).
Following in the footsteps of Temin (1976), White (1984), on the other hand, com-
pared the balance sheets of the national banks that failed during the first banking crisis
10Chicago was home to 3,376,438 dwellers in 1930, as compared to New York City’s population of
6,930,446 (Carter et al., 2006, Series Aa1-5).
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(November-December 1930) with those of the banks that survived.11 He found that
as far back as 1927 many financial ratios determined banks’ survival. He concluded
that the similarities between coefficients from year to year meant that the causes of
failure did not change significantly as banks entered the Depression. This study thus
delivered crucial results as to the possibility of banks’ fundamental troubles, and pre-
sented important information regarding the continuity of banks’ conditions from the
onset of the slump up to and including the first banking crisis.12
Calomiris & Mason (2003) analysed a panel of 8,707 member banks (out of 24,504
banks in total) from 1929 to 1933, using data on individual banks at two points in time,
namely December 1929 and December 1931. They applied a survival duration model
which allowed various variables (including aggregate and regional economic indicators)
to determine chances and length of survival for each bank at various points in time.
They concluded that the financial ratios indeed determined the length of survival, at
least for the first two Friedman-Schwartz crises (late 1930 and March-August 1931).
The only real exception was the fourth banking crisis (early 1933) which “saw a large
unexplained increase in bank failure risk” (ibid.).
The majority of regional balance sheet studies (four in total) have concentrated on
Chicago due to the outstanding magnitude of the Chicago failure rate. The two oldest
studies used very similar methods and obtained similar results. While Thomas (1935)
compared the June 1929 balance sheets of survivors with 1931 failures, Esbitt (1986)
11National banks accounted for only 12.4 percent of all suspensions, whereas state member and
non-member banks made up 2.4 percent and 85.2 percent of all suspensions, respectively. Member
banks are members of the Federal Reserve System, and a bank suspension occurs when a bank is
temporarily or permanently closed, as opposed to a failure which occurs when a bank will permanently
close and receivers take control of it to dissolve it. White excluded suspended banks that reopened
as they represented only a small proportion (White, 1984). Note also that White affirms that the
causes of failure of state and national banks were generally similar, as they competed strongly with
one another in almost all parts of the country (ibid.).
12White also drew attention to “swollen loan portfolios” and their link to agriculture. Although he
did this informally, he explained that the banks that failed in 1930 were in agricultural areas which
suffered from the post- World War I agricultural land boom and bust. Note that the links between
the November 1930 failure of Caldwell and Company, the investment banking giant of the South, and
the agricultural failures that followed still needs to be assessed. For more information on this bank
see McFerrin (1939).
Chapter 1. What Caused Chicago Bank Failures? 25
analysed the 1927, 1928 and 1929 portfolios of 1930, 1931 and 1932 failures. Both
found that, in general, failures had more loans on real estate, had accumulated smaller
surpluses, had fewer secondary reserves and had invested more in bank building. More
recently, Calomiris & Mason (1997) found that banks failing during the summer 1932
crisis had more in common with other banks failing earlier in 1932 than with survivors,
thereby suggesting that widespread depositor fear was not the primary cause of failure.
These banks, in particular, had lower ratios of reserves to demand deposits, lower
ratios of retained earnings to net worth, and higher proportions of long-term debt
in December 1931. The also lost more deposits in 1931. Finally, Guglielmo (1998)
compared the June 1929 balance sheets of both Chicago and Illinois survivors with all
Depression failures, using similar methods, and drew very similar conclusions.13
Some studies have also emerged focusing on the role of real estate in the U.S.
Depression. Most of this research examines the government’s policy response to mort-
gage distress in the 1930s (Fishback et al., 2001, 2009, 2013; Rose, 2011; Wheelock,
2008).14 A number of these studies emphasize the role of the Depression in causing
many building and loan (B&L) institutions to fail. Although commercial banks on
average were not the main mortgage lenders – individuals, B&Ls, and mutual savings
banks were –, Bayless & Bodfish (1928) point out that Chicago was specific in that
commercial banks supplied at least 50 percent of the market. Both White (2009) and
Field (2013) study the relationship between housing and the Depression, tackling the
role of commercial banks in particular, and argue that the 1920s real estate boom
cannot have been an important cause of the following slump. Some of their most
important arguments will be examined below.
13Guglielmo (1998) provides much more detail on the history of Chicago banking in the 1920s, for
instance describing at length the rise in mortgage lending, but he draws no explicit and quantitative
conclusions about the role of real estate in banks’ failure.
14Temin (1976) dwells very little on the real estate market and simply mentions that a fall in
construction may have been at the origin of the contraction. Note also that Snowden analyzes the
mortgage market in the 1920s and 1930s, without attempting to determine the existence of a causal
link with the Depression (Snowden, 2003, 2010).
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1.3 Data and empirical approach
The analytical core of this research will consist in tracing the evolution of the 131
state bank balance sheets (by cohort) from June 1923 to June 1933 of both Great
Depression survivors and failures.
1.3.1 Sources
There are two main sources of data that are detailed enough for this kind of study. The
most complete one is the semi-annual Statements of State Banks of Illinois. Published
by the Illinois Auditor of Public Accounts, they focus solely on state-chartered banks
(both members and non-members of the Federal Reserve System). Banks generally
reported in June and December of each year, which allows me to look at balance
sheets in all years from 1923 up 1933 for the first time.15 The full dataset includes the
following data points: December 1923, December 1924, June 1925, June 1926, June
1927, June and December 1928, June and December 1930, June and December 1931,
June and December 1932 and June 1933. All Statements give asset book values.16
The second main source of data used for this study was the Rand McNally Bankers
Directory. This is a recognized source for tracking down bank name changes and
consolidations (see Appendix 1.7.1 for more detail) .
15The NBER defines the early 1920s recession as going from the spring of 1920 to the summer of
1921. However, James (1938, p. 939) and Hoyt (1933, p. 236) see the real recovery only start in early
1922. Those years are not analyzed here as financial ratios would likely reflect the effects of this
recession, which is not the subject of this study. At any rate, many of the banks that went through
the Great Depression did not yet exist at that time, so the main analysis will focus on the 1923-1933
period. For example, of the 46 June 1931 failures only 18 existed in May 1920, whereas 28 of them
already existed by December 1923.
16See Section 1.5.1 and Appendix 1.7.1 for information on national banks and reasons for their
exclusion from this study.
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Survivors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
June 1931 Fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
June 1932 Fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
June 1933 Fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
1.3.2 Cohorts
For the analysis of the Great Depression banks have been divided into four groups:
survivors, June 31 failures, June 32 failures, June 33 failures. The survivor category
tracks down each bank and only includes the banks present at every point in time
from June 1929 to June 1933. This system allows me to keep the same sample size
over the Depression period (more on sample sizes below).17
The choice of the windows of failure was necessarily somewhat arbitrary but not
entirely so. Chicago faced banking crises especially in the spring of 1931 and in the
spring and early June of 1932 (Wicker, 1996, pp. 68-9, 112). Thus selecting the banks
that failed between January and June 1931 and banks that failed between January
and June 1932 allows me to include banks that were especially affected by banking
crises as well as non-panic failures, so as not to bias the samples in a way that would
include more of the latter.18
17For the same reason it is reasonable to make each cohort “exclusive” in the sense that each cohort
excludes the banks that failed before the “window of failure” for the whole cohort. For example, the
June 1931 exclusive cohort does not include banks that had failed by December 1930. It only includes
banks that had survived until December 1930 and failed between the start of 1931 and June of that
year.
18No cohort was included for 1930 as the wave of bank failures following that of Caldwell and Com-
pany in November 1930 was confined to the Southern regions of Tennessee, Arkansas and Kentucky,
while the failure of Bank of United States in December 1930 in New York did not lead to a panic at
the time (Wicker, 1996, p. 58). On the other hand, the early 1933 crisis was nationwide, prompting
me to analyze the few banks that failed in Chicago at the time (Wicker, 1996, p. 108) – although
some may argue that many of these banks failed for exogenous reasons (many of these closures where
ordered by the government). In general, while some banks failed before - and between - these cohorts,
I selected the cohorts that seemed most important to explain Chicago bank failures.
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Table 1.1 shows the different cohorts and the corresponding reporting dates. It
should be noted that for each cohort (except for survivors) there is never a data point
for the date by which banks failed. This is logical: as the banks no longer exist there
is no data for these banks. Thus, for instance, the June 1931 failure curve will stop in
December 1930, the June 1932 failure curve stops in December 1931, and so on.
For the 1923-1928 analysis there is a data point for banks from a particular cohort
which existed then. Often some of the banks that were part of a cohort were not
present in every year from 1923 to 1928. For example, there were 46 June 1931
failures, but only 39 of them were present in June 1926.19 The variation in sample
sizes will not directly affect the econometric analysis of the pre-1929 period as ordered
logistic regression only uses cross-sections in one particular year. Table 1.2 shows the
sample sizes for each cohort at various points in time.20
1.3.3 Consolidations
Note first that some banks were closed at some point during the Depression and then
reopened. As Table 1 indicates, such banks were excluded from the Depression samples
(there were very few of them) as was also done by White (1984). Including them in
the analysis did not significantly change the results.
A consolidation was “the corporate union of two or more banks into one bank
which continued operations as a single business entity and under a single charter”
(Richardson, 2007). During the Depression, mergers were pointed out as “shotgun
19This number may fluctuate between December 1923 and June December 1928 as, say, a fall from
40 to 39 banks may occur twice if different banks have appeared and disappeared. (In some rare
instances a bank could temporarily close and re-open; this happened for a few banks especially around
June 1926.) I could have chosen to reduce the whole cohort sample to 28 banks (since this is the
lowest number of banks for this cohort in the 1920s) but I give priority to full population study in
the years of the Depression itself. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this may cause the
variation in results between years to increase, especially for the June 1933 failures whose sample size
is never over 12 banks in this period.
20Note that in the regression models below sample sizes may not exactly equal those shown here.
The reason is that some of these banks lacked data for some particular explanatory variables (includ-
ing, for instance, such crucial variables as total deposits) and were thus automatically excluded by
the statistical software.
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Dec 1923 28 28 27 7
Dec 1924 30 37 31 8
June 1925 31 38 30 8
June 1926 32 39 34 9
June 1927 31 40 34 9
June 1928 33 44 36 11
Dec 1928 31 41 35 12
June 1929 35 46 36 14 0 0
Dec 1929 35 46 36 14 7 7
June 1930 35 46 36 14 6 12
Dec 1930 35 46 36 14 7 19
June 1931 35 46 36 14 24 43
Dec 1931 35 46 36 14 10 53
June 1932 35 46 36 14 18 72
Dec 1932 35 46 36 14 3 74
June 1933 35 46 36 14 9 83
Notes: The 193 banks in total for June 1929 mentioned in the sixth column and in the
introduction include those that are not part of any cohort, eg. those that failed between
the chosen windows of failure. The actual bank total for June 1929 as the sum of each
cohort is 131. Source: Statements of State Banks of Illinois.
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weddings,” as opposed to takeovers which were part of the “purge and merge system”
(James, 1938, p. 994). Both of these operations (merger and takeover) are usually
considered in the literature as a major sign of weakness. I follow Calomiris & Mason
(2003) in counting as failures banks that were taken over by other banks. This occurred
in 14 cases from June 1929, though the results are robust to a different treatment.
The treatment of mergers that ended up failing can be trickier as it is not clear
which of the two parties in the merger was the weakest. A healthy bank may have
merged with a less healthy bank which may have dragged the former into bankruptcy.
So instead of categorizing such mergers as a failure of both banks at the time of merger,
when possible both banks were kept alive by splitting the merger’s balance sheet in
proportional parts until the merger failed. Only one merger survived, the Central
Republic Bank and Trust Co. For this bank the same procedure was adopted except
that the bank was kept alive until the end.21 Appendix 1.7.1 provides more detail on
each merger, on the fate of Continental Illinois, and on name changes.
1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 Ex ante balance sheet ratios
This section examines some of the most important ratios related to bank health.
Note that geometric means are used throughout.22
Figure 1.1 shows the share of real estate loans (both residential and commercial) to
total assets by cohort from 1923 onwards.23 In the pre-Depression era, survivors often
21The results are robust either way.Calomiris & Mason (1997) emphasize that “Central Republic
was a solvent bank saved from failure by the collective intervention of other Loop banks.” This can
be considered as controversial however, as several sources point to political motives for its rescue (see
in particular Vickers (2011)).
22Geometric means have been shown to be the most representative measure of financial ratios in the
financial accounting literature (see, in particular, Lev & Sunder (1979), Mcleay & Trigueiros (2002),
and Tippett (1990)). This is because financial ratios often have a right skew, and are rarely normally
distributed, which was indeed the case with most of my financial ratios. I thank Mark Tippett for
extensive statistical advice on the study of financial ratios.
23There is no decomposition of real estate loans on the books of Chicago state banks.



















1922h1 1924h1 1926h1 1928h1 1930h1 1932h1 1934h1
halfyearly
Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.1: Real estate loans to total assets (all categories)
Source: Statements.
had the lowest mortgage share during most of the 1920s, followed closely by June
1933 failures.24 June 1932 failures had a substantially higher share, and the June
1931 failures share was even higher. Interestingly, some form of divergence between
June 1932 failures and survivors from around 1926 onwards is also noticeable, and this
difference becomes significantly larger starting in June 1928. This is evidence that the
banks which failed earlier were those that had invested more in real estate loans as
early as 1923. In other words, the share of mortgages at least partly explains not only
the event of failure but also its timing.25 The question is of course to what extent this
was the case, and the econometric analysis provided below will seek to give an answer.
The rise in the share of real estate loans after June 1929 is not surprising as most
banks suffered a large fall in total assets (see Figure 1.14 in Appendix 1.7.5). It will
be seen later on that other kinds of assets however declined as a share of total assets
24Note that June 1933 failures may have failed for reasons other than pure market discipline, as
many were closed during the national bank holiday in March 1933.
25When examining these graphs, it will often appear that a large gap between any cohort and
survivors signifies that the variable is a good predictor of failure. A gap between failing cohorts
themselves means that it is a good predictor of time of failure.
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during the Depression, indicating that real estate loans were more difficult to liquidate.
Regarding the size effect, it is interesting to note that four of the five largest state
banks in Chicago were survivors, and each of these four banks had a particularly low
ratio of real estate loans to total assets, even compared to the survivors average: in
June 1929 Continental Illinois had .7 percent, Central Trust Company of Illinois around
2 percent, Harris Trust and Savings .05 percent, and the Northern Trust Company
.7 percent.26 The fifth largest bank was part of the latest failure cohort, and had a
larger share invested in real estate (around 11 percent), which is representative of this
cohort’s average at the time.27
Although no other balance sheet item is as clearly graphically ordered as mortgage
holdings (see Figure 1.2 in this section, Figures 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 in Section 1.5.2,
and Figures 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13 in Appendix 1.7.2), it is necessary to test the pre-
cise importance of each variable econometrically. A simple way to do so is to introduce
an ordered logistic model, which for this study presents several advantages over other
estimation procedures. While in binary logistic models the outcome variable can only
take one of two values (“survivor” or “failure”), ordered logistic regression allows the
outcome variable to include several categories of failure, as well as the survivor one.
And while a discrete-time hazard framework necessarily takes into account within (ie.
post-1929) Depression variables, ordered logistic models allow one to focus exclusively
on the impact of pre-Depression variables on the outcome.28 This matters because
external shocks may affect bank variables during the Depression, whereas ex ante
variables are more likely to reflect banks’ pre-Depression portfolio decisions, which are
the subject of this study. Nevertheless I report discrete-time hazard estimations in
26See also Appendix 1.7.5 on bank size.
27One may also wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total assets may have substan-
tially weakened banks. Appendix 1.7.6 deals with mortgage growth rates.
28A discrete-time hazard model necessarily includes time-varying covariates up until the time of fail-
ure or censoring, which in this dataset occurred mainly during, not before, the Depression. Although
it is in theory possible to test the significance of pre-Depression variables by adding interactions with
time dummies, it is not possible to do so with this dataset as the hazard rate is very often zero prior
to 1929. A hazard rate of zero means that time dummies will perfectly predict failure, which leads
to such dummies being automatically omitted from the model.
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Table 1.3: Variable definitions
Variable Description
failure type ordinal dependent variable (1: June 1931 failure; 2:
June 1932 failure; 3: June 1933 failure; 4: Survivor)
size log (total assets)
capital capital÷ total assets
reserve dep (cash balances + due from other banks)÷
(demand deposits + time deposits + due to other banks)
gvtbds government bonds÷ total assets
secloans loans on security collateral÷ total assets
mortgages real estate loans (all categories)÷ total assets
other re other real estate÷ total assets
othloans other loans÷ total assets
bankhouse banking house÷ total assets
rearngs retained earnings÷ total capital
age dummy 1 = existed in May 1920;
0 = did not exist in May 1920
Notes: All variables except for size and age have been multiplied by 100
to ease interpretation of the odds ratios. The variable mortgages con-
tains both residential and commercial mortgages as no decomposition was
available on the original bank statements.
Appendix 1.7.3 for reference.
The dependent variable in the ordered logit model is thus an ordinal variable
(failure type) in which each category represents a bank’s failure type. The categories
are ordered so that the first category is June 1931 failure (1), the second category is
June 1932 failure (2), the third category is June 1933 failure (3), and the last category
is Survivor (4). Formally, I estimate a probabilistic model of bank failure such that
failure type = α + β1size+ β2capital + β3reserve dep+ β4gvtbds+ β5secloans
+β6mortgages+ β7other re+ β8othloans+ β9bankhouse
+β10rearngs+ β11age+ 
(1.1)
where size is a value of bank size, capital is the capital ratio, reserve dep is the reserve-
deposit ratio, gvtbds is the share of U.S. government bonds, secloans represents loans
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on security collateral (short-term loans backed by stock-market securities), mortgages
is the share of real estate loans, other re is the share of repossessed real estate after
foreclosure, othloans is the share of other loans, bankhouse is the share banking house,
furniture and fixtures (bank expenses), rearngs is retained earnings to net worth (a
common measure of bank profitability),29 and age is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
bank already existed in May 1920 and zero otherwise. The precise description of each
variable is given in Table 1.3.
Table 1.4 presents the results for this model, in odds ratios. Each column represents
a separate regression in which predictors are restricted to one particular year. For
instance, the 1923 column helps find out which 1923 variables best predict failure
during the Depression.
Clearly, many ratios predict failure quite well throughout the pre-Depression pe-
riod. In particular, government bonds, other loans and especially retained earnings to
net worth significantly each reduce the likelihood of failure. The relative importance
of the latter is also illustrated in Figure 1.2, which is quite reminiscent of that of real
estate loans, and is interesting in that the last failing cohort behaves quite differently
from survivors after 1926.
Of greater interest is the role of the real estate loan share. This variable stands
out as the most significant one overall. Already in December 1923, for a one percent
increase in the proportion of mortgages to total assets, the odds of surviving versus
failing (all failure categories combined) were .94 times lower, holding other variables
constant in the model.30 This coefficient retains its significant predictive power com-
pared to all other variables throughout the 1920s, up until the eve of the Depression
(June 1929). No other variables is as consistently significant as the real estate loan
29On 1929 financial statements retained earnings appear in the form of “undivided profits” or “the
volume of recognized accumulated profits which have not yet been paid out in dividends.” See Rodkey
(1944, p. 108) and Van Hoose (2010, p. 12).
30Recall that all ratio variables were multiplied by 100. This makes interpretation of the odds
ratios more practical, as a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable can now be interpreted as a
“one percent” increase in the original proportion. An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood
of survival, whereas an odds ratio below one decreases it.
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size 1.620 1.421 1.207 1.708** 1.568 1.206 1.120 1.196
(.56) (.43) (.29) (.49) (.46) (.31) (.28) (.27)
capital 1.027 .978 1.059 1.026 1.051 1.057 1.056 1.020
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
reserve dep 1.036 1.037 1.059 .988 .935 .965 .970 1.007
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.02)
gvtbds 1.070* 1.044 1.070* 1.046 1.048 1.070 1.061 1.141**
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
secloans .987 1.020 1.025 .999 1.035 1.030 1.044** 1.023
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
mortgages .937** .928** .951* .919*** .940** .940** .930** .927***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
other re .985 1.037 .937 .560** .477* .670 .568 .776
(.12) (.09) (.12) (.15) (.20) (.23) (.24) (.18)
othloans 1.012 .971 .969* .978 .951** .973 .938** 1.003
(.02) (.02) (.02) (02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
bankhouse .961 1.000 .939 1.072 .992 .922 .940 1.003
(.08) (.08) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.06)
rearngs .995 1.030 1.025 1.057** 1.068** 1.035 1.036 1.060**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03)
age .828 1.103 1.334 1.294 1.664 2.189* 3.249** (1.290)
(.49) (.55) (.64) (.64) (.80) (1.00) (1.55) (.55)
n 86 102 103 111 112 122 116 128
Prob > chi2 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Likelihood -98.78 -109.87 -111.91 -119.98 -116.85 -135.62 -125.21 -140.32
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. The
dependent variable (failure type) is an ordinal one, ordered in the following way: 1. June 1931
failure; 2. June 1932 failure; 3. June 1933 failure; 4. Survivor. Each column represents a
separate model run with variables taken each year before the start of the Depression. The
table shows odds ratios, with standard errors based on the original coefficients in parentheses.
An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio below one
decreases it. Each variable except for size and age has been multiplied by 100 so that a one
unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements.















1922h1 1924h1 1926h1 1928h1 1930h1 1932h1 1934h1
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Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.2: Retained earnings to net worth
Source: Statements.
share throughout the period.31
31The relative insignificance of other re will be explained in more detail in Section 1.5.2.
Chapter 1. What Caused Chicago Bank Failures? 37
1.4.2 Deposit losses
This subsection takes a closer look at the liability side of the balance sheet (in
particular, deposit losses). Key variables used here are the cumulative rates of decline
in deposits32 from June 1929 to December 1930 (just before the first failure cohort
drops out), from June 1929 to December 1931 (just before the second failure cohort
drops out), and from June 1929 to December 1932 (just before the third one drops
out). Note that the data on deposits come from the last call before failure, which
for some failures was almost six months before their failure date. As both 1931 and
1932 panics occurred in April and/or June, this means that on average, for banks that











































































Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.3: Mean cumulative growth rate of total deposits (base time: June 1929)
Source: Statements.
Clearly, all banks lost tremendous amounts of deposits. In 1930 the first failure
32Total deposits include demand deposits, time deposits and due to other banks.
33A survival model for the liability side is available in Appendix 1.7.7. It confirms the importance
of deposit losses in predicting failure, while rejecting any significant role for capital.
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cohort lost on average 22 percent of deposits, and from 1930 to 1931 the second, third
and survivor cohorts lost respectively 59 percent, 43 percent and 37 percent. Figure
1.3 shows the cumulative growth rate of total deposits, and Table 1.5 shows each co-
hort mean as well as tests of differences between them. In this table, it appears that
the difference in deposit losses between this first failure cohort and survivors is only
borderline significant, and is not significant when comparing to other failure cohorts.
On the other hand, the magnitude of the second failure cohort’s withdrawals signifi-
cantly differs from survivors’.34 Yet even in this case deposit losses were very large for
survivors (around 37 percent compared to 59 percent for June 1932 failures). By June
1932, survivors themselves had lost an outstanding 60 percent of total deposits.35 To-
gether these results suggest that while mortgages remain essential to explain Chicago
bank failures, the role of mass deposit withdrawals cannot be disregarded.
Now, the causes of these large withdrawals in preceding non-panic windows are
open to debate. Tentative answers may be found in the literature on bank runs.
According to Diamond & Dybvig (1983), bank runs are undesirable equilibria in which
borrowers observe random shocks (sunspots) and withdraw their deposits, thus causing
even “healthy” banks to fail. Others, such as Calomiris & Gorton (1991) and Calomiris
& Kahn (1991), have stressed the role of signal extraction in the context of asymmetric
information between depositors and bank managers. In this view, depositors observe
a specific shock to banks’ assets, but do not know which banks have been most hit.
They therefore run on all banks, which causes only the weaker banks to fail. Bank runs
thus act as a form of monitoring: unable to costlessly value banks’ assets, borrowers
use runs to reveal the unhealthy banks.
In Chicago, depositors in theory could know which banks had the highest amounts
34Note that these figures differ slightly from Calomiris & Mason (1997)’s as their sample included
national banks as well. Their survivor category also includes my June 1933 Failures cohort.
35Note that some central-reserve city banks in the Loop, most of which ended up surviving, bene-
fited from an inflow of deposits in the summer 1931 crisis as outlying banks closed and some of the
money was redeposited in the Loop banks (see, in particular, Mitchener & Richardson (2013) and
U.S. Congress (1934b, part 2, p. 1062)). Despite such inflows their total cumulative deposit losses
were very large, as Figure 1.3 suggests.
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Table 1.5: Tests of differences between mean deposit growth rates
Survivors June
1931
June 1932 June 1933
(1) (2) (3) (1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Mean -.08 -.37 -.59 -.22 -.17 -.59 -.00 -.43 -.63












-.527 .472 .366 -1.606 -1.288 -1.550
Observations 35 46 36 14
Notes: * significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, *** significant at α = 0.10.
(1) June 1929 - Dec 1930 cumulative deposit losses;
(2) June 1929 - Dec 1931 cumulative deposit losses;
(3) June 1929 - Dec 1932 cumulative deposit losses.
First row gives the mean deposit growth rates (standard errors in parentheses). Next rows give
t-statistics of differences between two means. Source: Statements.
of mortgages thanks to official publications of balance sheet summaries every six
months. This suggests that the initial cause of withdrawals is indeed still to be found.
Nevertheless, the fact that differences in withdrawals did widen to some extent af-
ter June 1931 may be explained by a learning effect on the part of creditors. As
creditors witnessed withdrawals and the failure of banks with the largest amounts of
mortgages in the first episode, they withdrew more from banks with larger amounts of
such assets subsequently. However this information effect cannot entirely explain, for
instance, why survivors themselves ended up losing nearly 60 percent of their deposits.
So why did mortgages matter so much in practice, given large deposit withdrawals?
Did banks fail simply because they had a particularly large share of illiquid mortgages,
or because of the particularly low quality (in terms of underlying values) of these
mortgages? It is to this question that I now turn.
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1.5 The role of mortgages
The aim of this section is to explain the importance of mortgages as a determi-
nant of bank failure. It will start by giving some background information on the
Chicago building boom of the 1920s, which explains the large share of mortgages on
banks’ portfolios. It will then move on to an exposition of the reasons why mortgages’
illiquidity came to be more problematic than their low quality.
1.5.1 Unit banking and the Chicago building boom
Already in August 1929, an article published in the Chicago Tribune entitled
“Claim Illinois is Overloaded with Banks” expressed concern that too many banks
were in operation for too small a number of people (Chicago Tribune, n.d.). And,
according to James, “[these banks’] soundness was intimately related to the building
boom” (James, 1938, p. 953).
The boom itself was the result of circumstances created by World War I. On the
one hand, a near wartime embargo on building material and labour created a housing
shortage which realtors were eager to compensate for after the war (U.S. Congress,
1921). On the other hand, the war led to a substantial boom in agricultural goods
and land, which quickly gave way to a deep recession in farming areas when the war
came to an end. As a flourishing business centre lying next to the vast but weakened
agricultural lands of the Midwest, Chicago profited from this situation perhaps more
than any other city in the U.S.
The excitement that the progress in economic activity and the near-constant arrival
of new dwellers in search of higher wages brought to the city led to an extremely fast
development of credit (James, 1938, p. 939). Eichengreen & Mitchener (2003) stress
the interaction between the structure of the financial sector and the business boom.
While the rapid growth of installment credit first started with nonbank institutions,36
36For example, in 1919 General Motors established the General Motors Acceptance Corporation
























































































Figure 1.4: Annual amount of new buildings in Chicago
Source: Hoyt (1933, p.475).
very quickly many sorts of financial institutions ended up competing for consumers’
credit.
One of the consequences of this credit expansion in Chicago was the boom in
construction activity.37 The Chicago real estate boom was excessive in the sense that
it reflected predictions of population increase that went far beyond the actual increase.
Hoyt shows how as Chicago’s population started growing at an unusually rapid rate
investors imagined that a “new era” was born and that Chicago would grow to 18
million by 1974 (Hoyt, 1933, p. 403).38 While from 1918 to 1926 the population
of Chicago increased by 35 percent, the number of lots subdivided in the Chicago
Metropolitan Region increased by 3,000 percent (ibid., p. 237).39 But a population
slowdown occurred in 1928, just before the start of the Depression. Figure 1.4 shows
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that the Chicago building boom reached a peak in 1925 and then receded abruptly.
The role that small state banks played in allowing this building boom to occur
was a determinant one. In December 1929, state banks made up 95.5 percent of
all banks in the city (University of Illinois Bulletin, 1929). There were few national
banks; however these banks were large. Indeed at the time they reported close to 40
percent of the aggregate resources of all banks (ibid.). The largest of these national
banks, First National, rivaled in size the largest bank in Chicago (Continental Illinois,
which was state-chartered). As a contemporary made clear, “by the summer of 1929,
then, the Continental Illinois and the First National towered over the Chicago money
market like giants” (James, 1938, p. 952).40 Yet a huge number of small unit banks
swarmed around the city, most of them state-chartered. As James put it “around
these great banks of the Loop, there nestled, however, some 300 outlying commercial
banks, each of which appeared microscopic with the Continental or the First although,
in the aggregate, they handled a considerable proportion of the city’s business.”
These small banks were usually unable to branch, due to state banking laws in
Illinois which prevented them from doing so. Such restrictions likely created incentives
for unit banks to make the most of local profit-making opportunities, such as real estate
lending. Had they been allowed to branch, they would have likely been able to better
diversify their assets and prepare for a sudden backlash (Carlson, 2001; Calomiris &
Mason, 2003; Mitchener, 2005). See Appendix 1.7.4 for a more complete discussion of
(GMAC) to finance the development of its mass market in motor vehicles.
37White (2009) studies the question for the country as a whole but does not disaggregate into the
various regions and cities of the U.S.. For journalistic accounts see Allen (1931) and Sakolski (1966).
38Hoyt humorously depicts “distinguished scholars”’ assessments of the situation, which were often
quite surprising (Hoyt, 1933, p. 388).
39In 1928, Ernest Fisher, associate professor of real estate at the University of Michigan, studied real
estate subdividing activity and found that “periods of intense subdividing activity almost always force
the ratio of lots to population considerably above the typical” (Fisher, 1928, p. 3). His explanation
was that “the only basis for decision is the position of the market at the time the manufacturer
[makes] his plans,” which leads to procyclicality.
40Indeed, together they were responsible “for about half of the banking business transacted in the
city” (ibid.).
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the role of unit banking in the Chicago boom.
1.5.2 The impact of mortgage illiquidity
Despite the excessive proportions of the real estate boom, evidence suggests that
the role of mortgages’ quality in causing banks’ failure was minor. Indeed, what really
mattered was their inherent lack of liquidity, for three reasons.
First, mortgages at the time only had a 50 percent loan-to-value ratio (LTV), which
is particularly low compared to today’s standards.41 This has been emphasized both
by Field (2013) and White (2009).42 Given that land values in Chicago never fell by
more than 50 percent until 1933, and that most Chicago banks failed before then (see
Table 1.2), they could not have made any substantial losses on these loans, even after
foreclosure. The fall in land values is documented by Hoyt (1933, p. 399), who shows
that Chicago land values fell by 5 percent in 1929, 20 percent in 1930, 38 percent in
1931, 50 percent in 1932 and 60 percent in 1933.43
Further, I use Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267)’s sectoral data on land values to test
the hypothesis that differences in land values were uncorrelated with bank failure
rates. Although Hoyt’s land value variable is categorical, his maps are detailed enough
to allow efficient matching with my balance sheet data, using banks’ contemporary
addresses in Chicago. I thus generated a new categorical variable, valuefall, which
includes three categories of cumulative fall in residential land values per front foot from
41In Chicago specifically, a survey conducted in 1925 indicates that the average LTV on residential
properties varied from 41.3 percent to 50.5 percent. First mortgages on apartments encumbered by
a second mortgage (which constituted the majority of cases for apartments) had an average LTV of
54.7 percent. In other cases (especially when apartments were not encumbered by a second mortgage)
LTVs could go up to 59.9 percent. Interest rates on average reached around 6 percent (Bayless &
Bodfish, 1928).
42This low average LTV is in fact one of the main arguments put forward by Field and by White
against any possible causation link between mortgage holdings and bank failures. As this section will
go on to suggest, low LTVs partly explain why the quality of mortgages did not matter, but do not
preclude mortgages’ lack of liquidity from having a detrimental impact on bank survival.
43These land values are mainly based on sales and real estate brokers’ opinions rather than assess-
ments for tax purposes. Note also that very few banks failed after March 1933, but that one cannot
know whether most of the “1933” decline occurred before the national bank holiday in March 1933
or after. On p. 172 Hoyt asserts that “the decline in the value of improved properties from 1928 to
1933 was 50 per cent,” not 60 per cent (Hoyt, 1933).
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Table 1.6: Percentage of banks by cohort falling into one of the











0 36.96 28.57 30.77 45.45
1 58.70 68.57 38.46 48.48
2 4.35 2.86 30.77 6.06
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267) and Statements.
1926 to 1931 (from lowest to highest) in each bank’s sector.44 As mentioned earlier,
banks were numerous and spread out around the city, which makes it reasonable to
assume that they catered mainly to their own neighbourhoods,45 so that land values in
their own sector would likely have had the highest impact on their health. Although
1931 is the latest available year, it was chosen by Hoyt to illustrate the geographical
pattern of falls in land values in the city as this was when the first sharp decline in
values occurred (ibid., p. 266). It is reasonable to assume that subsequent falls in land
values followed the initial geographical pattern in terms of differences in intensity.46
Table 1.6 shows the percent of banks in each cohort by category of value decline.
There are few differences within the three failing cohorts, so that falls in land values
do not point to any possible correlation between falls in land values between 1926 and
1931 and those cohorts’ timing of failure. In addition, although survivors seem to have
experienced less of a decline in values than all other cohorts together, many survivors
were very large banks from the Loop, where land values were more stable throughout
the period. Controlling for size may therefore be important when assessing the role of
land value falls. More generally, should there be any relationship between land values
44This variable was generated using the two maps shown in Figures 42 and 47 in Hoyt (1933,
pp. 259, 267). For these maps he used sales data from Olcott’s Land Values Blue Book of Chicago
and land assessment data from Jacob (1931). These maps are divided into grids, and a bank’s sector
is one of the 219 squares on each grid. Each square’s size is about 2.5 squared kilometers.
45This is confirmed by James (1938).
46Indeed, while it is likely that a particular section of Chicago saw further declines in land values
after 1931, the assumption that the geographical pattern of differences in intensity between regions
remained stable seems reasonable.
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and bank failures, it may not be a directly causal one: sectors experiencing a larger
fall in land values may also be sectors in which banks simply made larger amounts
of mortgages in the 1920s, which may lead land values to be related to bank failures
only indirectly and not through loan losses. Controlling for other financial ratios may
therefore also be important. Table 1.7 reports estimates of the same ordered logistic
model as before, only with 1929 balance sheet variables on the right-hand side and
the added valuefall variable. This variable remains insignificant regardless of whether
mortgages are included or not.
Interestingly, a simple t-test reveals that deposit losses among all cohorts are
uncorrelated with falls in land values. This holds for deposit losses up to Decem-
ber 1930 (Prob > F = 0.701) as well as for deposit losses up to December 1931
(Prob > F = 0.080).
The fact that banks’ losses did not have a large impact on bank failure can also
be seen in the low predictive power of capital ratios throughout the period (see Table
1.4). As Figure 1.5 suggests, June 1931 failures had the highest ratio of capital to
total assets through most of the 1920s, despite being the first cohort to fail.47
Finally, although mortgages’ contract maturity was usually only three to five years,
their de facto maturity in the 1920s was much longer. Precisely because these loans
were relatively short-term (and perhaps for other reasons), it was customary for banks
to renew them. As Saulnier made clear in his 1956 study of 1920s mortgage lending in
the U.S., “the much lauded feature of full repayment by maturity has been won at the
price of extended maturities” (see Morton (1956, p. 8) and Chapman & Willis (1934,
p. 602)). This created entrenched renewal expectations on the part of borrowers, who
after three or five years, having only made the initial down payments and interest
47There are unfortunately no good statistics on the rate of foreclosure for commercial banks in
Chicago. Most of the numbers are provided by Hoyt (1933, p. 269-270), and they concern the total
amount of foreclosures: “Foreclosures were mounting rapidly, the number increasing from 5,818 in
1930 to 10,075 in 1931 (...), [and] reached a new peak in 1932, rising to (...) 15,201.” It is thus not
possible to describe banks’ precise losses in real estate. In any case, as will be shown later, foreclosures
only mattered for banks insofar as it took more than eighteen months to foreclose in Illinois, which
greatly impeded banks’ liquidity during crises.
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Table 1.7: Ordered logistic model of bank failure
(odds ratios), (dependent variable: failure type; ex-




























Prob > chi2 .000 .000
Likelihood -136.83 -140.87
Notes: The variable valuefall is a categorical variable con-
sisting in three categories of intensity in cumulative falls
in land values from 1926 to 1931 based on Hoyt (1933),
from lowest to highest (see text for further details on the
computation of this variable). *** significant at α = 0.01,
** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. Odds
ratios with standard errors based on the original coeffi-
cients in parentheses. An odds ratio above one increases
the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio below
one decreases it. Each ratio variable has been multiplied
by 100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a
one percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements.
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Figure 1.5: Capital to total assets
Source: Statements.
payments – loans were unamortized –, expected to be given another three to five years
to make the final “balloon” payment. This is illustrated in the following quote:
“Another thorn was the uncertainty and recurring crises in the credit
arrangements inherent in the then prevalent practice of buying a home with
a first mortgage written for one to five years, without any provision for
paying back the principal of the loan during that time. This latter device
was a fair weather system, and, as is the case with most such systems,
nobody suspected that there was anything wrong with it until the weather
changed.
What usually happened was that the average family went along, bud-
geting for the interest payments on the mortgage, subconsciously regarding
the mortgage itself as written for an indefinite period, as if the lender were
never going to want his money back (...). This impression was strengthened
by the fact that lenders most frequently did renew the mortgage over and
over again when money was plentiful” (Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
1952, pp. 2-5).
As a consequence, while most loans were made in the boom years of 1925 to
1927 (see Figure 1.6), those maturing between 1929 and 1930 were likely renewed and
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would not actually come due before 1932-35.48 In addition, loans maturing for the first
time during the Depression would come up for (expected) renewal, with banks under
liquidity pressure pressing unprepared borrowers to pay back their loans.49 In such
cases foreclosure would not entail any loss (due to the 50 percent LTV),50 but it would
create a clear liquidity issue as the foreclosure process in Illinois lasted more than
eighteen months on average (Child, 1925; Gries & Ford, 1932; Hoppe, 1926; Johnson,
1923).51
Mortgages’ sheer lack of liquidity thus posed a tremendous challenge to banks.
In the interwar period mortgages could neither be sold in the secondary market nor
48This is confirmed by Morton (1956), who derived figures on contract maturity from a National
Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mortgage lending, whose absolute precision may be
taken with care. The survey was made in 1947 on a sample of 170 surviving commercial banks of all
sizes, “representing about one-third of the commercial banks total nonfarm mortgage portfolio as of
mid-1945” (ibid., p. 71). The precise average contract length for loans made in 1926 was 3.6 years
(for commercial banks), and 3.1, 2.5 and 3.2 years for loans made in 1925, 1927 and 1928 respectively
(ibid., p. 174). For 1927 loans, maturity would be reached around mid-1929, and for 1928 loans
around mid-1931. In 1925 the amount of new mortgages in Cook County was slightly lower than
in 1927, but taking this year into account would still mean that a large portion of mortgages were
expected to be refinanced in early 1929 (the average contract length for 1925 loans was 3.1 years).
Morton points out that even for mortgages made in the 1925-29 period, the realized maturity was
8.8 years (ibid., p. 119).
49As the vice-president of the banking department of the First National Trust and Savings Bank
in Chicago put it: “I have heard a lot of talk about foreclosures and that the banks are calling loans
and insisting upon repayment and that the borrowers are unable to refund elsewhere, and they are
doing this because they are trying to keep their assets liquid” (U.S. Congress, 1932, part 2, p. 269).
This is confirmed in Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1934), which mentions “the dangers attendant
on the mortgagee’s refusal to renew,” and in Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1952), which reports:
“The time of stress came in 1929-30; the short-term mortgage came to maturity against a situation
of tight credit and, in many cases, of no credit (...). All too often the lender (...) did not want to
renew the loan to the home-owner no matter how high the premium or rate of interest.” Note, in
addition, that second mortgage financing made prompt repayment even less likely – see Chapter 2.
50After foreclosure either the property could be auctioned off to external buyers or, if there were no
buyers, the property was repossessed by the bank at an appraisal price. Such repossessed property
then sat on the bank’s books as non-performing assets (called “other real estate”) until they could
be sold again later. Arguably, the foreclosure price could potentially be lower than the current
“market” price. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in Depression Chicago transactions were
few, foreclosures widespread (Hoyt, 1933, p. 266-272), and sales prices were probably themselves
affected by foreclosures in surrounding areas (this theoretical point is made by ?; see also ?). This
suggests that gaps between foreclosure and sales prices may not have been very large. Further
comments on the meaning and significance of other real estate in the dataset under study can be
found at the end of this sub-section.
51This was particularly emphasized by Gries & Ford (1932, p. 39): “One of the greatest hindrances
to the availability of mortgage money in some states is the right of redemption from sale under fore-
closure. During the period of redemption, foreclosed property is rendered practically unmarketable,
may suffer serious damage or depreciation, and presents in a high degree a type of frozen asset.” See
also Anderson (1927), Hopper (1927), Stalker (1925), and Chapter 2.
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Figure 1.6: New mortgages and trust deeds, Cook County, Illinois ($)
Note: the source does not specify whether new mortgages include renewed mortgages.
Source: Hoyt (1933, p.475).
rediscounted at the Federal Reserve.52 Figure 1.1 showed how real estate loans in-
creased as a share of total assets for all banks during the Depression, at the same
time as assets as a whole were diminishing.53 Other types of loans, on the other hand,
were promptly liquidated in this period. Figure 1.7 shows the falling share of loans on
collateral security owned by banks,54 while Figure 1.8 shows a similar decline in other
52Note that in early 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation proposed to lend against “in-
eligible” collateral, which could include high quality real estate loans. Nevertheless loans against
such assets remained proportionately small as the RFC preferred loans with maturities of less than
six months (?) and refused to lend against real estate loans’ book value, likely taking into account
their uncertain quality paramount to their long maturity (Wigmore, 1995, p.324). In general the
RFC remained very cautious and mainly lent against high-quality and liquid collateral, until 1933
when it switched to preferred stock purchases in financial institutions (??James, 1938; ?). In addi-
tion, around the same time the Banking Act of 1932 also allowed the Federal Reserve to widen its
accepted collateral for rediscounts. According to Friedman & Schwartz (1963, p. 45), however, such
powers were used only to a very limited extent, perhaps for the same reason. See also ? and Wicker
(1996, p.85).
53For a graph of total assets see Figure 1.14 in Appendix 1.7.5.
54Security loans were mainly call loans, that is, loans repayable at the option of the lender within
twenty-four hours’ notice. Funds were lent in this way to individuals who used them to carry securities,
for example when dealing with them on margin. The securities themselves were used as collateral for
these loans, with the understanding that they were likely to be withdrawn at any time. According
to Bogen & Willis (1929, p. 245), “depositors can, and sometimes do, determine the calling of loans
by the activity of their own demands.” Other loans were short-term commercial loans, often sought
by companies for the seasonal expansion of their inventories. In such cases “the customer of the
commercial bank is expected to pay off or “clean up” his obligations to it at certain intervals” (ibid.,
p. 11). Both types of loans were eligible for rediscount at the Federal Reserve Banks or could be
sold in the open market, while mortgages in general were not (Bogen & Willis, 1929; U.S. Congress,
1927).
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Figure 1.8: Other loans to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Figure 1.9: Other real estate to total assets
Source: Statements.
loans as a share of total assets. Compared to other assets, therefore, mortgages were
notoriously difficult to liquidate.55 As all banks engaged in fire sales they became the
main constraint on their liquidation process.
As a final note, the variable “other real estate” deserves special attention. Other
real estate is an asset consisting of property repossessed by banks after real estate
foreclosures and before it can be resold. One might question the importance of this
variable in explaining bank failures given the very low percentages shown in Figure
1.9, which never go much beyond 3 percent, and given the low significance of this
variable in the ordered logit model. This can be explained, first, by the fact that
mortgages’ impact on bank failure could have been strong without any foreclosures
taking place. When foreclosures did occur, it is precisely their very lengthy process
that would have created liquidity problems for banks. Each cohort’s last data point
55Note, perhaps surprisingly, that cash is not a good predictor of failure. This suggests that cash
ratios were relatively similar for all four cohorts, and that what really differentiated them were their
mortgage holdings. Government bonds were more important than cash, as can be seen in Table 1.4
and Figure 1.11 in Appendix 1.7.2.
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represents its status at the last call before failure, and each call occurred only every
six months. This means that if many banks failed between April and June, which was
the case for the first two failing cohorts, it is likely that much of their repossessed
property would not have been recorded by December before this date. Thus, the
lengthy foreclosure process increases the odds that many of the effects of foreclosure
are not visible on this graph (Child, 1925; Hoppe, 1926; Johnson, 1923).56
1.6 Conclusion
Looking into the long-term behaviour of Chicago banks in the 1920s yielded new
insights into the causes of their failure. I showed that banks’ long-term investments
in illiquid assets (especially mortgages) severely weakened their position when they
came to face large withdrawals on their deposits. Though restricted to Chicago, these
results reassert the role that liquidity issues played in the Great Depression, both on
the liability and the asset sides of the balance sheet. More specifically, they suggest
that a solvent but ex ante less liquid bank is not necessarily healthy, and that liquidity
risk management is just as important as credit risk management when the occurrence
of bank runs cannot be completely excluded.
This paper also reassessed the role that mortgage investments played in the Great
Depression via the banking channel. Parallels with the recent crisis may be tentatively
drawn, despite major differences in mortgage contracts then and now. In both cases
banks suffered tremendous liquidity shocks on the uninsured liability side of their
balance sheets, which, regardless of their origin, highlighted once again the impact
of maturity mismatches between long-term assets and short-term liabilities (Brun-
nermeier, 2008; Gorton & Metrick, 2012). Securitization can potentially increase the
liquidity of mortgages by making them more salable and by distributing different kinds
56Further comments on the value of repossessed property after foreclosure are made earlier in this
sub-section.
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of risks to different types of investors. But in order to do so it has to be undertaken
in the right way (see Chapter 3).
Central banks can in theory help during a liquidity crisis by following Bagehot’s
rule and lending on good (though not perfect) collateral. Although central banks’ role
during crises is essential, it is always difficult for it to gauge the precise quality (credit
risk) of an asset – especially if the asset is a long-term one, thereby creating more
uncertainty about its long-term value (Goodhart, 2008, 2010). For this reason, the
Federal Reserve’s role in the recent crisis has been controversial: by actually lending
against such doubtful collateral as mortgage-backed securities it has once again raised
the question as to how a central bank can measure asset risk (Bordo & Landon-Lane,
2010; Schleifer & Vishny, 2011; Gorton & Metrick, 2013; Stein, 2013).57
Because central bank help will likely never be entirely adequate, it is important
for banks to attend to the inherent liquidity of their portfolios. Of course, nowadays
assets’ liquidity is increasingly intertwined with their quality as markets are formed
and disappear in terms of the perceived quality of such assets. Nevertheless, some
assets are inherently less liquid than others, and longer-term assets tend to be less
liquid either because they are paid back in a long time or because of the uncertainty
attached to their long maturity. Conversely, some assets are inherently more liquid
than others, such as cash assets and (usually) government bonds.
No bank will ever be perfectly hedged in terms of its maturity profile, but promoting
liquidity in a preventive regulatory framework, perhaps through countercyclical cash
ratios may be a good start. In this paper, cash did not matter in the sense that
differences in mortgage holdings made a larger difference. But it is possible to speculate
that had banks holding more mortgages also held more cash, they would not have run
into such difficulty in the face of bank runs.58 Although Basel I and Basel II had a
57And by purchasing such securities outright, it clearly cut across the boundary between monetary
and fiscal policy (Reinhart, 2011).
58Note that government bonds mattered more than cash, as can be seen in Table 1.4 and Figure1.11
in Appendix 1.7.2.
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clear focus on capital rather than liquidity, Basel III has started to introduce measures
to regulate the latter (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). Yet it has
mainly focused on so-called “liquidity coverage ratios,” which may be inadequate as
their vagueness could lead to new forms of risk-shifting. Cash may be a simpler and
more transparent way of assessing a bank’s liquidity. And, in turn, increased liquidity
in the system may reduce the risk of runs, as runs can partly be triggered by fears of
banks’ illiquidity, not just by fears regarding their potential insolvency.59
59See also Calomiris et al. (2012), Goodhart (2008, 2010) and Shin (2009). Note that Calomiris
et al. (2012) also see cash ratios as important buffers against credit risk.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Sources, name changes and consolidations
This study uses the Statements of State Banks of Illinois. The Reports of Condition
from the Office of the Comptroller of Currency focus on all member banks (both state
and national) nationwide at disaggregated levels, and contain very detailed information
on individual banks, including qualitative information. For my study these reports
would have proved insufficient: the extant reports for state member banks are available
for the same dates as the Statements and are less complete since they include only
state member banks, and for national member banks the only available reports are
for December 1929 and December 1931.60 There are no reports for 1930, which is an
important year for this research.Focusing on state banks should not be a problem since
as pointed out in Section 1.5.1, in December 1929 state banks made up 95.5 percent
of all banks in the city (University of Illinois Bulletin, 1929) and 87.6 percent of all
suspensions, whereas national banks accounted for only 12.4 percent of suspensions
(White, 1984).
Creating cohorts is an essential way of keeping track of the same sample of banks,
whether failures or survivors (aside from its advantages for economic analysis). An-
other essential feature of this aim is linked to name changes and consolidations. As
previously mentioned, I had all the data needed for this purpose. Name changes were
corrected in 26 instances. However, I still had to make decisions about whether to
include a merger or acquisition in the failing or surviving categories. Most authors
include such consolidations as failures; that is, a bank that was taken over is usually
considered a failure, and so are both of the banks that merged, even when the merger
itself ended up surviving the Depression. For instance, Calomiris & Mason (2003)
specify that their data “contain almost seventy different ways a bank can exit the
60Details of the available volumes are described in Mason (1998).
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Table 1.8: State mergers between June 1929 and June 1933








































Sources: Statements, and Rand Mc Nally Bankers’ Directory.
dataset, ranging from all imaginable types of mergers and acquisitions to relatively
simple voluntary liquidations and receiverships; [...] together, we term [them] fail-
ures.” The Reports of Condition they used were more detailed in this respect, and I
do not have data on all types of mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless, the Rand Mc-
Nally directory gives sufficient detail at least on whether a merger or a simple takeover
occurred.
As in Calomiris & Mason (2003) I thought reasonable to count as failures banks
that were taken over by other banks. This occurred in 14 cases since June 1929. The
banks that were taken over before June 1929 are not taken into account in the sense
that only the resulting consolidation should be part of a cohort. Exactly the same
applies to pre-June 1929 mergers: only the resulting merger can be part of a cohort
and thus only this bank will be tracked down as early as possible in the 1920s. Table
1.8 shows the state mergers that occurred since June 1929 and whether the merger
ended up failing or not.
For the mergers that had failed by June 1933, there is no apparent dilemma regard-
ing how to classify the original consolidating banks. That is, when a merger ended up
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failing, the two original banks’ data could be kept until they merge under a new name,
at which point the new merger’s data could be excluded from the dataset, making
the two original banks failures at the time of consolidation. Yet this decision sounds
slightly arbitrary given the fact that a healthy bank may have merged with a less
healthy bank which may have dragged the former into bankruptcy. In the first and
third cases shown in Table 1.8, it was actually possible to divide the merger’s balance
sheet in two proportional parts and make the two original banks continue until the
time the merger itself fails. In the second case, the merger itself fails in August 1930
so could not be part of any cohort. Results are robust to different categorizations.
In the dataset only one state merger actually survived in Chicago: the Central
Republic Bank and Trust Co, a July 1931 consolidation of Central Trust Co of Illinois,
Chicago Trust Co and a national bank, the National Bank of the Republic. As in
the previous cases, it was decided that both state banks would be kept “alive” by
taking the items on the balance sheet of the new merger and splitting them into parts
proportional to each original banks share of the total.61
Finally, it seems necessary to specifically discuss the case of the Continental Illinois
Bank and Trust Company, which was the largest bank in Chicago in 1929, and which
with the First National Bank (as its name indicates, a national bank) “towered over
the Chicago money market like giants” (James, 1938, p. 952). Together they were
responsible for about half the business transacted in the city (ibid.). Initially this
bank was not included in the sample, for the simple reason that it apparently failed
in December 1932 and thus could not be part of a particular cohort. However, it was
soon discovered that the “failure” of the bank was in fact due to a rare phenomenon
at the time: the fact that it adopted a national charter. The Chicago Tribune titled
in October 1932 “CONTINENTAL GETS NATIONAL BANK CHARTER” which
was at the time seen as a strange kind of event (Chicago Tribune, 1932). One of the
61But again the results are robust either way. See footnote above in Section 1.3 on the controversial
aspect of this rescue. I also thank Joseph Mason for kindly making national bank data available to
me.
Chapter 1. What Caused Chicago Bank Failures? 58
reasons this happened, as the article explained, is that national banking laws were
in the process of being changed to allow branching everywhere, including in states
that technically forbade it. As the crisis made clear to some bank managers the
potential benefits of branching, it is not surprising that a strong bank like Continental
Illinois sought a national charter, and was granted one.62 The bank was thus manually
categorised as a survivor.
1.7.2 Additional financial ratios
Figures 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13 show the reserve-deposit ratio, U.S. government bonds
to total assets, banking house to total assets, and borrowed funds to total assets. The
relative importance of government bonds, which was also noted in Table 1.4, can likely
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Figure 1.10: Cash reserves to total deposits (includes cash, other cash resources, due
from other banks)
Source: Statements.
62The adjective “strong” here is based on the fact that Continental Illinois in June 1929 had
healthier ratios than even the average of survivors. I do not know of any other state banks in
Chicago which adopted a national charter at that time.
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June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.12: Banking house, furniture and fixtures to total assets
Source: Statements.
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halfyearly
Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.13: Bills payable and rediscounts to total assets
Source: Statements.
Bills payable and rediscounts are a form of long-term, high interest debt, which is
a good indicator of bank trouble, as when deposits are withdrawn from risky banks,
they are forced to rely on high-cost debt (Calomiris & Mason, 1997). Figure 1.13 thus
shows banks’ race for liquidity as they started losing deposits. In December 1931, for
instance, when survivors lost slightly fewer deposits than the June 1932 Failures, they
also secured fewer funds from these sources. Note however that the interpretation of
this variable is not straightforward, as it could also reflect creditors’ confidence (or
lack thereof) in the bank.63
63As a side note, the June 1932 spike for survivors and late failures may be due to a Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC) plan to inject liquidity during the June 1932 crisis (Calomiris & Mason,
1997).
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1.7.3 Discrete-time hazard estimates
Table 1.9 reports estimates of discrete time hazard models. As mentioned above,
survival models necessarily take into account within-Depression covariates and there-
fore cannot test the importance of pre-Depression variables as well as ordered logit
can. Adding time dummies with interactions could potentially help, but with this
particular dataset the hazard rate is frequently zero in pre-Depression years, so that
pre-Depression effects cannot be efficiently estimated (time dummies are automatically
omitted).
Nevertheless the results are of some interest. Both models are discrete-time pro-
portional odds (logit) models, chosen among other survival frameworks (such as con-
tinuous time survival models) due to the frequency of the data, which is halfyearly.
If T is survival time and T = t the time of failure, then the discrete hazard for this
model is:
λ(t | x) = P (T = t | T ≥ t, x) = exp(βt + γX)
1 + exp(βt + γX)
(1.2)
where β is the baseline hazard, X a vector of explanatory variables and γ a vector of
variable-specific parameters.
The first model in Table 1.9 assumes a constant baseline hazard, which may not
be wholly adapted to the dataset since the hazard rate greatly increased as the De-
pression unfolded. For this reason a second model, assuming positive time duration,
is estimated in the second column. The time variable is very significant, and the Mc-
Fadden R-squared much higher, suggesting that this model is a better fit than the
previous one. Odds ratios are reported, which in such models can be interpreted as
hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one decrease the probability of failure;
hazard ratios above one increase it.
In this model it can be seen that many variables are significant – more so than
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Table 1.9: Proportional odds discrete-time survival models, 1923-33































Prob > chi2 .000 .000
McFadden R-squared .18 .41
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant
at α = 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios can be interpreted
here as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one decrease the prob-
ability of failure; hazard ratios above one increase it. Each variable has been
multiplied by 100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one
percentage increase in the ratio. Source: Statements.
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in the ordered logit models. This could be interpreted as a sign that the Depression
exacerbated differences between banks. The most powerful variable, however, remains
mortgages to total asset, with a hazard ratio of 1.084.
1.7.4 Problems with unit banking
In the 1920s all Chicago state banks operated under the unit banking system; they
were not allowed to open branches as Illinois banking law forbade it. Problems linked
to unit banking were numerous. The main reason branch banking is usually thought
of as an advantage is that it increases portfolio diversification. Branch banking can
be contrasted to group or chain-banking as branches of the same bank can pool their
assets and liabilities together. When there is a liquidity shortage at one of the banks
in a chain, other member banks cannot simply transfer funds to that bank for help,
a problem which does not even arise in the branch banking system. This may partly
explain the collapse of the Bain chain in June 1931 which triggered the banking crisis
at that time (James, 1938, p. 994).
Yet the lack of portfolio diversification was not necessarily directly due to the
unit banking system. Indeed, Rodkey points to the fact that many small bankers
prior to the Depression felt a moral duty to “meet all demands for good local loans”
(Rodkey, 1944, p. 4). It also seems that the lack of portfolio diversification was not
the only disadvantage of unit banking. Rodkey blamed this system for fostering the
incompetence of bank managers:
“This system leads naturally to a multiplicity of small banks under
local control, owned locally, and operated usually by citizens of the home
community who may or may not have some knowledge of the fundamental
principles of sound banking” (Rodkey, 1935, p. 147).
Thus, by triggering the establishment of many small banks, unit banking made it
easier for inexperienced bankers to become managers.64 Rodkey also pointed out that
64Nevertheless, the debate on branch banking has not completely ended. So far, at least four studies
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little attention was given to the ability of the borrower to meet his interest payments
(ibid., p. 122).
The ease with which almost any kind of manager could open a small community
bank and the resulting lack of experience of such unit bank managers in Illinois stand
out as potentially serious problems when the Chicago mortgage boom is taken into
account.
1.7.5 Bank size
This appendix deals with the problem of bank size. First of all, it should be noted
that bank size is not necessarily a problem in the sense that it does not necessarily
introduce bias in the results. Most of the time it does not because authors make a
point of studying mainly financial ratios. When looking at the main indicators of
bank size (total assets, total capital, and sometimes total deposits), it appears that
larger banks did tend to have a higher survivor rate. However, one of the aims of
this paper is precisely to show that this was certainly not the only reason for their
survival (of course, it may be that there is a correlation between larger bank size and
better management practice). Table 1.10 shows the failure rate per size group, using
the whole population of 193 banks (see notes below Table 1.2).
From this table it appears that there is indeed a relationship between size and
failure, although this relationship is not very strong. True, whether large or small,
banks had a high failure rate, always above 70 percent. Nevertheless, it is still notice-
able that banks with less than $250,000 in capital had 89 percent chances of failing,
whereas banks whose capital went beyond $800,000 “only” had a failure rate of 73
have shown that the branch banking system was detrimental to bank survival during the Depression.
While Calomiris & Wheelock (1995) concede that it has usually been a good thing in U.S. history,
they find that such was not the case in the Great Depression. Some of the largest branching networks
collapsed in the 1930s, which may have been due to a form of moral hazard: branching banks thought
they were better protected against local risk, and thus were less careful with their asset management
(see also Carlson (2001)). Calomiris & Mason (2003) confirm the negative effect of branch banking,
and so does Carlson (2001). On the other hand, Mitchener (2005) finds a positive effect, while Gambs
(1977) finds no effect at all.
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Table 1.10: Relationship between bank size and failure rate,
June 1929 - June 1933


















Notes: There are 193 banks in total in this table because they include
those that are not part of any cohort, eg. those that failed between
the chosen windows of failure. The actual bank total for June 1929
























1922h1 1924h1 1926h1 1928h1 1930h1 1932h1 1934h1
halfyearly
Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
standard error
Figure 1.14: Total assets
Source: Statements.
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percent. Looking at total assets for the whole period, the differences are even more
striking (see Figure 1.14).
1.7.6 Mortgage growth rates
One may wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total assets may have
substantially weakened banks. First note that the data only start in 1923, which as
shown in Section 1.5 was already some way into the boom. The real estate boom
may also be hidden by the fact that banks grew significantly throughout the 1920s.
This is shown in Figures 1.15 and 1.16. Figure 1.15 represents the median growth
rate of mortgages as an absolute value, a useful (albeit highly approximate) measure
in the absence of data on new mortgages made by year. It shows substantial growth
rates between 1923 and 1927 for all cohorts, as well as the fact that June 1931 failures
always had a higher growth rate than June 1932 failures, which had a higher growth
rate than survivors (the June 1933 failures cohort, in light grey for better visibility,
behaves much more erratically, as is often the case).
The graph of the median growth rate of total assets looks similar (see Figure 1.16),
although most cohorts had a slightly higher mortgage than asset growth rate. It
is interesting to see that the June 1931 failure cohort grew particularly fast in the
mid-1920s.
1.7.7 Survival model for the liability side
Table 1.11 provides a discrete-time proportional odds model for the liability side of
bank balance sheets. This model was chosen for the same reasons as in Appendix
1.7.3. The focus is on the years 1929-1933. As borrowed funds and deposit losses are
highly correlated, they were entered separately in the regression. All items are ratios
to total liabilities and equity except for retained earnings to net worth.
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Table 1.11: Discrete-time proportional odds estimation,
1929-33 (binary dependent variable equals one at the time











Prob > chi2 .000 .000
Likelihood -284.22 -287.12
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, *
significant at α = 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Odds
ratios can be interpreted here as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios
between zero and one decrease the probability of failure; hazard
ratios above one increase it. Each variable has been multiplied
by 100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one
percentage increase in the ratio.Source: Statements.
1.7.8 Determinants of deposit losses
To what extent was the shock to liabilities endogenous to the share of mortgages?
While this question is difficult to answer certain pieces of evidence can help to draw
a few preliminary conclusions. Table 1.12 provides results of an OLS model with
deposit losses as the dependent variable and some of the most important ex ante
variables on the right-hand side. From this model it appears that for June 1931 failures
none of the fundamental variables explain their deposit losses between June 1929 and
December 1930, thus suggesting that withdrawals from these banks were on average
not information-based, despite an absence of significant panics in this period (Wicker,
1996).65 On the other hand, for the second failure cohort, mortgages predict 1931
deposit losses well (though the R-squared is relatively low), a result consistent with
the fact that the magnitude of their withdrawals significantly differed from survivors’.
65Note that bank statements were released to the public every six months by the State Auditor.
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June 1933 Failures and Survivors
Variable in June
1929
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Cash reserves to to-
tal assets
-.032 .029 .096 .053 .308 .222
(.14) (.19) (.24) (.27) (.25) (.40)
Gvt bonds .008 .002 .018 .009 .013 -.011
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Mortgages -.074 -.074 -.151*** -.063 -.113* -.065
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.05)
Other loans -.044 -.012 .011 -.057 -.005 -.096
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.09)
Banking house .004 -.000 -.015* -.001 -.002* -.014
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Retained earnings .081 .015 .089 .013 .070 .190*
(.05) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.06) (.10)
Const -.190 -.167 -.514 -.173 -.043 -.588
(.37) (.50) (.57) (.68) (.61) (.99)
n 75 66 66 45 45 45
R2 .11 .09 .31 .08 .34 .17
Prob > F .101 .111 .106 .416 .378 .091
Notes: * significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, *** significant at α = 0.10. Standard
errors in parentheses. The explanatory variables are taken in June 1929. All variables are log
transformed as OLS regressions assume a normal distribution, which as noted earlier does not
fit with these ratios. Source: Statements.
(1) June 1929 - Dec 1930 cumulative deposit losses;
(2) June 1929 - Dec 1931 cumulative deposit losses;
(3) June 1929 - Dec 1932 cumulative deposit losses.
Yet even in this case deposit losses were very large for survivors (around 37 percent
compared to 59 percent for June 1932 failures). Together these results suggest that
while mortgages remain essential to explain Chicago bank failures, the role of mass,
non-discriminating deposit withdrawals cannot be disregarded.











1922h1 1924h1 1926h1 1928h1 1930h1 1932h1 1934h1
halfyearly
Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures













1922h1 1924h1 1926h1 1928h1 1930h1 1932h1 1934h1
halfyearly
Survivors June 1931 Failures
June 1932 Failures June 1933 Failures
Figure 1.16: Median growth rate of total assets (six months to six months)
Source: Statements.
Chapter 2
Debt Dilution in 1920s America:
Lighting the Fuse of a Mortgage
Crisis
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has led economists to draw parallels with the Great Depres-
sion, either by focusing on speculation generally or, in the case of the U.S., on the
real estate market. While it is clear that a real estate bubble and reckless mortgage
dealings can at least partly be blamed for the current U.S. crisis, the causes of the
U.S. Great Depression remain far less evident, and indeed no single explanation for
it has ever attracted unanimous support. Given the occurrence of a nationwide real
estate boom throughout the 1920s, it is tempting for economic historians to see if any
useful comparisons may be made between this boom and the more recent one. And as
widespread commercial bank failures were a notorious aspect of the Great Depression
(Friedman & Schwartz, 1963; Wicker, 1996), commercial bank mortgages made in the
1920s naturally deserve particular attention. Yet recent studies found that there could
be no direct link between the 1920s real estate boom and commercial bank failures
70
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(see, in particular Field (2013) and White (2009)). An important argument against a
possible causation link has to do with the conservatism of commercial bank real estate
loans made at the time: most of them did not exceed a maturity of 3 to 5 years and had
a 50 percent loan-to-value ratio (ibid.). This would tend to discard any explanation
of the Depression based on mortgage lending via the banking channel.
This paper re-examines the alleged safety of the structure of pre-Depression com-
mercial bank mortgages. By inquiring whether borrowers could in practice make 50
percent down payments, it uncovers the extent of the “second mortgage system” (as
it was called at the time), one of the most widespread – and yet least well-known –
forms of debt dilution in the twentieth century. While the negative effects of debt
dilution are well documented in the theoretical economics literature, its prevalence in
the 1920s U.S. commercial bank mortgage market is much less so. This is despite con-
temporaries, such as President Hoover, describing the second mortgage system as “the
most backward segment of [the U.S.’s] whole credit system” (Gries & Ford, 1932). As
few authors have analysed debt dilution empirically (see Degryse et al. (2011)), this
paper thus also provides further empirical support to the idea that debt dilution can
be highly detrimental to credit.
While borrowers were urged to “own their own homes” in the early 1920s, banks
on the other hand often would not lend more than half the price of the house. As
contracts did not contain any covenants against further borrowing, borrowers were
tempted to borrow from third parties (such as individuals or small second mortgage
institutions) to help them make the high down payment. A second mortgage market
flourished, benefiting more than 75 percent of first-mortgage borrowers. In addition to
the serious debt dilution problem it created for first mortgage lenders (the commercial
banks), the second mortgage system presented other aspects which only aggravated it.
Indeed, second mortgage lenders charged exorbitant interest rates, and insisted that
their loans be repaid before first mortgages and at more regular intervals. This meant
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that while second mortgages were junior before the law, they acquired a certain form
of seniority in practice, putting repayments of first mortgages under further threat.
The paper starts with a brief overview of existing models of debt dilution in the
economics literature. Particular attention will be drawn to Bizer & DeMarzo (1992)’s
model which analyses the negative impact of “sequential banking” (the occurrence of
borrowing from different lenders) on the first lender. While Fama & Miller (1972)
suggest that sequential banking is not a problem in the presence of seniority rules,
Bizer & DeMarzo (1992) effectively demonstrate that extra lending from a second
bank creates an externality through the devaluation of prior debt which seniority rules
cannot completely eliminate. In equilibrium, as first lenders anticipate the problem,
interest rates end up higher on all debt, and so do probabilities of default.
The paper then moves on to provide contemporary evidence on the existence and
extent of the second mortgage system (Section 3). Information gathered from the
National Association of Real Estate Boards archives in Chicago allows me to establish
that around 76 percent of first mortgage borrowers resorted to this system, so that
total mortgage debt was not 50 percent of the value of the property but rather around
75 percent, from two different lenders. I document average interest rates for both
types of loans in most states, and report on what contemporaries described as the
negative effects of the second-mortgage system. In particular, I examine factors which
aggravated the debt dilution problem. Higher interest rates, shorter maturities and
systematic amortization made second mortgage payments more pressing and acquire
some priority in the eyes of the borrower. While separate from the debt dilution
problem, this seniority reversal effect certainly made matters worse.
Section 4 examines a newly compiled dataset on commercial bank mortgages made
in 22 U.S. cities before the Great Depression started, and provides evidence that low
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) led to higher foreclosure rates in those cities. The data
are taken from the Survey of Urban Housing published in 1937 by the Department
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of Commerce under the supervision of David L. Wickens. While the data do not
allow one to analyse each mortgage individually, it exploits variation in average LTVs
and foreclosure rates on first mortgages between cities to examine the nature of the
relationship between the two variables. The result is a strong negative correlation:
the lower the loan-to-value ratio, the higher the probability of foreclosure. This result
would be counter-intuitive to observers without a knowledge of the second mortgage
system. However, the existence of the second mortgage system explains it perfectly.
Finally, I provide evidence that the foreclosure process was particularly lengthy at
the time, often lasting up to eighteen months (Section 5). This meant that although
house prices usually did not fall by more than 50 percent in the Great Depression
period, implying few losses for commercial banks, the latter would be seriously weak-
ened by an increased default probability. A protracted foreclosure process meant that
a house would be difficult to turn quickly into cash - a great impediment in case of
a liquidity crisis. As most commercial banks lost tremendous amounts of deposits
starting in 1930, higher probabilities of foreclosure no doubt severely weakened their
positions at that particular time. In addition, if depositors knew about this problem
a liquidity crisis could easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Chapter 1 showed,
high proportions of mortgages together with deposit losses caused many banks to fail,
at least in Chicago.
Section 6 concludes that 1920s commercial bank first mortgage contracts presented
significant risks to first mortgage lenders. More generally, the Depression experience
serves as an incentive for caution regarding the use of additional loans (such as “pig-
gyback” mortgages) whose debt dilution effects are difficult to mitigate.
2.2 Models of debt dilution
Debt dilution is one of the central topics of contract theory. It is suspected to have
played an important role in a number of financial crises, such as the Latin-American
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debt crisis of the 1970s, the East-Asian crisis of the late 1990s (Bisin & Guaitoli, 2004;
Radelet & Sachs, 1998), and even the recent worldwide financial crisis (see Acharya &
Bisin (2010)).
At the core of debt dilution is the idea of contract incompleteness. When a lender
enters into a contractual relationship with a borrower, he usually cannot make his
contract contingent on all other contracts that the borrower might sign aside from the
original contract. This is because such contingent contracts would be very costly to
implement, as they would imply intense monitoring of the borrower. As a result, most
financial contracts are non-exclusive.
As the borrower takes on one or more additional loans, an externality is created
because effort to repay the original loan is reduced proportionately, in a way that
was not taken into account when the initial contract was signed. If expectations
of straightforward debt dilution are taken into account by the original lender, he will
likely react by changing the terms of his original loan, which can lead to higher default
rates.
Fama & Miller (1972) initially showed that a simple solution to this problem would
be for each lender to be assigned a clear priority level in the bankruptcy process.
According to this theory, seniority rules would reduce the first lender’s anxiety about
possible debt dilution as he would be first in line to recover the borrower’s assets
in case of default. However since then a great number of authors have warned that
seniority rules were no panacea, and that first lenders were still likely to modify their
loan terms in equilibrium.
Such changes in terms can include, for example, a rise in interest rates. This is
the most common change described in the theoretical literature. In their much-cited
model of “sequential banking,” for example, Bizer & DeMarzo (1992) begin by showing
that in situations where the borrower can only take loans from one bank, additional
lending from that same bank imposes an externality on prior lending but the bank
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can internalise it by increasing the marginal price (interest rate) of each new loan,
which compensates for the devaluation of prior debt. This contrasts with a situation
in which the borrower can take an additional loan not from the first bank, but from a
second bank. In that case the first bank cannot compensate for the externality that
the second loan imposes on its own prior debt by charging a higher rate on that second
loan. Instead, in equilibrium, it charges a higher interest rate on its own original debt,
which leads to a higher probability of default on that loan, even in the presence of
seniority rules. Such a result is also found by Holmstro¨m & Tirole (1997) and more
recently by Parlour & Rajan (2001).
First lenders can also ration credit, change the maturity of loans and make them
shorter, or, in the case especially of sovereign debt, make their loans harder to restruc-
ture. The latter is described in a model by Bolton & Jeanne (2009), where sovereign
debt is described as excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium, due to expec-
tations of debt dilution. Shortening maturities is something that lenders to banks,
in particular, resort to, according to Brunnermeier & Oehmke (2013). By shortening
the maturity of their loans junior lenders can become de facto senior; but this in turn
leads first lenders to shorten the maturity of their own debt: thus a “maturity rat
race” is created.1 Finally, a number of authors point to credit rationing as a reaction
to debt dilution (see, in particular, Bennardo et al. (2013); Degryse et al. (2011); Kahn
& Mookherjee (1998)).
Which of these reactions was commonest in the 1920s? We will see that while
debt dilution increased the probability of foreclosure, the channels through which this
occurred varied. In some cases it is possible to ask simply whether lenders could clearly
anticipate that debt dilution would occur, given that second mortgage lending was,
according to contemporary sources, a relatively new phenomenon. In others, such as
1This paper has wider implications than those directly linked to the debt dilution problem. Indeed,
it questions the very efficiency of banks’ maturity mismatch, long heralded as a liquidity enhancer
and a disciplining device (see Diamond & Dybvig (1983) and Calomiris & Kahn (1991)). It argues
that bank debt may in fact be excessively short-term and thus inefficient.
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for mortgages made in 1928, it seems that interest rates are too blame. The possibility
of credit rationing makes things even more complex, as in the 1920s the very reason
for the existence of second mortgages was the small size of the original loans. This
means that a negative feedback effect towards smaller and smaller loans cannot be
excluded.
2.3 The second mortgage system
This section aims to give a sense of the extent of the second mortgage system. Based
on contemporary accounts and newly-discovered archives from the National Associ-
ation of Real Estate Boards in Chicago, it provides an explanation for its existence
and an examination of its most negative consequences. It begins by describing how
first mortgages were made by commercial banks and why they would often refuse to
lend over 50 percent of the value of the property. It then moves on to describe the
most salient features of the resulting second mortgage system, before analysing its
consequences for first lenders: debt dilution on the one hand, and seniority reversal
on the other. The next section will empirically test the hypothesis that low LTVs led
to higher foreclosure rates.
2.3.1 Conservatism of first mortgages
Starting around 1921 commercial banks greatly expanded their holdings of real estate
loans. As Figure 2.1 shows, the peak in total U.S. mortgage debt held by commercial
banks was reached between 1925 and 1929.2 As is well-known in the literature, most
of these loans up until 1927 were made by state rather than national banks, as the
2Commercial banks were not the only mortgage lenders. Both building and loan (B&L) associ-
ations and mutual savings banks held higher shares. Life insurance companies held almost just as
much as commercial banks, and mortgage companies held a much lower share. See Grebler et al.
(1956), Tables N-2 and N-3, pp. 468-74. They are not analysed here as the topic of interest is the
relationship (if any) between mortgage lending and widespread bank failures. The figures provided
here and in Figure 2.1 may take renewals into account.










Figure 2.1: Real estate loans by type of bank (all categories), 1900-1938 ($ million)
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1956).
latter’s real estate lending powers were considerably constrained by law until then.
The literature also rightly insists that the contract maturity of these first mortgage
loans rarely exceeded 5 years, and that often it only averaged 3 years. Nor did their
loan-to-value ratio often exceed 50 percent, and most only required interest payments,
with the principal payable at maturity in a “balloon” payment. The most authoritative
source on these figures is Morton (1956, pp. 3-7, 178),3 though numerous contemporary
sources confirm this (see for instance Adair (1923) and Gries & Ford (1932, pp. 6, 16,
20)).4
An interesting feature of these contracts is that, despite their conservatism, they
were not usually implemented for legal reasons in the case of state banks.
National banks were the most constrained type of bank in terms of mortgage
3Since these figures are based on a National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban mort-
gage lending, their absolute precision may be taken with care. The survey was made in 1945 on a
sample of 170 commercial banks, “representing about one-third of the commercial banks’ total non-
farm mortgage portfolio as of mid-1945.” It included “commercial banks of all sizes” (ibid., p. 71).
4This contract differed from, say B&L contracts whose mortgages were amortized over 11 years
on average. It would be useful to see how this difference in contracts impacted these institutions’
chances of survival during the Depression, but B&L’s are known to have suffered from other structural
problems with their share participation system which would make a comparison with commercial
banks particularly difficult (see, in particular, Snowden (2010)).
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lending. The National Banking Act of 1864, whose aim was partly to bring banks
under the control of the federal government and thereby to set standards of good
practice (White, 1983), prohibited any type of lending on real estate.5 Under the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, conditions were slightly liberalized for country national
banks so as to allow them to make farm mortgages for a duration of up to 5 years, which
could not exceed 25 percent of capital and surplus or a third of time deposits (United
States, 1913, p. 25). In September 1916, this act was amended to allow urban banks
to make urban real estate loans of up to one year, though excluding banks located in
central reserve cities (Chicago, New York and St Louis) (Federal Reserve Board, 1918,
p. 44). It is only after the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927 that all national banks
were allowed to loan on real estate for 5 years, to an aggregate amount of 50 percent
of their time deposits (Behrens, 1952, p. 18). The legal maximum loan-to-value ratio
thus never exceeded 50 percent for national banks (Lloyd, 1994).6
However, there is good reason to think that had national banks been allowed to
loan more and for longer than the McFadden Act allowed them, they would have
rarely done so. Such was the case with state banks, which despite particularly lax
legislation would not commonly lend above 50 percent and for longer than 3 to 5
years – on average. The only precise data available on state-chartered bank legislation
comes from Welldon (1910), although this source should be a rather conservative one
5Except to “prevent losses on debts previously contracted in good faith” (Behrens, 1952, p. 15).
In such cases, if necessary, they could acquire title to the property but had to dispose of it within
five years (United States, 1864).
6Much of this liberalization was due to an effort on the part of the national banking system to
compete with state banks. During hearings on the Inquiry into Membership in the Federal Reserve
System, Senator Glass insisted that restrictions on real estate were an important reason for the
reluctance of state banks to join the system (U.S. Congress, 1926b, p. 13). This may explain the
liberalization of national banking laws as all national banks were required to be members of the
Federal Reserve System. Senator McFadden openly supported liberalization to achieve this purpose,
as can be seen in the 1926 Hearings on the Consolidation of National Banking Associations chaired
by him (U.S. Congress, 1926a, p. 25). It is also interesting to note that Mr Bains of the National
Bank of Philadelphia remarked that one reason why state banks might still be reluctant to join the
system was that they could not rediscount real estate paper at the Federal Reserve Banks: “You take
the State banks: the principal loans are on real estate. That may be why so many State banks do
not want to go into the national system, because they have no use of the rediscount privileges. They
can get rediscount from their correspondent banks, but not from the Federal Reserve bank, because
most of their bonds are on real estate; that is, in Pennsylvania” (U.S. Congress, 1926b, p. 644).
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as real estate regulation had a tendency to become more lax in the following decades.
According to this survey, only Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon and
Texas limited loan-to-value ratios to 50 percent.
The reasons for such conservatism are of two different kinds. On the one hand,
up until the early 1920s commercial banks thought of real estate loans as particularly
illiquid. As there was no market for them and they could not be rediscounted at
the Federal Reserve, many were aware of the fact that long-term, high-leverage loans
would be hard to liquidate in case a bank run occurred.7
On the other hand, redemption laws that were particularly favourable to borrowers
increased first mortgage lenders’ cost of lending and contributed to their contract
conservatism. Variation in redemption laws and loan-to-value ratios by state helps
to see this. While the average loan-to-value ratio was indeed around 50 percent, this
figure tends to conceal some interesting variation among the different U.S. states.
Likewise, there was substantial variation between states in terms redemption laws:
some state legislations were much more favourable to borrowers than others, as Table
2.1 makes clear. Examining the relationship between the two variables by state, it
is possible to notice a modest negative correlation (around .5) between the number
of months allowed by a particular state for redemption and this state’s mean LTV
for commercial banks. In other words, the more generous state laws were towards
borrowers, the more likely banks were to reduce their mortgage loan amounts.8
7Note that some mortgage securitization took place, especially in Chicago (see Chapter 3). At a
1913 congressional hearing, a national banker declared that real estate loans should not be made “out
of any money left on deposit or subject to check. If such loans are made upon money subject to check
sooner or later you are bound to involve yourself in trouble for two reasons: First, you can not always
find a market for these notes. (...) [Second], if you foreclose on your mortgage and want to sell the
property there is not always a buyer for it” (U.S. Congress, 1913, p. 180). This attitude was reinforced
by the “real bills doctrine,” a pervasive ideology at the time according to which commercial banks
should only engage in short-term commercial business. Of course many bankers did not in practice
follow it, especially with respect to stock investments and loans on securities, but it certainly acted as
a constraint once a commercial banker decided to make any mortgage loans at all (see, in particular,
U.S. Congress (1913, p. 180)).
8The data on redemption laws are taken from Jones (1928). The data on LTVs by state are taken
from the same NBER database as Morton (1956) used to derive his averages, mentioned above. As
pointed out earlier, these data are to be taken with great care as they come from a survey, made
only in 1945, of commercial banks which by definition survived the Great Depression. As Morton
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Table 2.1: Redemption laws and urban LTVs by state, 1928 and 1920-1929































New Hampshire 0 -
New Jersey 0 48
New Mexico 9 -
New York 0 55
North Carolina 0 -





Rhode Island 0 53
South Carolina 0 53







West Virginia 0 49
Wisconsin 12 -
Wyoming 6 -
Notes: Data on LTVs are missing for some states, and in general presents quite a
few weaknesses (see text).
Sources: See text, and Jones (1928).


























































































Other stocks and bonds
Government bonds
Real estate loans
Figure 2.2: Main asset holdings at national banks, 1900-1938 ($ million, stacked)































































Other stocks and bonds
Government bonds
Real estate loans
Figure 2.3: Main asset holdings at state banks, 1900-1938 ($ million, stacked)
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1956).
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Once these self-imposed restrictions were in place, state banks would allow them-
selves to lend a fair portion of their assets on real estate. Thus mortgages came to
account for 16 percent of assets in the portfolios of state banks in 1926 (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1956).9 Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the main
assets of national and state banks from 1900 to 1938.
2.3.2 The second mortgage system
In the depth of the Depression, President Hoover ordered 25 committees to work for
a number of months on the problems facing mortgage borrowers and lenders. The
Committee on Finance for the Conference then drew conclusions that two years later
would form the basis of the justification for the National Housing Act. One of these
conclusions was that the frequent 50 percent limit on first mortgages was based on
erroneous principles: “If security is considered, this would seem to be in line with
sound public policy. On the other hand, the practice is the principle cause for most
second mortgages with their exorbitant rates and frequent failures” (Gries & Ford,
1932, p. ix). As a result the bill for the National Housing Act was specifically designed,
among other things, “to eliminate the necessity for costly second-mortgage financing”
(U.S. Congress, 1934a, p. 1). The necessity for second mortgages in the 1920s was
best described by Reep (1928, p. 1):
“The chief financing problem (...) is that of financing above the first
mortgage. (...) In purchasing a property (...) it is assumed, of course,
that at least a small down payment is made. The difference between the
sum of the first mortgage plus the down payment and the total cost of
the property must be financed by junior liens. If the cost of the property
is $10,000, the purchase money mortgage $5,000, and the down payment
$2,500, then the balance, $2,500, is the junior lien.”
himself insists, banks were less likely to report accurately on loans made twenty years earlier than
on more recent loans (see Morton (1956, p. 133-8)). I thank Andra Ghent for making these data
available to me in a processed format. The raw data are available online on the NBER website:
<http://www.nber.org/nberhistory/historicalarchives/archives.html> .
9In the same year national banks’ real estate loans only amounted to 5.4 percent of their assets.
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But what proportion of borrowers took on a second mortgage in addition to the
first? And what was its average loan-to-value ratio? The National Association of Re-
altors Archives in Chicago contain extensive archival material on the second mortgage
system.10 Aside from numerous contemporary research articles from the Association’s
Real Estate Finance journal and thousands of news items from its National Real Es-
tate Journal (from which many of the references cited in this section and the next are
drawn), they also store contemporary statistical surveys conducted by the Association
itself.
The most extensive such statistical inquiry shows that, in 1923, 76 percent of first
residential mortgage borrowers took on a second mortgage (National Association of
Real Estate Boards, 1923). This figure is based on questionnaires sent to 200 banks
which were members of the Association,11 and is confirmed by other contemporary
accounts such as Gries & Ford (1932, p. 21), who say that “two-thirds or more of all
home purchase transactions require junior financing.”12 According to the survey, the
average loan-to-value ratio for second mortgages was 29.6 percent, so that the total
average ratio for first and second mortgages combined was 83.3 percent (National
Association of Real Estate Boards, 1923). Other sources put the average LTV lower,
at 75 percent (Beach, 1926; Gries & Ford, 1932). Most loans lasted on average one to
three years; in other words, they usually matured before the first mortgage (Dunton,
1926; Gries & Ford, 1932).13 Also contrasting with first mortgages, second liens were
not expected to be renewed, and required monthly amortized payments (see Bayless
& Bodfish (1928), Beach (1926), Brigham (1928), Dunton (1926), and Gries & Ford
10This trade association of realtors still exists but at the time was called the National Association
of Real Estate Boards. In the field of mortgage finance their aim was to capture contemporary trends,
describe and explain them, and to some extent warn against them if they thought they could be a
threat to the business in the long run. They often asked outside observers (businessmen as well as
academics) to contribute to their research output. The second mortgage system was one of the chief
examples of ”bad practice” that many contributors criticized.
11It therefore excludes B&L’s.
12See also, for example, Adair (1923).
13Gries & Ford (1932, p. 20) note that sometimes the first mortgage matured before the second,
but they present this fact more as an oddity than common practice.
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Contract maturity 3-5 years 1-3 years -
Loan-to-value ratio 50% to 54% 25% to 29% 75% to 83%
Annual interest
rate










Sources: Beach (1926), Gries & Ford (1932, pp. 6, 16, 20-1) and National
Association of Real Estate Boards (1923).
(1932, pp. 6, 20)).14 Table 2.2 summarizes these findings.
The prevalence of very high interest rates and charges - on average 14 to 16 percent
for second mortgages on homes - can be explained in part by the underdevelopment
of large institutions making second mortgages. As Bayless & Bodfish (1928) put it,
“the majority of second mortgage business is carried on by small firms and individuals,
which prevents the operation of the insurance principle through the spreading of risk”
(ibid.).15
Yet the most important reason behind these high interest rates was the lack of
security backing the second mortgage and the resulting “discounting business.” As
liens were junior they were by definition hazardous for the lender - so much so that
charging the maximum legal rate would not be enough to cover the risks attendant to
second mortgages. As charging a usurious rate would bring disrepute to the firm or
individual offering the loan, they would in turn sell it to a third party, at a discount.
14Brigham (1928) noted, regarding second liens: “one of the commonest sharp tricks is to sell a
man a house for more than it is worth with a small down payment and a one-year second mortgage
which at the end of the year the seller mortgagee says that he cannot renew in spite of his assurances
to the contrary at the time of sale.”
15Gries & Ford (1932, p. 29) mentioned the existence of “second mortgage companies,” the great
majority of which failed to weather the Depression.
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This would render the transaction between borrower and investor legal.16 The third
party would then charge an even higher rate to the borrower to compensate for the
commission it had to pay the dealer (Beach, 1926; Reep, 1928).17 In other words,
through the discounting business the borrower ended up paying a higher rate than
the already usurious rate he would pay without it. Consequently many contemporary
observers, including Reep, criticized usury legislation itself and supported higher statu-
tory maximums. Table 2.3 provides information on legal rates (the default interest
rate suggested by law) and statutory maximums.
To what extent was this discounting business established? According to Reep
(1928, p. 86), the discounting of second mortgage paper was carried out in most
U.S. cities for most second mortgages. In this regard it is interesting to note that a
small portion of second mortgages were in fact pooled with others and sold to banks
and investors as securities. Such securities were the direct obligation of the issuing
company. But as Beach (1926, p. 13) made clear, this practice had yet to become
more common and better known.18
16As ?, p. 19 put it, “instead of financing the borrower direct, the lender will purchase the second
mortgage and land contract paper if it has been executed. This procedure is not affected by usury
law because any man has the right to sell his mortgage or his contract at any rate of discount (...)
provided that the mortgage or contract is not already tainted with usury in the hands of the seller.”
Further detail can be found in Reep (1925), where the author insisted that “second mortgages are
bought at a discount and are not made directly with the owner of the property,” and the following
example is provided: “[t]he seller can take this second mortgage to a second mortgage company and
discount it $500 and thereby realize his $5,000 cash for the property as follows: $1,500 cash from the
purchaser, $2,500 in cash from the first mortgage and $1,000 cash from the discounted $1,500 second
mortgage. In fact, the seller can discount the $1,500 second mortgage any amount that he wishes or
even give it away without any danger of usury.”
17This was explained by Beach (1926): “The individual investor, fearing that he had more hazard
and knowing that he had more trouble demanded a large profit. The dealer wanted a profit too. The
borrower paid both - two profits - both large.”
18Reep also provided an interesting account of what has survived today in the literature on building
and loan associations (B&Ls) as the “Philadelphia experiment.” It is often described as a relatively
rare form of innovative behaviour on the part of B&Ls, in which some Philadelphia B&Ls started
specializing in the second mortgage business in what seemed at first sight an attempt to reap a
larger profit (Loucks, 1929; Snowden, 2010). Reep’s account provided additional information in
explaining why even first mortgage borrowers who were B&L members also needed access to the
second mortgage market. He conceded that B&Ls’ monthly amortization principle allowed them to
make first mortgages about 15 percent higher “with equal safety” (ibid., p. 90). However for him,
65 percent LTVs had not solved the junior lien problem as “they have merely limited the problem
to a narrower margin of security.” Indeed, many borrowers still could not make a 35 percent down
payment and still needed to take out a second mortgage (ibid., p. 92). But Reep was quite pessimistic
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Table 2.3: Legal interest rates on mortgages and
statutory maximums by state, 1928




















Maine 6 no limit
Maryland 6 6







Nevada 7 no limit
New Hampshire 6 no limit
New Jersey 6 6
New Mexico 6 12
New York 6 6
North Carolina 6 6





Rhode Island 6 30
South Carolina 7 8







West Virginia 6 6
Wisconsin 6 10
Wyoming 8 12
Sources: Reep (1928, pp. 215-7).
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2.3.3 Consequences
Drawing on 1925 data for Chicago, Bayless & Bodfish (1928) described the second
mortgage as a rather sound instrument since it only lasted one to three years, there
was no intention of renewal, and it required monthly payments.19 They also asserted
that it “has broadened the real estate market and has often been the financial ladder
by which the urban tenant climbs to complete ownership.”
However they did recognize a “complete lack of standardization,” emphasizing
particularly high interest charges. Indeed, these interest rates were often blamed for
borrowers’ inability to pay back their second mortgages. Consequently, most lenders
specializing in second mortgages went bankrupt in the Depression. As Fahey pointed
out in his 1934 article, the mortality rate of second mortgages was “practically 100
percent” (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1934).20
More importantly from the point of view of commercial banks, the second mortgage
system also impaired borrowers’ ability to repay first mortgages. Although having a
large loan split between two lenders in theory also splits the risk between those two
lenders, in reality the risk is not entirely split as first mortgage lenders may suffer.
First, first mortgage lenders suffered due to debt dilution. First mortgage borrowers
would have an incentive to conceal the fact that they were taking a second mortgage
to make the down payment. This is because they would either fear that first lenders
would simply refuse such a deal, or that first lenders would agree to such a contract
but would increase interest rates accordingly. If due to asymmetric information first
lenders wrongly thought that no second mortgages were taken,21 they would suffer
about the future of B&Ls in this business as he thought they would in the end face similar constraints
as other second mortgage dealers (ibid., p. 100).
19According to their survey, based on a small sample of properties in Chicago, about half of homes,
and around two thirds of apartments, were encumbered with a second mortgage in 1925 (ibid.).
20See also Cope (1929).
21Concealment of second mortgages may have been relatively easy as, on the one hand, they
constituted a relatively new phenomenon, and, on the other hand, they were mainly provided by very
small institutions and individuals who were not regulated by law.
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from straightforward debt dilution (effort to pay back the first loan would be diluted
by the existence of second loan) with no compensating reactions. Should first lenders
be uncertain about whether a second mortgage would be taken or not, modifications
would be brought about, such a interest rate increases, which would also lead to higher
default probabilities. While little data remain to ascertain which of these situations
was most prevalent, it is clear that in any of these cases debt dilution would be
detrimental to first mortgage lenders.22
Second, differences in contract terms between first and second mortgages would
strongly aggravate the situation by creating a seniority reversal effect. Since interest
rates on second mortgages were usurious, and since the latter matured in general before
the former, the second mortgage acquired some priority in time – what is sometimes
called “de facto priority” (Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013). This seniority reversal
effect was reinforced when second mortgages required monthly payments, unlike first
mortgages which usually remained unamortized.
The existence of both of these negative effects is confirmed by numerous contem-
porary accounts. It was best expressed by Schmidt (1930):
“Experience proves that it is better and safer to have one mortgage for
seventy percent than to have, say, a fifty percent first mortgage and junior
financing above that amount. The expense of the junior financing is very
great, and such second and third mortgages, because of heavy amortiza-
tion and other causes, have been frequently the occasion of leading a first
mortgage issue into difficulty.”
Adams (1928) likewise expressed his concern: “[i]t has been our experience that
where a corporation is dealing purely in conservative first mortgage paper, it is almost
invariably the case that the borrower is not being pressed by his obligation, but that
he has incurred other obligations, (...) in the form of a second mortgage (...).” For
Beach (1926), while the borrower should not worry about paying the first mortgage as
22The next section will show that, analysing 22 cities, a rise in interest rates at least for first loans
made in 1928 was likely.
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it was unamortized and would mature later, “[y]ou reserve a portion of your income
each month for the retirement of this second mortgage.”23
This problem was not confined to urban mortgages. Although second mortgages
were of a slightly different character in farm lands than in cities, Wickens (1933)
insisted that:
“(...) the man who mortgages his land and later mortgages his crop or
other income from the land in effect borrows twice on the same security.
Not only does he pledge to another the income on which the first loan
was based, but the resulting increase in his total liabilities and burden of
payment reduces his capacity to meet all of his obligations.”
It is interesting to note that junior liens were sometimes paid before maturity. For
Reep this could be due to two reasons. Either the borrower was a “successful man”
and he paid it off “because he does not like the hazard of a junior lien.” Or he was
not successful and would need to entirely refinance his first mortgage, which at the
time included paying the junior lien (Reep, 1928, p. 37). This would appear to be
especially important in times of crisis: it would imply that if the borrower for various
reasons could not pay back the second mortgage, he would not be able to refinance
his first mortgage, and would be more likely to face foreclosure.
There is also evidence that in some rare cases second mortgages were made by
commercial banks themselves. One study comparing five North-Eastern states shows
great variation in terms of first, second and third mortgage providers. It was carried
out in 1936 on Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) loans so may not be entirely
representative of 1920s loans. Nevertheless, it is striking to see that in Ohio nearly 20
percent of the amount of second mortgages were provided by bank and trust companies.
Individual firms provided around 50 percent, while the rest was mainly provided by
building and loans associations and financial and mortgage companies (Federal Home
23See also U.S. Congress (1934a). It should also be noted that a 25 percent effective down payment
meant that borrowers had less equity in their homes, prompting them, as theory predicts, to make
less of an effort in times of stress to pay back their mortgages than if the equity was 50 percent as
some first mortgage lenders may have believed.
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Loan Bank Board, 1936, p. 352).24 This means that in some isolated cases commercial
banks were affected by second mortgages not only indirectly through second mortgages’
impact on first mortgage risk, but also directly through their exposure to second
mortgage risk.
2.3.4 Aftermath
It is not clear why this highly problematic situation has not been emphasized to a
larger extent in the recent literature on the 1920s mortgage boom. Perhaps this is
due to the scarcity of second mortgage records due to the unregulated types of second
mortgage lenders. Nevertheless, President Hoover said in 1931 that “the finance of
home building, and especially for second mortgages, is the most backward segment
of our whole credit system” (Gries & Ford, 1932, p. ix). Samuel Reep, a scholar and
author of a 1928 book on second mortgages, designated them as “the chief real estate
financing problem” (Reep, 1928, p. 1). Finally John Fahey, Chairman of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and a key actor behind the National Housing Act of 1934,
described them as “the outstanding sore spot in the [U.S.’s] home-financing system”
and“The Evils of Ultraconservative Lending” (Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1934,
p. 4).
In the 1930s bills were introduced in Congress by the Roosevelt administration
not only to relieve distressed homeowners but also to overhaul the real estate lending
system. While the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 already bought mortgages from
troubled lenders and restructured them by extending their maturity up to 30 years
and amortizing them, it was only designed as an emergency measure (U.S. Congress,
1933, p. 1).
The National Housing Act of 1934, on the other hand, clearly aimed at the long-
24The four other states studied were: New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and West Virginia. The
numbers are similar for West Virginia, while for Connecticut bank and trust companies held fewer
second mortgages (14 percent). The lowest shares are for New York and New Jersey, which still held
around 8 percent of these mortgages (ibid.).
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term restructuring of the mortgage financing system as a whole, and to do so primarily
by introducing national mortgage insurance. The goal of mortgage insurance was
not simply to increase the liquidity of real estate finance. It was in fact the main
incentive structure through which the U.S. government hoped to make commercial
banks, insurance companies and savings and loan institutions increasingly offer long-
term (15 to 20 years), low down payment, monthly amortized and low interest (6
percent) mortgages. Indeed, once the law was enacted, a bank could only insure its
mortgages if they conformed to these criteria (U.S. Congress, 1934a). This way the
U.S. government hoped to eliminate the second mortgage system, which it successfully
managed to do for some time.
2.4 Empirical analysis
In this section I analyse a newly-compiled dataset of commercial bank first mortgages
in 22 U.S. cities and establish a strong negative correlation between LTVs and foreclo-
sure rates. While Section 3 made clear that LTVs on such mortgages rarely exceeded
50 or 55 percent, Table 2.1 also showed that there was some geographical variation
in LTVs. This variation can be exploited to test the hypothesis that particularly low
LTVs led to higher foreclosure rates. The result that there was indeed such a negative
correlation would seem counterintuitive at first, but it can readily be explained by
the existence of the second mortgage system whose prevalence was described in the
preceding section. This section thus provides empirical grounding to the idea that low
LTVs, which gave rise to the widespread use of second mortgages, posed a significant
threat to first mortgage lenders.
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2.4.1 Data description
The data are derived from the Financial Survey of Urban Housing published in 1937
by the Department of Commerce under the direction of David L. Wickens.25 To my
knowledge this survey provides the most elaborate and detailed data on first mortgages
made by commercial banks just before the Great Depression. For 22 “representative”
U.S. cities, most of which had a population of over 100,000 souls, information was gath-
ered on January 1st, 1934 on existing owner-occupied residential properties, whether
mortgaged by a commercial bank, not mortgaged or undergoing foreclosure.26
For this study the important items of the survey were, in each city: 1) the average
cost of properties by year of acquisition (whether acquired through debt or bought
outright); 2) the average value of properties acquired in 1926 on January 1st, 1934; 3)
the average original amount of existing first mortgages; 4) the average percentage of
existing first mortgages undergoing foreclosure; 5) the average amount of existing first
mortgages by year loan made or renewed; and 6) the average contract interest rates
on existing first mortgages.27
Unfortunately there was no ready-made LTV variable for first mortgages made by
commercial banks by year loan made. Instead I had to construct such an average
LTV variable by dividing (5) by (1) (and multiplying the result by 100) for each year
before the Depression.28 As the foreclosure rates concern only first mortgage loans
25The data in raw form can be accessed online at <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/
001106778>.
26The cities included are: Portland, Maine; Worcester, Mass.; Providence, R.I.; Syracuse, N.Y.;
Trenton, N.J.; Cleveland, Ohio; Indianapolis, Ind.; Peoria, Ill.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Des Moines, Iowa;
Wichita, Kans.; Richmond, Va.; Wheeling, W. Va.; Atlanta, Ga.; Birmingham, Ala.; Oklahoma City,
Okla.; Dallas, Tex.; Butte, Mont.; Casper, Wyo.; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Wash.; San Diego,
Calif.
27Another potentially useful source is the data collected by the NBER in 1945 mentioned earlier.
However, as was pointed out, and as Morton himself insists, the foreclosure data from this source
are likely to be fraught with errors since many banks declined to fill out the questionnaire and many
others may have been dishonest about their foreclosure experience (see Morton (1956, p. 133-8)). In
this respect Wickens’s data are more reliable, being closer to the Depression and surveying individual
properties instead of individual banks, which avoids the self-selection problem.
28This average is thus a ratio of means rather than a mean of ratios. While this may at first strike
as odd, it should be noted that the arithmetic mean of ratios is only superior to the ratio of arithmetic
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still existing on January 1st, 1934 - with no breakdown by year loan made - it was
important to find out the most likely contracting dates for those existing loans. This
would allow the study of relationships between foreclosure rates and LTVs of loans
made roughly in the same years. Correlations included in Appendix 2.7.1 show that
most existing loans were made in 1927 and 1928, which induces me to focus on those
two years (see Figure 2.10). This should not pose too much of a problem as the peak
in residential construction was reached in 1926 (see Figure 2.11 in Appendix 2.7.1)
and mortgage lending plateaued around 1927 (see again Figure 2.3).29
As the sample contains only 22 observations (and sometimes even fewer where
commercial banks were not big lenders), the analysis of simple two-way correlations
with fitted regression lines seemed appropriate.30
2.4.2 Results
The results are quite striking. In both 1927 and 1928, average LTVs on first mortgage
loans made by commercial banks are strongly and negatively correlated with foreclo-
sure rates on those loans. This is shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. In other words, the
lower was the LTV on these loans, the higher was the foreclosure rate. To many ob-
servers today this would seem counterintuitive, as high LTVs are usually associated
with higher risk. But the existence of the second mortgage system offers a powerful
explanation for this negative correlation. Although correlation does not necessarily
imply causation, it is likely that the lower was the LTV on the first mortgage, the
means if both the numerator and denominator are normally distributed. This assumption, however,
can be questioned in the case of many financial variables, which often display lognormal distributions.
In such cases, the ratio of arithmetic means in fact approximates the geometric mean of the ratios,
which is considered a better estimate than the arithmetic mean of the ratios (see, in particular, Lev
& Sunder (1979), Mcleay & Trigueiros (2002), and Tippett (1990)). Geometric means for instance
were used in Chapter 1 of this thesis. However in this dataset a few resulting LTVs are unexpectedly
high, which may suggest that the presence of some measurement error cannot be definitely excluded.
29Unfortunately no second mortgage data can be used as in 1934 it can be expected that most
second mortgages, which had a very short maturity, would have been either paid off or foreclosed
long ago.
30Appendix 2.7.2 nevertheless reports results for a tentative simple OLS regression framework.
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Figure 2.7: Average LTV and average interest rate, 1927 and 1928
Source: Wickens (1937).
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larger was the second mortgage loan, and the greater was the debt dilution problem.
Unsurprisingly, foreclosure rates are also associated with falls in property values
between 1926 (the peak in construction) and January 1st, 1934. This is shown in
Figure 2.6, where the percentage fall in property values, calculated by using variables
(1) and (2), often averaged as much as 30 percent.
Now, as was seen previously, the precise channels through which second mortgages
could have led to higher foreclosure rates on first mortgages are of various kinds. All
that can be said given the available data is that, on average, interest rates were not
the obvious problem in 1927, whereas they may have been in 1928. Figure 2.7 helps
to see this, plotting average LTVs against average interest rates on first mortgages
for both years. In 1928, there is a strong negative correlation between LTVs and
interest rates: the lower the LTV, the higher the interest rate. But the correlation is
much weaker for 1927, which suggests an unstable relationship between the two. This
could mean that foreclosures increased due to other kinds of modifications of the first
mortgage loan contracts, or that first mortgage lenders suffered from straightforward
debt dilution due to their possible ignorance of the extent of the second mortgage
system (and concealment on the part of borrowers).
2.5 The negative impact of foreclosures
As Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show, U.S. foreclosure rates increased dramatically for loans
made in 1925, and increased even more for loans made in 1928. Did an increased
foreclosure risk on first mortgages matter for banks, given an average 50 percent
LTV? Theory predicts that it would, if liquidity needs were pressing. Of course,
were they given all the time in the world to foreclose, they would in the end get their
security back, unless land values fell by more than 50 percent (which is unlikely).31
31Section 4 showed that in the 22 cities surveyed the fall in property values from 1926 to 1934 often
averaged 30 percent but never exceeded 40 percent.
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But problems arose for banks facing large deposit withdrawals. In such cases, banks’
liquidity needs were urgent, and should they have to foreclose on some properties, they
would often have to wait for at least one year before acquiring title.
Table 2.4 complements Table 2.1 by providing precise information not only on
redemption laws but also on court proceedings in each state around 1925. As Ghent
(2012) also insists, many states required lenders to go to court in order to acquire title
to the property. Therefore while in 26 states the redemption period was 6 months
or more, court time (which could vary) often needed to be added. Among these 26
states, 19 had a redemption period of one year or more.32
That the foreclosure process was particularly lengthy and thus posed a significant
threat to banks’ health is emphasized by Gries & Ford (1932, p. 39)’s study of mortgage
lending:
“One of the greatest hindrances to the availability of mortgage money
in some states is the right of redemption from sale under foreclosure. Dur-
ing the period of redemption, foreclosed property is rendered practically
unmarketable, may suffer serious damage or depreciation, and presents in
a high degree a type of frozen asset.”33
Numerous accounts of the Depression emphasize the tremendous amounts of de-
posit losses that commercial banks had to endure during the period. Friedman &
Schwartz (1963) and Wicker (1996) provide extensive evidence of this fact, which can
be seen in Figure 2.12 in Appendix 2.7.1. Given the relatively large holdings of real
estate loans, especially at state commercial banks (see again Figure 2.3), it is clear that
large deposit losses combined with high foreclosure rates would have been problematic
at best. In addition, if depositors knew about this problem a liquidity crisis could
32The data used in this table differ slightly from those used in Table 2.1 as information on court
time was needed, which can be found in Child (1925). Court time varied according to the case, the
location in the state and the state itself. Some estimate it to be around three months (Johnson,
1923).
33See also Anderson (1927), Hopper (1927), Johnson (1923) and Stalker (1925). Sometimes, in the
case of income-producing properties, an “assignment of rents” contract would be signed by borrower
and lender to ensure that all rents during the foreclosure period would be collected by the lender, not
by the borrower. This would tend to limit the financial damage over the period (Hoppe, 1926).
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Figure 2.8: Number of nonfarm foreclosures (all lenders), 1926-1940









Figure 2.9: Residential foreclosure rates at commercial banks by year loan made,
1920-1935 (%)
Source: Morton (1956, p. 100). Note: in this graph a foreclosure rate in a particular
year represents the average foreclosure rate for loans made in this particular year.
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Table 2.4: Redemption laws and foreclosure practice by state, 1925
State Suit in court Redemption
period
Total approximate time to get title
Alabama No 2 years psd + 2 years
Arizona Yes 6 months court time + 6 months
Arkansas Yes 1 year w court time
California Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Colorado No 9 months 10 months
Connecticut Yes - court time
Delaware Yes - court time
Florida Yes - court time
Georgia Yes - court time
Idaho Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Illinois Yes 15 months court time + 15 months
Indiana Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Iowa Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Kansas Yes 18 months court time + 18 months
Kentucky Yes 1 year 2/3av court time
Louisiana No - 50 days
Maine No - 1 year
Maryland No - psd + confirmation of sale by court
Massachusetts No - 21 days
Michigan No 1 year 15 months
Minnesota No 1 year 13.5 months
Mississippi No No 21 days
Missouri No - 20 days
Montana Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Nebraska Yes 9 months court time + 9 months
Nevada Yes 6 months court time + 6 months
New Hampshire No 1 year 1 year
New Jersey Yes - court time
New Mexico Yes 3 months court time + 1 year
New York Yes - court time
North Carolina No - psd + 10 days
North Dakota No 1 year 14.5 months
Ohio Yes - court time
Oklahoma Yes 6 months court time + 6 months
Oregon Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Pennsylvania Yes 1 year w court time
Rhode Island No - psd
South Carolina Yes - court time
South Dakota No 1 year 13.5 months
Tennessee No 2 years w psd
Texas No - 20 days
Utah Yes 6 months court time + 6 months
Vermont Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Virginia No - psd
Washington Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
West Virginia No - 20 days
Wisconsin Yes 1 year court time + 1 year
Wyoming No 9 months 10.5 months
Notes:“psd” - power of sale days; “w” - period may be waived in the mortgage; “2/3av” -
redemption allowed only if property does not sell for 2/3 appraised value.
Sources: Child (1925).
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easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Chapter 1 showed, high proportions of
mortgages together with deposit losses caused many banks to fail, at least in Chicago.
An explanation of the widespread commercial bank failures that plagued the Depres-
sion era (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963; Wicker, 1996) can therefore hardly do without
reference to the second mortgage system.
As the vice-president of the banking department of the First National Trust and
Savings Bank in Chicago put it:
“As to retaining homes, I have heard a lot of talk about foreclosures
and that the banks are calling loans and insisting upon repayment and
that the borrowers are unable to refund elsewhere, and they are doing this
because they are trying to keep their assets liquid. In our State it takes
us, at a minimum, 18 months to foreclose a loan, and it will probably be
closer to two years, if not two years and a half, before we acquire title.
We are certainly not maintaining our liquid condition by foreclosing loans.
We cannot do anything with it after we get it foreclosed” (U.S. Congress,
1932, part 2, p. 269).
2.6 Conclusion
A 50 percent down payment is not easy to make for many borrowers - and indeed, more
than two-thirds of them could not make one in the 1920s. Their solution was simple
but more burdensome than they probably imagined at first: taking out a second, junior
mortgage from another institution or individual, in order to bridge the gap between
the down payment they were initially able to make and the mortgage itself. This in
effect allowed them to make the required 50 percent down payment, but in reality
their equity in the home was only around 25 percent. The interest rate on the second
mortgage was usurious, maturities were shorter and more binding than in the first
mortgage case, and as such it greatly impaired the borrower’s ability to repay even
the first mortgage. Should foreclosure occur, the first mortgage lender would indeed
receive 50 percent of the value of the property, but at great costs.
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This paper presents compelling qualitative and empirical evidence of the extent of
the second mortgage system and of its negative consequences for commercial banks
during the Depression. In today’s world of “piggyback” lending and multi-party over-
the-counter trading in derivatives such as credit-default swaps, it is a timely reminder
that debt dilution, or “sequential banking” can be highly detrimental to credit. In
particular, it is noteworthy that even though first mortgage contracts have changed
considerably, the 2000s saw the reemergence of interest-only loans combined with
piggybacks (second mortgages).34 Recent research by Mayer et al. (2009) and LaCour-
Little et al. (2011) has indeed shown that by 2006-7 the share of Alt-A mortgages that
were interest-only rose by 44 percent, the share of those with piggybacks rose to 42
percent, and that the share of subprime mortgages with piggybacks reached 28 percent.
Overall, they find that such loans had a significantly higher probability of default –
an unsurprising fact in the light of history.
34Interestingly, piggyback loans emerged in the 2000s not as a result of low first mortgage LTVs
but as a way for borrowers to bring down first mortgage LTVs to 80 percent or below in order to
avoid having to pay for private mortgage insurance.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Additional figures
Figure 2.10 shows that the strongest correlations between the average original amount
of existing first mortgage and the average amount of existing loans contracted or
renewed in some particular years can be found in 1927 and 1928. This suggests that
a focus on LTVS for loans made in those years is recommended, given that the data
on foreclosure rates are not broken-up by year loan made but are average foreclosure
rates for existing loans. Figure 2.11 shows residential housing starts in the U.S. for
the period 1914-1933, pointing out a peak around 1926. Figure 2.12 shows deposits










































2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
amount28
Fitted values amountorig
Figure 2.10: Average original amount of existing loan and average amount of existing
loan contracted or renewed in 1925-8 (in dollars)
Source: Wickens (1937).








Figure 2.11: U.S. Nonfarm housing starts, 1914-1933










Figure 2.12: Deposits at national and state commercial banks, 1900-1938 ($ million)
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1956).
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2.7.2 OLS Regression framework for LTVs and foreclosure
rates
Table 2.5 reports results for a simple OLS regression framework to test the hypothesis
that low LTVs in 1927 and 1928 led to higher foreclosure rates. These results are
to be taken with great care as observations are very few, variables are also very few,
and the data may suffer from some measurement error. The variables ltv27 and ltv28
represent average LTVs for loans contracted or renewed in 1927 and 1928 respectively.
The variable pcfall is the average percentage fall in property values between 1926
and January 1st, 1934 (which is always negative). Most variables have been entered
stepwise because of the high correlation between the two LTV variables.
Table 2.5: OLS regression results (dependent variable: per-
centage of foreclosures started on loans existing on January
1st, 1934







constant 6.219 5.670 -.744 4.292
(1.30) (1.09) (1.27) (2.34)
n 14 16 22 16
R-
squared
.434 .423 .247 .442
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05,
*significant at α = 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Source:
see text
Chapter 3
Out of the Shadows: Commercial
Bank Mortgage Securitization in
Great Depression Chicago
3.1 Introduction
Contrary to the 1930s Great Depression, the current crisis still affecting the U.S.
and most of Europe is said to have fairly identifiable causes. One does not have to
look very far to understand that the U.S. housing market bubble in the 2000s was
a determinant factor. Scholars still debate, however, what precisely went wrong in
the mortgage securitization process leading up to it (Brunnermeier, 2008; Schleifer
& Vishny, 2011). In Europe, where mortgage securitization first took shape in the
nineteenth century, the process of issuing bonds from real estate loans and selling
them to investors had always seemed remarkably safe in comparison. Many point out
that an important difference between the modern U.S. process and the old European
one is that mortgage bonds were only implicitly (and thus partially) guaranteed in the
former case, whereas they were fully covered by the issuer in the latter case (hence the
designation “covered bond” – see especially Snowden (1995), and Frederiksen (1894)).
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Another important difference is the absence of a formal and regulated exchange for
real estate securities in the U.S. (ibid.). Yet the precise inefficiencies affecting the U.S.
securitization process are still under scrutiny.
Chapter 1 showed that unsecuritized mortgage loans were a significant predictor of
failure among Chicago banks in the Great Depression. As real estate loans could not be
sold in the open market or rediscounted, they severely impaired banks’ liquidity, which
as banks came to face large, indiscriminate withdrawals, led to one of the highest urban
bank failure rates in history. Then the question arises as to whether the securitization
of these loans would have substantially increased their liquidity. While this should in
theory be the case, this paper suggests that there were great inefficiencies in the way
Chicago bankers experimented with mortgage securitization.
First, using new archival material I show that many banks in the Chicago area
did engage in some form of mortgage securitization in the 1920s. While a majority of
real estate loans remained unsecuritized, banks often raised money for a mortgage by
creating a bond and looking for investors in this bond. The aim was thus not exactly to
increase the liquidity of existing loans – rather it was to release new funds for additional
mortgage investments, and, in particular, very large ones. The existence of commercial
bank mortgage securitization in 1920s Chicago may come as some surprise as it was
previously thought to have only truly emerged in the U.S. in the 1970s. Second, I
provide evidence that two important conditions for efficient mortgage securitization
(based on Snowden (1995)) – the existence of a regulated securities exchange and full
legal guarantee on the part of the issuer – were not met, thereby increasing default
risk on the bonds. Finally, I emphasize an aggravating factor in the special case of
commercial, deposit-taking banks: the fact that many investors in the mortgage bonds
were also depositors in the bank, thereby increasing the likelihood of a run on the bank
if the bonds went bad.
That the conditions for efficient mortgage securitization were not met is clear.
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Mortgage bonds in the Chicago area were sold over the counter to investors, often
through an affiliate, with no explicit contractual guarantee – only, in many cases, an
implicit one. In addition, the liabilities often did not appear on the parent bank’s bal-
ance sheet.1 Given deep information asymmetries between bankers and investors, the
fact that these conditions were not met increased moral hazard and induced the qual-
ity of bond issues to deteriorate over time. Default rates rose significantly throughout
the Depression. Perhaps for those reasons, no secondary market for these securities
ever developed in the 1920s.
The fact that many of the investors were depositors in the bank exacerbated the
problem – although some might see it as increasing efficiency in the banking system.
As default rates rose, investor-depositors acquired information on their bank unknown
to other depositors. They revised down their assessment of the bank’s health, thereby
potentially increasing the likelihood of a bank run. As the possibility of a run on the
bank rose, the bank found itself in a dilemma. One possibility for the bank was to
honor its implicit guarantee and repurchase the bonds customers were bringing back to
the bank, thereby maintaining a good reputation – but incurring some potential losses.
Another possibility was to renege on its (unbinding) commitments, thus avoiding such
losses – but risking potentially larger deposit withdrawals. In other words, commercial
banks had to walk a fine line between incurring losses on their bonds and facing deposit
withdrawals. In both cases, however, the bank’s health would be further compromised.
These problems are not dissimilar to those affecting U.S. mortgage securitization
in the 2000s. Granted, the recent securitization process was much more complex
and involved many more players. Nevertheless, in the recent crisis sponsoring banks
also had ambiguous commitments regarding mortgage-backed securities (MBS). As
commitments were not legally binding and mortgages were written off-balance sheets,
banks lacked incentives to monitor their borrowers (Brunnermeier, 2008; Schleifer &
Vishny, 2011). In addition, because the creditors of the banks were in many cases
1This partly resulted from the lack of explicit guarantee.
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investors in the banks’ MBSs (money market funds),2 banks could not simply refuse
to take the securities back on their balance sheets, for fear of creating a run on repo,
and thus on their own funds (Claessens et al., 2012; Pozsar & Singh, 2011).3
The evidence used in this study comes from two main sources. First, congressional
hearings leading up to the Glass-Steagall and Securities Acts of 1933, and to the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, were analyzed in depth in search for evidence of mortgage
securitization in the Chicago area. Such deep inquiry into those congressional hearings
has never been undertaken, explaining in part the fact that Chicago bank mortgage
securitization in the 1920s has remained in the shadows until now. Second, I examined
a newly uncovered 1934 Masters Thesis from the University of Chicago entitled “First
Mortgage Bond Financing as Conducted by a Small State Bank” to shed further light
on the phenomenon. The bank chosen for this study was not named, but several
clues tend to suggest that it was located in East Chicago, Indiana, a town with a
1930 population of 55,000 today situated in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. Archival
material from the Holman D. Pettibone Papers at the Chicago History Museum as well
as the National Association of Real Estate Boards in Chicago were also scrutinized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 puts Chicago mortgage
securitization into the broader context of the rise of investment banking activities car-
ried out by commercial banks – often through an affiliate – in 1920s America. Section
3.3 presents the newly uncovered evidence of mortgage securitization in the Chicago
area and provides an explanation for its development. Section 3.4 then demonstrates
the inherent inefficiency of the securitization process as conducted by these banks.
While no formal testing of this hypothesis is possible due to quantitative data con-
straints, it is shown that the qualitative evidence in this regard is highly suggestive. It
2Money market funds (MMFs) invested in MBS indirectly through their investments in asset-
backed commercial paper (Kacperczyk & Schabl, 2010).
3It is important to note, however, that the run on repo by MMFs occurred because individual
investors ran on the MMFs in the first place. These investors saw the connection between their MMF
and the bank and worried about their MMF’s investment in the banks’ MBSs. They thus ran on
their MMF, which in turn ran on the bank.
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should be noted that the lack of quantitative data is a direct result of mortgage bonds
being written off-balance sheets. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The rise of investment banking in the 1920s
This section aims to retrace the origins of the significant transformation in banking
that constitutes the appearance and increase of investment banking activities, in order
to better understand the rise of commercial bank mortgage securitization in Chicago
as part of this broader phenomenon.4
3.2.1 Banks’ security affiliates
In the 1920s, many commercial banks which until recently had remained simple in-
vestors in securities also became underwriters. In the 1910s and especially in the 1920s,
demand for short-term commercial loans from banks, which were meant to be almost
self-liquidating, started to dwindle. This resulted from an increasing desire on the part
of borrowing corporations to be “free from all debt” (Peach, 1941, p. 26). Commer-
cial banks therefore naturally turned to securities operations in a wide move to offset
the decline in commercial loans.5 There was good reason to think that they would
succeed, given their economies of scale advantage. Indeed, theoretical and empirical
research has shown that it is easier for existing banks than for arms’ length lenders to
retrieve information on firms, given their accumulated experience in business lending
(Calomiris & Hubbard, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Ramirez, 1999).6
4It is important to note, however, that so far no evidence of commercial bank mortgage securiti-
zation in regions outside the Chicago vicinity and Michigan has been found.
5As Steiner (1934) put it: “The advantage to the bank in conducting an investment business lies
in the fact that securities may be sold to the bank’s clientele at but moderate additional expense -
an important factor in the decade of the twenties, when commercial loans declined to a low figure.”
6For the same reasons commercial banks also greatly increased their loans on collateral security,
which helped investors increase their securities purchases (Bogen & Willis, 1929). Both the rise in
securities operations and the expansion in security loans were seen by Congress as important causes
of the speculative stock market boom in the 1920s (see in particular U.S. Congress (1931)).
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Yet important restrictions existed on banks’ security dealings aside from war bonds.
The National Banking Act of 1864 only allowed national banks to buy securities by
investing their surplus funds. Moreover, until the McFadden Act of 1927 buying
bonds and reselling them to investors at a higher price remained ultra vires. The
McFadden Act finally gave them legal authority to perform such operations on bonds
through a bond department, but only for the equivalent of 25 percent of capital and
surplus. Stock operations continued to be prohibited (see Peach (1941, p. 40) and
White (1986)). Such restrictive legislation induced national banks to create affiliates
which, being incorporated under state laws, allowed them to “get into almost any type
of financial intermediation” (White, 1986).
While it appears that state laws were generally more liberal than national ones in
this regard, a number of state banks seem to have opened affiliates for similar purposes
– in particular, to bypass certain capital requirements. In New York, for instance, state
banks were not allowed to lend a single borrower more than 10 percent of its capital
paid in and surplus (25 percent in boroughs of 1.8 million or over). In Illinois, this ratio
was 15 percent, and in Michigan banks were not allowed to lend more than 50 percent
of their capital on real estate (Welldon, 1910). Should they want to lend more (on
a large office building via a large mortgage bond for instance), setting up an affiliate
would have allowed them to carry on this sort of operation.7 In addition, banks usually
supplied funds to their affiliate in the form of loans (Peach, 1941, p. 51). This meant
that capital regulations of the above type would also put restrictions on how much a
parent bank could lend to its affiliate. To circumvent this requirement, some parent
banks, such as Bank of United States, created a large number of additional affiliates.
There is strong evidence that state commercial banks opened affiliates in large
numbers. While most of the postwar literature has focused on national banks, con-
gressional hearings leading up to the Glass-Steagall Act are clear on the fact that
7As Steiner (1934) emphasizes: “The affiliate possesses certain marked advantages - absence of
legal restrictions to which a bond department is subject, ability to establish branches, and some
simplification of technical operation.”
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many state banks were also involved in the process. Notorious examples include the
two largest banks failing at the onset of the Depression, Caldwell and Company from
Nashville, Tennessee, and Bank of United States from New York City, each of them
having over 50 affiliates (see U.S. Congress (1931, p. 1068) and Wilmarth (2005)).8
Peach (1941, pp. 26,83) emphasizes that “the affiliates of state banks followed the
same general pattern as the affiliates of national banks,” and provides figures on state
security affiliates in particular. These figures may not tell the whole story, however,
given that many affiliates were not “security affiliates” per se. Indeed, Peach him-
self stresses that there were at least 18 other types of affiliates.9 The question as
to whether a mortgage bond affiliate would qualify as a “security affiliate” remains
open to consideration, especially as contemporaries admitted that they lacked a clear
description of such an entity.10
3.2.2 The rise of mortgage securitization in the U.S.
Mortgage securitization as carried out by Chicago commercial banks should be seen
as part of this broader investment banking and affiliates creation phenomenon.
Granted, a large part of the mortgage securitization undertaken in the U.S. at the
time resulted from the involvement of firms other than commercial banks (Goetzmann
& Newman, 2010; Snowden, 1995; White, 2009). Large, autonomous real estate bond
houses for instance, including such notorious ones as W. Straus & Co., American Bond
& Mortgage Co. and Miller & Co., issued bonds backed by a single, large property.
8In the case of Bank of United States, most of the affiliates were used to lend on real estate (see,
in particular, Lucia (1985), Peach (1941, p. 53) and Temin (1976)).
9These include: “realty companies, holding companies, bank building companies, safe deposit
companies, mortgage companies, liquidating companies, agricultural loans companies, personal or
small loan companies, investment trusts, building and loan associations, insurance agencies, finance
and acceptance corporations, title and mortgage guarantee companies, foreign banks, joint stock land
banks, title and mortgage companies, investment houses, and life or casualty companies” (Peach, 1941,
p. 18).
10See Peach (1941, p. 83). Bogen (1934)’s definition includes the following: “wholesalers of security
issues, retailers of securities, holding and finance companies, investment trusts, asset realization
companies, mediums for supporting the market for the bank’s own stocks, and real estate holding
companies.”
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Guaranty companies issued so-called guaranteed mortgage participation certificates
or GMPCs, which were less common but more complex as they were backed by ge-
ographically diversified pools of mortgages.11 The size of this real estate securities
market was quantified by Goetzmann & Newman (2010) relying on Johnson (1936):
total issuance between 1919 and 1931 in this category exceeded $4.1 billion.12 Re-
markably, representing around 23 percent of corporate debt issuance at the 1925 peak,
it surpassed total railroad bond issuance in 1924, 1925 and 1928. New York City
commercial and residential buildings backed 46.2 percent of the issuance, representing
the largest proportion, with Chicago buildings coming second at 25.9 percent.13 At
the 1925 and 1928 peaks White (2009) shows that such real estate bonds accounted
for almost a third of all mortgage debt in the U.S. As Goetzmann & Newman (2010)
show, the breakdown in the price of these real estate securities preceded the 1929
crash, beginning in late 1928, and was followed by a near complete drop in issuance.
The recent literature only rarely mentions commercial banks as mortgage bond is-
suers (see Snowden (1995, p. 287) and White (2009)). This can mainly be explained by
the fact that most recent studies have examined bond issues listed in Moody’s Manuals
and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Goetzmann & Newman, 2010; White,
2009). Such listings indeed pointed to large bond houses and guaranty companies as
the main issuers, most of which were located in New York City.
However, a fair share of real estate issues remained unlisted at the time, and –
as will be seen with respect to Chicago – most of these unlisted bonds were issued
by commercial banks. As Fisher emphasized, “fairly accurate records of large issues
are available, but about 1925 a large number of banks and their affiliates and real
estate concerns and mortgage bankers began to float small issues. No compilation of
these exists” (Fisher, 1951, pp. 29-30). White (2009) confirms this by noting that “the
11GMPCs will be referred to in more detail in Section 3.4.
12Johnson’s data come from monthly summaries of capital flotations in the Commercial and Fi-
nancial Chronicle and Poor’s Manual (Johnson, 1936).
13These figures represent issues of one million dollars or over.
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aggregate figures for mortgage debt and real estate bonds omit many small issues that
began to flood the market in 1925, which in itself was an indicator of the boom.” It
is therefore likely that no good record exists of mortgage bond issues made by small
commercial banks.14
3.3 Evidence of mortgage securitization in Chicago
Though perhaps not the only one, Chicago was certainly the main city at the time
with commercial banks engaging to some extent in mortgage securitization. As James
(1938, p. 966) put it, “in regard to real estate bonds, (...) no other city in the coun-
try challenged Chicago’s preeminence in this field.” A casual perusal of the general
literature on banking panics in the Great Depression already suggests Chicago’s “id-
iosyncrasies.” Witness Wicker’s description of the first serious banking panic in the
area, in the summer of 1931, where he clearly identifies the Foreman group of banks
– about half a dozen of which were located in the outlying regions of Chicago – as
causing trouble due to its real estate bond sales and repurchase agreements (Wicker,
1996, p. 70).15
A close look at some contemporary sources is also suggestive. In a 1931 study of
investment banking in Chicago, the Bureau of Business Research at the University of
Illinois indicated that the “cornerstone” of securities underwriting was “the commercial
banks of the city,” that in June 1930 there were 174 (banking or other) houses in a
position to issue securities, and that of these 49 made a “specialty” of real estate bonds
14Fisher (1951, p. 30) pointed out in a footnote that a Chicago firm, Nelson, Hunt and Company,
estimated unlisted issues as well, but he did not appear to consider it an entirely reliable estimation.
15Michigan is another state where real estate bonds are known to have played an important role in
the interwar period. According to Rodkey (1935), the author of the most extensive study of mortgage
bonds in this state, real estate bonds there were in fact mainly to blame for state banks’ failure during
the Great Depression. There is also evidence of commercial bank mortgage securitization in Indiana
(U.S. Congress, 1931, part 2, p. 393). In New York City only a few small banks issued real estate
bonds – Bank of United States, whose failure made the headlines in December 1930, being one
notorious exception (U.S. Congress, 1931, part 1, p. 116).
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(University of Illinois Bulletin, 1931, pp. 20-1).16 It provides tabular comparisons
of listed security issues offered by Chicago banks, represented in Figure 3.1. These
statistics are necessarily incomplete for real estate, as mentioned above, but some
preliminary conclusions can be drawn.17 Although public utilities made up the largest
proportion of issues for most of the decade, listed real estate bonds, which made up
only 5 percent of the total in 1921, rose to 37.3 percent in 1925, surpassing all other
types of issuance. Their share remained fairly large until 1928, and while in 1930
public utility issuance was still substantial, real estate issuance dropped dramatically
to a mere .2 percent of the total.18
The method of financing real estate by bond issues grew significantly in Chicago
in the fifteen years preceding the Great Depression. As Culberston (1923) pointed
out already in 1923: “Following the Liberty Bond sales of the war, there developed in
every community a new largely increasing number of investors who bought bonds of
some kind, and they naturally, most of them, turned to real estate bonds as the form
of security with which they were most familiar and on which they looked with most
favor (...).”19 In 1920s Chicago bonds could often be found in denominations as low as
$100, which contributed to the attractiveness of this type of investment to the general
public. As Hoyt (1933, p. 385) put it: “In the last boom that culminated in 1929, a
vast supply fund for building projects was tapped by the sale of real estate bonds (...)
16Its findings are mainly drawn from the 1930 edition of Security Dealers of North America, and
unfortunately it is not clear just how many of the 200 commercial banks existing in 1929 did make
real estate bonds in one way or another, especially as small real estate securities were usually neither
reported in standard manuals nor in banks’ statements, as mentioned above. Koester (1939), who
specifically studied real estate bonds in Chicago, said in relation to securities issued by banks that
“complete data could be obtained for only the few listed securities (...).” Note also that by June 1930
real estate bond issuance had already fallen considerably – see end of paragraph.
17Regarding the incompleteness of their data, which come from the usual Commercial and Financial
Chronicle as well as American Underwriting Houses and their Issues, the authors note that “because
a large number of real estate issues are relatively small in amount it is likely that more of the securities
of this class are omitted from the sources from which the material of the analysis is drawn than of
other kinds of issues.”
18The rise in importance in public utility issues in Chicago can most probably be attributed to the
growth of the public utility giant Insull, which also had negative consequences for banks during the
Depression (for more detail see Calomiris & Mason (1997) and Vickers (2011)).
19Bennett believed that the very first real estate bond originated in Chicago (Bennett, 1928, p. 29).













Figure 3.1: Percentages of the volume of various groups of listed security issues to the
aggregate volume of listed issues offered by Chicago investment bankers, 1921-1930
Source: University of Illinois Bulletin (1931, p.41).
because the splitting of a large mortgage into bonds of denominations as low as $100
vastly widened the market.” Bennett (1928, p. 31) corroborated:
“Formerly, real estate mortgage bonds were for $2,000, $1,000 and $500,
which would cut the moderate man from the picture; consequently there
was a reduction from $100 to $500 in the denominations of which could be
bought in installments, either monthly payment plan of subscription [sic].
The reduction in the denominations increased bond sales (...).”
The maturity of these bonds averaged 10 to 15 years with interest rates around 6
percent (ibid., p. 5).
A large portion of real estate bonds sold by banks were secured by a mortgage on
a very large building (Bennett, 1928, p. 11). The aim of this type of bond issue was to
raise money from various investors for a particularly large project – the construction of
a skyscraper for instance. However there are many cases in which bonds were backed
by a relatively small mortgage – less than $100,000. As Johnson (1923) pointed out:
“Some of our outlying banks, that can sell a bond issue without going outside, but
sell it to the people who come into the bank, will make bond issue loans as low as
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fifteen to twenty thousand dollars. They can do it. It is good business, and they
want it.” Mr Sabath of the Sabath Committee also emphasized in 1937 that “(...)
there are tremendous numbers of small issues on buildings that cost $4,000 to $50,000.
Those bonds, those issues, are purchased mostly by the little fellow, small fellow, in
the neighborhood (...)” (U.S. Congress, 1937, p. 317).20
Importantly, the aim of securitization was not to directly increase the liquidity of
existing real estate loans. Real estate loans remaining on banks’ balance sheets could
neither be sold nor re-discounted at the Federal Reserve. Mortgage bonds were usually
issued by the bank affiliate, and, to the best of my knowledge, did not appear on banks’
official balance sheets (see, in particular, U.S. Congress (1934b, p. 3095) and Illinois
Auditor of Public Accounts (n.d.)).21 An important factor behind this securitization
process was bank managers’ will to release additional funds for new loans. Cody (1922)
indeed emphasized that “state banks (...) must depend upon the sale of loans on hand
for the funds with which to make additional loans.” Boysen (1927) also stressed the
importance of “the releasing of [the bank’s] funds for additional loans.” In addition,
mortgage bonds were sold “to secure an outlet for the constantly increasing savings
deposits which were being drawn from this bank by the promise of increased interest
rates offered by other banks in the community,” and “to make a handsome commission
for the services of bringing the mortgagor and investor together” (Fruehling, 1934).
So what types of banks in Chicago became involved in the mortgage securitization
process? Chapter 1 described the Chicago banking landscape as being made up of
mainly two kinds of banks. On the one hand, the large state and national banks of
the Loop were few but responsible for close to half the business transacted in the
city. On the other hand, a very large number of small state banks catered to the
outlying regions of the city, which together “handled a considerable proportion of the
20The Sabath Committee was tasked with the investigation of mortgage bondholders’ reorganization
committees in the 1930s. More on this Committee will be said below.
21The reasons why banks preferred to issue securities through an affiliate were summarized in
Section 3.2. This also explains why it is not possible to exactly quantify the size of each investments
per bank.
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city’s business” (James, 1938, p. 952). It was also noted that the very large banks did
not on average invest massively in real estate loans, unlike numerous small outlying
state banks (many of whom failed for this reason). Quite interestingly, contemporary
archival sources reveal roughly the same pattern with respect to mortgage bonds.
The Sabath Committee investigation is perhaps one of the most enlightening
sources on the subject. Tasked with the investigation of fraudulent practices in real
estate bondholders reorganization committees, its members held hearings as of 1934,
mainly in Chicago, which eventually led to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.22 At
one of the hearings Seymour Schiff testified as chairman of the Schiff Bondholders’
Committee and former officer of the Schiff Mortgage Investment Co., an affiliate of
the Schiff Trust and Savings Bank, a small outlying state bank which failed in 1931.
Questioned about the purpose of his Schiff Mortgage Investment Co., he replied: “It
was the custom in those days for banks to have a subsidiary corporation to make and
underwrite real-estate loans and other issues. They in turn sold them back to the
bank, who sold them to the bondholders” (U.S. Congress, 1934b, p. 3095). Asked by
the chairman whether this was a general practice “with all of the banks,” he answered
affirmatively: “Practically all of the banks had that” (ibid.). Most of the banks cited
by the committee were indeed small outlying commercial banks,23, which is confirmed
by the following quote from Melvin Traylor, President of the First National Bank:
“The real estate operations in the Chicago area are financed largely by
the so-called outlying banks and not for their own account. They prac-
tically sell all the loans they could make largely over the counter” (U.S.
Congress, 1931, p. 406).24
22This Act regulated for the first time the formation of bondholders’ committees after default on a
bond. It required the appointment of an independent trustee to act for the benefit of the bondholders,
and was administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission created in 1934.
23See U.S. Congress (1934b, part 19, p. 816) as well as Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
24Note that for both quotes the witness may have an incentive to overstate the situation; in the
first case to show that he is not alone, and in the second to lay the blame on the outlying banks.
However, the way the question is framed in the first case signals that the chairman is already aware of
the phenomenon and is simply asking rhetorical questions. The second case is confirmed, as already
noted, by the Sabath committee.
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Most of the large Loop banks seem to have preferred handling the securities of
Insull’s public utility empire (Vickers, 2011). Indeed, as James (1938, p. 966) pointed
out, while the great Chicago-based real estate bond house S.W. Straus and Company
was an outstanding originator of mortgage bonds, “at the other end of the scale, most of
the outlying banks engaged in the distribution of such securities and supplemented this
activity by the sale to investors of mortgages on local properties” (ibid.). Nevertheless,
it is important to note that some large Loop banks did have an interest in mortgage
bonds. Continental Illinois, for instance, created in 1927 the Continental National
Mortgage Company, and there is evidence that the First Union Trust and Savings
Bank engaged in mortgage securitization (ibid., pp. 962, 996).25
The situation was nicely summarized by Boysen (1929):
“Real estate loan departments are found in most of the large banks in
cities of the West and Middle West. This is particularly true in Chicago,
where practically every large bank has such a department and where nearly
every small bank handles real estate loans through its managing officer
and considers them one of its principal sources of revenue. A real estate
loan made by a bank serves two customers, the applicant who borrows
the money and gives a mortgage on his real estate as collateral, and the
investor who buys the mortgage from the bank.”
Bringing together the most complete extant sources mentioning Chicago banks
involved in the mortgage securitization process, it is possible to draw up a list of those
banks known to have issued real estate bonds. This is done in Tables 3.1 and 3.2,
combining information from Hemingway (1923), James (1938), the Security Dealers of
North America, the Sabath Committee hearings, and the Chicago Tribune. It clearly
shows that at least 59 commercial banks issued such bonds - about a quarter of all
existing banks in 1929. Among these banks, 51 stand out as being small outlying
banks serving local communities.
James provided a detailed account of the way in which the Foreman-State Trust
25The fact that Continental Illinois issued mortgage bonds is confirmed p. 996 in the context of
the June 1931 crisis.
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Table 3.1: Known commercial banks’ bond departments or affiliates issuing mort-
gage bonds in Chicago, 1923-1933
Name of bank Loop? Year of
failure
Source
Adams State Bank n.a n.a U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Alliance National Bank n.a n.a U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
American Bond & Mortgage Co No 1931 Hemingway (1923)
Armitage State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Brainerd State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Bryn Mawr State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Capital State Savings Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Central Trust Co of Illinois Yes - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929) and Hemingway
(1923)
Chatham State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Chicago City Bank & Trust Co No - U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Chicago Lawn State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Chicago Trust Co Yes - Hemingway (1923)
City State Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Community State Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Congress Trust & Savings Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Continental Illinois Company Yes - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929) and James (1938,
p. 996)
Cosmopolitan State Bank No 1933 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929) and Hemingway
(1923)
Elston State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Equitable Bond & Mortgage Co No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Fidelity Trust & Savings Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
First Union Trust & Savings
Bank
Yes 1933 James (1938, p. 996)
Foreman State Trust & Savings Yes 1931 James (1938, p. 996)
(6) Foreman satellites No 1931 James (1938, p. 996)
Franklin Trust & Savings Bank No 1931 Hemingway (1923)
Garfield State Bank No 1931 U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Harris Trust & Savings Bank Yes - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
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Table 3.2: Known commercial banks’ bond departments or affiliates issuing mort-
gage bonds in Chicago, 1923-1933 (continued)
Name of bank Loop? Year of
failure
Source
Home Bank & Trust Co No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Humboldt State Bank No 1931 U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Independence State Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Lake Shore Trust & Savings
Bank
No - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Lake View State Bank No 1932 Hemingway (1923)
Lawndale State Bank No - Hemingway (1923)
Madison-Kedzie Bank No 1933 U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Metropolitan State Bank No - U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
Noel State Bank No 1931 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929) and Hemingway
(1923)
People’s Securities Co Yes - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
People’s Stockyards State Bank No 1929 Hemingway (1923)
The Northern Trust Company Yes - Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Old Dearborn State Bank No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Reliance Bank & Trust Co No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Ridge State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Second Security Bank No - Hemingway (1923)
Schiff Trust & Savings Bank No 1931 U.S. Congress (1934b,
part 19, p. 816)
State Bank of Chicago No 1933 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Stony Island State Savings
Banks
No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Union Bank of Chicago No 1932 Herbert Seibert & Co.
(1929)
Union Trust Co No 1928 Hemingway (1923)
United State Bank of Chicago No 1932 Hemingway (1923)
West Englewood Trust &
Savings
No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Western State Bank of Cicero n.a n.a Hemingway (1923)
West Highland State Bank No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
West Lawn Trust & Savings
Bank
No 1931 Chicago Tribune (n.d.)
“Bain mortgage”
Woodlawn Trust & Savings
Bank
No 1932 Hemingway (1923)
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and Savings Bank and its outlying satellites contributed to the June 1931 crisis. This
large bank had indeed formed a group of about six outlying banks, each of which were
engaged in the mortgage bond business.26 There is also evidence that the Bain chain
of outlying banks, which failed during the same crisis amid allegations of fraud, was
heavily involved in mortgage securitization.27
3.4 Inefficiencies in the mortgage securitization pro-
cess
The previous section showed that most Chicago area banks (predominantly outlying
banks) engaged in some form of mortgage securitization. The aim of this fourth section
is to describe this securitization process and to analyse the inherent inefficiencies that
characterized it. First, it will be seen that two important conditions for efficiency
(based on Snowden (1995)) were not met. Second, the investor-depositor problem will
be identified as an aggravating factor.
It is remarkable that the market for mortgage securities shrank tremendously in
1929 and had almost vanished by 1930. While there was no secondary market from
the start (see below), banks simply stopped issuing new real estate bonds around that
time. This can be seen simply by taking a quick look at Figure 3.1. In this figure
it is clear that while mortgage issues made up the largest portion of listed issues in
Chicago in 1925, they also saw the largest fall from 1928 to 1930. Now, perhaps there
was still a market in unlisted issues. But this is not corroborated by contemporary
sources. Indeed, contemporaries observed as early as April 1929 that investors were
shifting away from the real estate bond market into the stock market. As Emery
26More detail on this crisis will be provided on Section 3.4.
27On November 6, 1931, the Chicago Tribune headlined: “BAIN MORTGAGE DEALS, DRAIN
ON CASH REVEALED” (Chicago Tribune, n.d.). In this article it is said that “the banks had
sold second mortgage notes to their customers as first mortgages, (...) labeled “First Mortgage Gold
Notes.”
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(1929) emphasized, “it is because of the lack of this confidence that money which
might normally be used for real estate investment has gone instead into the stock
market.”28 Later on, in January 1930, Bowen (1930) simply stated: “the market for
real estate is gone,” and in 1931 he was told in a letter from a banker of a “bad odor
around real estate securities,” emphasizing that “the real estate market is in a well-nigh
hopeless condition” (Bowen, 1931). In the same year, a report from the Investment
Bankers Association of America noted that “the real estate bond situation is one of
the blackest spots in our present financial outlook” (Investment Bankers Association
of America, 1931). In 1937, the Sabath Committee final report estimated that of the
$10 billion real estate bonds outstanding in the U.S., upward of $8 billion were in
default, directly affecting some four million and indirectly upward of 20 million people
(U.S. Congress, 1937, p. 321).
3.4.1 No exchange, no explicit guarantee
In his comparative history of U.S. and European mortgage securitization, Snowden
(1995) examines what made the old European system so much more robust than its
counterpart. The European system is seen as robust because it survived for over
a century without any major changes or crises among its mortgage banks. In the
U.S., by contrast, mortgage securitization developed in spurts in the 1870s, 1880s
and again in the 1920s, each time ending with a major crisis. Snowden’s focus is on
mortgage banks and real estate bond houses rather than commercial banks.29 Yet his
comparative study allows him to single out two main conditions for what he sees as
efficient mortgage securitization in general (ibid., p. 279).30
The first condition for efficiency is that real estate securities should be secured by
28See also Bingham (1930).
29Note that mortgage banks, contrary to commercial banks, do not take deposits.
30Snowden regards both of these conditions as necessary given the deep information asymmetries
between borrower and lender. In a mortgage bond sale, the lender must isolate the cash flow from
that underlying risk in order to satisfy investors.
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high-quality loans. This in effect means that there is a need for a public authority to
regulate the quality of the loans backing up the securities. The easiest way in which
this could be achieved is through a regulated exchange having the authority to accept
or dismiss the securities offered for sale. The admission criteria could be of various
kinds. The authority could ensure that the mortgages underlying the security are all
first liens on real estate (as opposed to second or third liens). It could also, as was done
in France and Germany, put limitations on inflated appraisals by setting the valuation
of an income-producing property as a multiple of the owner’s income as stated in its
most recent tax form. In addition, the owners of private mortgage banks could be
asked to issue securities only up to a multiple of their paid-in capital, and to make
mandatory contributions to a reserve fund proportional to the volume of securities
issued.31 Finally, the underlying mortgages could be required to be amortized over
a long period of time. In the end, Snowden insists that in Europe restrictions were
imposed on almost every phase of the mortgage-making process (ibid., p. 273).
This first requirement was clearly not fulfilled by Chicago area commercial banks
in the 1920s, (nor was it met by other institutions issuing real estate bonds (Snowden,
1995)). Mortgage bonds were sold over the counter to investors and did not benefit
from any form of regulation (see U.S. Congress (1931, part 2, p. 406) and U.S. Congress
(1934b, part 2, pp. 901-2, 1067, 1080)). As Miller (1930) put it: “there was no
organized body, in which the public had confidence, to give approval to such certificates
before they were sold.”32 Houses issuing mortgage bonds were not required “to report
to any governmental agency,” and few of them made any public financial statements
31In analysing the reasons for the failure of guaranty mortgage companies during the Depression,
Snowden points out that although the law stipulated that they should maintain a reserve fund, the
size of the fund required was proportional not to the volume of securities but to their capital and
surplus.
32Note there was an attempt to regulate mortgage bonds through so-called “Blue Sky Laws.” But
such laws were dismissed as insufficient and badly implemented. See for instance Middleton (1930),
who points out that “the “blue-sky” departments (...) have contributed nothing at all in so far as
concerns the protection of the interests of the investor.” See also Smith (1927), who says: “Every
state in the Union, except three, has a Blue Sky Law. But that is not necessarily any genuine
protection.”
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(Smith, 1927). This can explain the absence of any official balance sheet data for
such bonds.33 The circulars handed out to potential investors often lacked crucial
information on the underlying property, as emphasized by Culberston (1923): “there
is the growing tendency in bond issue loans not to state in the circular, either in the
heading or in the body of the circular, what the building is worth, or what the building
is to cost.”34 Such circulars could be downright misleading, for instance when they
stated that the bond was a “general” one, which most investors did not know stood
for “second mortgage bond” (U.S. Congress, 1934b, part 19, p. 598). An attempt
to create a national real estate exchange in New York City failed in 1929 (Miller,
1929), and it is only in May 1930, when authorities in Chicago realized the extent
of the problem and sought to “rehabilitate the financial structure of distressed real
estate projects,” that the Chicago Curb Exchange required the public listing of all
real estate securities (Farr, 1930). Finally, while there was some general legislation
regarding how much banks could lend to one borrower as a percentage of their capital,
many banks created an affiliate to get around the law. Indeed, the affiliate system
allowed these banks to lend a particularly large amount on a single building through
a series of bonds.35
The second condition for efficiency given by Snowden is that mortgage banks’ own-
ers or members of a borrowers’ association need to be directly liable for the bonds they
offer for sale. In other words, they should provide an explicit contractual guarantee
for the bond even in case of default on the underlying mortgage.36 Note that this
33For instance Mr Bain, who owned the Bain chain of banks, controlled a bond affiliate called
Drexel Western whose only auditor, Mr O’Neal, was appointed by Mr Bain himself (U.S. Congress,
1934b, part 2, p. 900). See also U.S. Congress (1931, part 1, p. 39, 117) and U.S. Congress (1937,
p. 342).
34This is one reason why insurance companies were reluctant to invest in mortgage bonds. As
Smith (1925) put it, “The issuing houses do not furnish sufficient data on the properties to satisfy
the insurance commissioner that we are obeying the mortgage law by which no loan can exceed fifty
percent of the value of the property.”
35Mr Schiff, the congressional witness referred to above, clearly stated that such was the case (U.S.
Congress, 1934b, p. 3095).
36This implies also, in the case where several mortgages back up one bond, that all loans have to
be on one particular institution’s balance sheet and cannot be spread across various institutions.
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condition cannot be efficiently met without the first one being fulfilled as well, as the
guaranteed certificates of participation debacle in the Depression demonstrated. In-
deed, while guarantees were explicit in this case, the regulatory reserve fund for the
institutions providing such certificates was insufficient as it was based only on a multi-
ple of capital as opposed to the volume of issues sold. Moreover, the mortgage-making
process was practically unregulated (Snowden, 1995).
Here again, the evidence dismisses the existence of any kind of contractual guar-
antee on the part of Chicago commercial banks in the 1920s. Banks often made an
implicit commitment to repurchase the bonds in case investors so desired. As James
(1938, p. 993) made clear: “The banks (...) had sold mortgages and mortgage bonds
to the general public, and all of them, as a selling argument, had adopted the custom
of repurchasing such securities from dissatisfied customers.” The agreement was not
that the bonds would be repurchased at full value: “[investors would invest in] 6 per-
cent mortgages and banks would agree to buy them back at a discount of one point”
(U.S. Congress, 1931).37 But these commitments were not binding. In the following
quote James indeed implied that banks had a choice to renege: “Dangerous as the
repurchase of real-estate bonds and mortgages was, none of the outlying banks dared
to abandon the custom (...)” (ibid., p. 996).38 And as will be seen later, banks often
did seize the opportunity to renege on their commitments.
The reasons for these repurchase agreements seem to have been several, together
forming a good “selling argument,” according to James. One direct reason for offering
to repurchase bonds is that it offers investors a form of insurance against losses in
case bonds go bad. In Snowden’s terminology, this separates the cash flow from
the underlying risk arising from informational asymmetries between investors and
borrowers. This is especially significant when investors lack a developed secondary
37This is corroborated by Holman D. Pettibone, president of the Chicago Title and Trust Company
at the time: “(...) they would furnish a market for the mortgages they sold them, and a number of
them do furnish that market at some discount” (Pettibone, 1962).
38See also Pettibone’s account in the following paragraph.
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market in which to sell those bonds whenever desired. This seems to have been
the case in 1920s Chicago, as the following quote demonstrates: “(...) the habit
of protecting the interest and sinking funds on those mortgages grew up, and the
practice continued, namely, that in the attempt to find a market for the mortgages
it resulted in the purchasers bringing them back to the bank” (U.S. Congress, 1931).
Miller (1930) also emphasized that:
“there was no market in which to sell [the mortgage bonds]. The only
course the holder had was to hold them until maturity and to return them
to the issuing house with the request that the house buy them (...). This
lack of market had the effect of locking up many millions of dollars invested
in such securities and rendering them frozen.”39
Holman D. Pettibone, president of the Chicago Title and Trust Company, corrob-
orated: “[Banks] not committing themselves in writing did have a general understand-
ing with their [customers] that they would furnish a market for the mortgages they
sold them (...) [emphasis added]” (Pettibone, 1962).40 Indirectly, such repurchase of-
fers should have an impact on the issuer’s general reputation, which may affect other
lines of the bank’s business. As will be seen below, this reputational effect becomes
important when investors are depositors in the bank. Nevertheless, it is clear that
many banks stopped repurchasing bonds starting around 1929, as Middleton (1930)
emphasizes:
“Buyers of real estate bonds have been educated in the belief they can
demand the repurchase of bonds, at any time and under any conditions,
at par, less a very small commission charge of one or possibly two percent.
The bond houses are directly responsible for that education, but the expe-
rience we are now in the midst of undoubtedly means the discontinuance
of that practice. It should be regarded as a relic of bygone days.”
39This is also confirmed by Goggin (1930): “In the past one of the drawbacks to real estate securities
has been the lack of market for such securities in the event of re-sale. Unless the house of issue, or the
syndicate members made a market, real estate bonds usually have slumped off from the issue price.”
40Pettibone actually points out that some repurchase agreements were written contracts. But this
seems to have been rather rare. Halliburton insists that implicit repurchase agreements were common
among specialist real estate bond houses in order to create an active secondary market for its bonds
(see Halliburton (1939) and Snowden (1995, p. 287)).
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The fact that neither conditions were met means that the cash flow was no longer
isolated from the underlying risk. Had they been met, mortgage defaults would likely
have been inconsequential for investors as the bank would have had the ability to
stand behind the mortgages at no great cost. In addition, the absence of regulation in
the bond-making process directly led to a relaxation in the bank’s lending standards.
And the implicit – rather than explicit – guarantee in turn led to an increase in moral
hazard, in the form of reduced lending standards as well as reduced screening and
monitoring incentives for banks.
3.4.2 Lending standards, screening and monitoring
There is indeed evidence of lax lending standards and reduced monitoring in 1920s
Chicago. First, it was often pointed out by contemporary observers that prices of bonds
issued for the financing of rented properties were either unduly inflated or based on a
full-rental assumption. For instance, Stabler (1926) already warned of potential issues
in 1926:
“ (...) many of these issues were anything but conservative and a large
proportion unsound. The values given for the property were greatly inflated
both as to land and buildings and loans stated to be 60 to 85 percent of
appraised values, were in reality frequently ninety to one hundred percent
of real values. Because of these excessive loans builders with small capital
to put into an operation have been encouraged to produce more space of all
kinds than was needed. (...) The bond issues above mentioned are based on
the buildings being fully rented and at high rents. If space becomes more
plentiful than can be readily absorbed, prices are sure to sag, vacancies are
sure to come and defaults will certainly occur.”41
In addition, in a section titled “Shoestring financing swells the number of new
structures,” Hoyt described how several Loop office buildings were erected without
any capital invested by the promoter. The promoter would get a one-hundred-year
41See also, for instance, Jackson (1929), More (1929) and Smith (1927).
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ground lease and, based on this sole security, he would float a bond issue. As Hoyt
(1933, p. 387) put it:
“When such financing methods prevailed, it is little wonder that there
was such a rush to erect new buildings, regardless of the cost of the land,
labor, or materials, for the promoter who engineered the affair did not risk
much of his own wealth.”
Observing the real estate situation in 1927, Boysen (1927) confirmed:
“The ease of financing top-heavy loans has (...) brought a number
of concerns into the field which without adequate capital, experience, or
foresight do not hesitate to float real estate securities where loans are not
only for full value, but exceed the entire cost, thus permitting a profit over
and above the total financing. (...) There is no question (...) that we are
now overbuilt with office buildings, stores and apartments of the better
type.”
In 1930 some observers from the field became particularly concerned. Such was the
case, for example, of Robert Bingham, who worried in 1929 that an increasing number
of investors were participating in stock market speculation, withdrawing their funds
from real estate securities:
“Unfortunately, unscrupulous operators and bankers have loaded upon
the public in years past unsound real estate securities. Heavy finan-
cial losses have prejudiced many against investments arising out of land
projects. This condition must be frankly faced and conquered. The day of
selling the public a first mortgage for one hundred and ten percent of the
value of a real estate project is past” (Bingham, 1930).
The National Association of Real Estate Board’s judgment in this matter was also
a negative one: “(...) It became apparent to the directors of the National Association
that the quality of safety (...) was being sacrificed by many banking houses in the
desire to secure a steady stream of issues for public offering. (...) The past three years
have seen many mortgage bond issues come into distress” (Schmidt, 1930). This was
also the judgment of the Sabath Committee, which stated in its final report that
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“with the oncoming of the Depression defaults began rapidly to occur,
primarily due to the improper methods used by bankers and investment
houses in selling to the public, securities based on inflated values and fic-
ticious incomes (...). Most real estate and industrial securities now in
default owe their present condition to the false and inflated values which
were honestly set up as security for the obligation ” (U.S. Congress, 1937,
p. 342).
More precise evidence of lax lending standards and low monitoring comes from
the study of one particular bank. In a newly discovered 1934 University of Chicago
Masters Thesis entitled “First Mortgage Bond Financing as Conducted by a Small
State Bank,” Fruehling (1934) analyses mortgage securitization at a “typical” small
state bank most certainly located in East Chicago, Indiana.42 The “X Bank” was
examined from November 1924 to November 1933 – almost two years after its failure –
from observations based on the bank’s records and interviews with the bank’s officers
and directors as well as delinquent mortgage borrowers. The bank issued 80 percent
of its bonds on 1-to-2- family homes, very few of which exceeded 5,000 dollars. The
usual denominations of the bonds were $1,000, $500, and $100, the latter being the
investors’ favourite. Bonds based on a single mortgage were generally held by any
number of bondholders ranging from one to about ten.43 Like most other banks it
guaranteed its real estate bonds only implicitly and sold them over the counter.
Table 3.3 shows delinquency rates by type of mortgage at the X Bank in November
1933 (nearly two years after the X Bank’s failure in January 1932). It is apparent
that all types of properties except farms suffered delinquency rates above 50 percent,
with the “dwelling and business” type suffering the highest rate at 70 percent. The
average delinquency rate across all types was just under 53 percent. Fruehling clearly
attributed these delinquencies at least partly to lax lending and monitoring standards
42Although the bank is designated anonymously as “the X Bank,” it is said to be located in Lake
County, Indiana, in a 60,000 population town. In 1930 only two Lake County towns had a population
around 60,000: Hammond, and East Chicago. But only one of these two had the “industrial”
character Fruehling describes: East Chicago, which was then known for its steel mills. This town is
now located in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.
43Sometimes the entire issue was indeed bought by a single investor.
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Table 3.3: Delinquency rates by type of mortgaged property at











Dwelling 572 288 50.3
Dwelling and
business
10 7 70 .0
Apartment 8 5 62.5
Business 62 37 60.0
Farm land 7 3 42.9
Unimproved 56 38 68.0
Total 715 378 52.9
Notes: The category “dwelling” includes one-to-two family homes,
“dwelling and business” includes buildings inhabited by one or two fam-
ilies only with part of the building used as a store or shop, “apartment”
refers to multi-family housing, “business” refers to buildings used exclu-
sively for business purposes, and “unimproved” designates either residen-
tial or business unimproved properties. Source: Fruehling (1934, p. 35).
– not just to the Depression.
Regarding lending standards, Fruehling noted that in 13 percent of cases loans were
attributed to contractors seeking to finance a building programme, so that the bank
would provide one-half of the loan when the roof was on the structure, and the other
half when the building was ready for occupancy. This meant that the amount of the
loan was based on the appraised land value and the estimated building costs rather
than on the completed building. Moreover, Fruehling insisted that “the appraisal of
land was made in a haphazard way.”44 Yet even in the case of completed dwellings
and apartments a value was obtained through a rental multiplier technique, with
corrections made for type of floors, design, number of rooms, age, etc. “in a very
haphazard manner” (Fruehling, 1934, p.7). Moreover, when the borrower could not
pay the commission up front in a loan renewal case, the bank simply wrote an extra
note and allowed him to pay later, which “resulted in some very lax methods, which
44This observation was drawn “from answers received to questions given the appraisers” (Fruehling,
1934, p. 6).
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later made it necessary for the bank to charge off many of these amounts (...)” (ibid.,
p. 8).
Fruehling was also interested in monitoring issues. To him, low monitoring levels
were a significant factor leading up to delinquencies and foreclosures. He emphasised
that “until the delinquencies occurred at a cumulative rate the bank made no yearly
effort to check on the delinquencies in taxes, assessments, water rent, and mainte-
nance” (Fruehling, 1934, p. 29). This behaviour was so pervasive that in many cases
the bank learned about delinquencies “through chance” or “because the property was
advertised for tax sale in the columns of the newspapers” (ibid., p. 30). In Indiana a
property would only be advertised for tax sale after taxes had been delinquent for two
years.45 As the sale of mortgage bonds was largely dependent upon the reputation of
the bank, bondholders rarely checked the security underlying their bond. In his con-
cluding remarks Fruehling therefore called for much closer supervision of borrowers
(ibid., p. 49).46
3.4.3 The investor-depositor problem
Various sources point to the fact that many investors in the bank’s mortgage bonds
were also depositors in that bank. According to James (1938, p. 996), “[m]any bond-
holders were customers of the banks from which they had bought securities and, in
their indignation at the refusal of those institutions to repurchase the bonds, they often
withdrew their deposits.” Pettibone (1962) insisted that banks’ “depositors” were “at
the same time their mortgage customers.”47 Fruehling (1934, p. 38) also emphasized
45Remarkably, such tax or assessment delinquencies (as compared to interest or principal delin-
quencies) could still lead to a foreclosure suit according to the bank’s own mortgage contracts (ibid.,
p. 11).
46He added the following: “Some mortgagors had kept their interest paid but had failed to pay any
taxes for years. Others had allowed the property to deteriorate. When the delinquencies were finally
discovered by the mortgagee, some cases had gone too far and the mortgagor took the attitude that
he would get all he could out of the property and then give it up” (ibid.).
47The context makes it clear that “mortgage customers” refers to mortgage bond investors. Banks
had “a general understanding with their depositors, who were at the same time their mortgage
customers, that they would furnish a market for the mortgages they sold them (...).”
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that “[m]any of the bondholders were also customers of the bank (...).” Finally, at a
congressional hearing mentioned earlier, a congressman rhetorically asked Mr Schiff,
a former banker, whether real estate bonds were sold “mostly to depositors” (U.S.
Congress, 1934b, p. 3095).48
The fact that many investors were also depositors in the bank was problematic in
case some of the borrowers started defaulting on their mortgages. The main problem
for the bank was that these investors would get a signal about the bank’s health more
quickly than other depositors who would have to rely on more aggregate information.
This means that they would revise their assessment of the bank’s health more easily,
which in turn could trigger withdrawals from the bank more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case.
Calomiris & Kahn (1991) suggest that a run serves as an incentive mechanism
whereby the first depositors to run are rewarded for their bank monitoring efforts by
being able to withdraw their entire deposits, while those that are late in the run bear
the costs of their lack of monitoring. The investor-depositor problem introduces a
distortion in that the investors holding bonds are likely to get first-hand information
on these bonds – itself a signal on the bank’s health. They are likely to receive this
information without any effort on their part, so that running on the bank would not
in effect reward them for anything. Nevertheless, the investor-depositor problem can
be seen as increasing the overall efficiency of the banking system, in that asymmetric
information between banks and investor-depositors are reduced, which allows them to
better discipline bank management.
Facing an increased risk of withdrawals, a bank could respond by making advances
on delinquent bonds – that is to say, to honor its implicit guarantee on the bonds.
However, this could force the bank to incur potential losses. Thus, in the investor-
depositor case, either the bank decides to renege on its commitments while running
48Mr Schiff here replied that this was not exactly true as there were other types of customers
coming to the bank.
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the risk of a potential deposit withdrawals, or the bank honors its commitments while
taking in some losses. In both cases, the bank’s health is further compromised.
The main source of evidence from the point of view of a single bank is again
Fruehling (1934). He showed that the representative small state bank, the X Bank,
had an interest in making advances on the real estate bonds when they were delinquent.
The main reason was that confidence in the mortgage bond market “seemed necessary
to keep the confidence of the customers in the bank itself.” He elaborated:
“The two were linked together. The reason for this is quite clear. The
first mortgage bond business was carried on under the same roof, under
the same management, and with the funds of the bank. Many of the
bondholders were also customers of the bank and if they had known for
one minute that a default existed in one of the mortgage issues in which
they held the bonds their confidence in the bank itself would have been
shattered and the closing of that institution would have occurred much
earlier than it did.” (ibid., p. 37-8).
Often the repurchases were done through bondholders’ reorganization committees
organized by the issuing house itself (wrongly so according to the Sabath Committee).
Bondholders were offered the possibility to “deposit” their bonds with the committee,
which often paid fees to a trust company (more often than not, the Chicago Title
and Trust Company) which was to take care of the bonds. It should be noted that
a number of banks abused bondholders’ committees and misled bondholders quite
significantly in the process.49
49These abuses are documented at length by the Sabath Committee. For instance some banks
repurchased some bonds which they knew were better than the bondholders thought they were, or
than they made bondholders think they were, at a low price, in order to make a profit – a form of
insider trading (U.S. Congress, 1934b, part 2, p. 1117). Mr Husek, a bondholder at the Kaspar State
Bank, angrily stated after having discovered he had been misled in such a way: “I asked the clerk,
“Why must we deposit bonds?” They told me it was to have the bonds in their hands always; that we
would not get nothing out of it; and that if the bondholders’ committee is going to have the bonds,
they will take charge of the earnings; (...) and that people who will not deposit their bonds, they will
be wiped out, they will not get 5 cents on the dollar” (U.S. Congress, 1934b, part 8, p. 3121). Mr
Sabath himself humourously depicted the situation in the following way: “No one else but the houses
of issue had the lists of these bondholders. (...) But the individual bondholders themselves could
not communicate with each other(...). But the houses of issue had these lists, and the protective
committees used them to send out letters to bondholders, something like this: “My Dear Mrs So and
So: In your interest and for your protection, this splendid committee has been appointed to safeguard
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It is important to note that there are also some macroeconomic factors at work.
First, it would seem that if all banks are repurchasing bonds the cost for one particular
bank of reneging will be greater. Conversely, it will be smaller if other banks have
already started reneging. In addition, if all banks have stopped reneging and one
particular bank is still honoring its commitments, this may induce withdrawals anyway
as it may send a signal regarding the lengths to which the bank is willing to go in
order to avoid them, and therefore the fact that it would be difficult for it to withstand
them.
The macro-level mechanisms are readily seen in James’s description of some of the
runs occurring during the June 1931 crisis in Chicago:
“Dangerous as the repurchase of real-estate bonds and mortgages was,
none of the outlying banks had dared to abandon the custom lest the
decision should be seized upon by the public as an evidence of weakness,
and precipitate a run. The Loop banks had to break the precedent and,
in the spring of 1931, the First Union Trust and Savings Bank announced
that it would repurchase no more of the bonds that it had sold.
Primarily, this step was taken to protect the First Union Trust itself,
but the officers of that institution realized that their decision would make
it easier for other banks to adopt a similar policy. The Continental did so
immediately, as did many of the outlying banks, but the Foreman banks
hesitated. (...)
The real reason for the reluctance of the Foreman State group was soon
to become apparent. Many bondholders were customers of the banks from
which they had bought securities and, in their indignation at the refusal
of those institutions to repurchase bonds, they often withdrew deposits.
The Foreman banks, being in no condition to stand a run, hoped that a
policy of leniency to owners of bonds and mortgages would prevent a drain
of deposits. Their attempt did not succeed. (...) By June, (...) runs on
both the parent institution and its satellites became more severe” (James,
1938, pp. 996-7).
Thus, both at the micro and at the macro level, commercial banks in Chicago
ran significant additional risks by choosing to sell mortgage bonds to their depositors,
given their implicit guarantee.
your investment. You are advised to send your bonds in here and we will look after them after your
interests. If you do not do so you may lose almost all”” (U.S. Congress, 1937, p. 312).
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3.5 Conclusion
Real estate loans can be particularly difficult for a commercial bank to liquidate due
to their long-term maturity, a problem made more severe when they are not easily
marketable or rediscountable at a central bank. Creating a market for them is a
difficult task, and maintaining one is even more demanding. To ensure a minimum
amount of defaults on the underlying mortgages, a regulated exchange and contractual
guarantees are necessary. The Chicago area experience was an early demonstration
that the absence of such conditions can be particularly damaging. Indeed, this paper
showed that some form of mortgage securitization was undertaken in this location
during the Great Depression, but that its development was unsuccessful.
These inefficiencies have been recognized in some places in the literature on the
current crisis, but the preceding analysis suggests that they deserve particular atten-
tion. In the current crisis, mortgage-backed securities were sold over the counter, and
usually did not remain explicitly on banks’ balance sheets. Banks provided only im-
plicit guarantees for such securities, which reassured investors at the time of purchase
but ended up misleading during the crisis (Brunnermeier, 2008; Schleifer & Vishny,
2011). During the crisis, some banks took their conduits back on their balance sheets
while others did not, which created confusion about banks’ health and exacerbated
existing informational asymmetries (Kacperczyk & Schabl, 2010). More fundamen-
tally, lack of explicit guarantees during the boom led banks to become lenient towards
the screening and monitoring of their borrowers, which likely led to moral hazard and
higher default rates (Brunnermeier, 2008). In addition, investors in mortgage-backed
securities sold by banks and their conduits were also creditors of the banks, which in-
creased the likelihood of haircuts once the quality of such investments became better
known.50 It may be that had the Chicago case been examined more closely some of
50Many of the investors in asset-backed commercial paper were money market funds that held
reverse-repos from the banks. When defaults on the underlying mortgages started to rise, a run on
Chapter 3. Out of the Shadows 136
the problematic features of the recent mortgage securitization system could have been
avoided.
In part this paper relates to Chapter 1 by suggesting a possible cause of mass
deposit withdrawals in Chicago during the Great Depression, although the lack of
balance sheet evidence in this regard makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions.
It is also likely that many banks incurred losses on real estate bonds, although here
again extant data are too scarce to draw any formal relationship between such losses
and bank failure rates. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that there were great ineffi-
ciencies in the way Chicago bankers experimented with mortgage securitization. The
securitization process never led to the development of a deep secondary market for
mortgage bonds, even before the start of the Depression.
repo was thus more easily triggered (it was in fact triggered by the investors in the money-market
funds themselves, when the latter “broke the buck”) (Kacperczyk & Schabl, 2010).
Conclusion
By looking into the causes of bank failures in Chicago during the Great Depression,
and uncovering the importance of illiquid asset holdings as a determinant risk factor,
this thesis serves to reassert the importance of liquidity risk management on the part of
banks. While liquidity risk was considered an important aspect of bank management
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, it was then replaced with a
greater focus on credit risk and capital holdings. This dissertation suggests that both
aspects of bank management are equally important: while capital is essential, assets’
inherent liquidity should not be disregarded.
A bank usually transforms liquid claims into more illiquid assets such as long-term
loans and investments. Indeed, maturity transformation is an essential feature of mod-
ern banking. Nevertheless, given the funding illiquidity risks that persist throughout
the world despite the establishment of deposit insurance, a balance needs to be struck
between long-term lending and liquidity maintenance. The introduction of deposit
insurance after the Great Depression has tended to shift the latter to the background,
and this dissertation is a timely reminder that it should be brought back into the
foreground.
The first chapter analyzed balance sheet ratios from 1923 to 1933, and using a new
methodological framework, found that mortgages were the best predictor of failure
and of timing of failure. At the same time, it found that all banks faced tremendous
deposit losses, suggesting that mortgages’ inherent lack of liquidity may have been
the source of the problem. This was confirmed by the fact that banks could not have
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made any substantial losses on these loans given the 50 percent LTV, low correlations
between bank failure rates and falls in land values, and the unsalability of mortgage
loans. Capital was not the main determinant of failure in this depression.
The second chapter zoomed in on the nature mortgage contracts in the 1920s. It
found that default rates on first mortgages made by commercial banks were linked to
the fact that most borrowers could not make a 50 percent down payment, and had
to take on a second mortgage from a different lender, which led to a debt dilution
problem. While this did not induce any mortgage losses for first mortgage lenders
(banks) – given the 50 percent LTV – it increased the illiquidity of such loans as
the foreclosure process in Illinois took over eighteen months on average. This would
not have been problematic in the absence of bank runs, but given their widespread
occurrence, it did increase the risk of bank failure.
The third paper asked whether mortgage securitization would have increased the
liquidity of mortgages in 1920s Chicago, and uncovered the fact that many banks
did indeed engage in some form of securitization. While mortgages on banks’ books
usually remained unsecuritized, it was found that banks often issued mortgage bonds
off-balance sheets. While securitization can in theory increase the liquidity of long-
term assets, this was not the case then due to a lack of transparency on those bonds
and the fact that banks did not explicitly guarantee them, which led to moral hazard.
Other types of issues such as covered bonds would have probably been more efficient.
Securitization can have positive effects by releasing new funds for additional lend-
ing, increasing the salability (and thus the liquidity) of underlying loans, and tailor-
ing investment risk to different types of investors. In the recent crisis, however, the
mortgage securitization process suffered from inefficiencies similar to those found in
Chicago.
Today, banks securitize mortgages by pooling them and dividing them into secu-
rities with different credit risks attached to them. This process is usually undertaken
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not by the bank itself but by a special purpose vehicle or conduit, which packages the
mortgages into securities and issues asset-backed commercial paper to fund them. The
securities and the commercial paper appear off the balance sheet of the original bank,
but the original bank’s risk is not completely separated from the conduit’s risk as it
usually provides implicit guarantees or “liquidity puts” to the conduit. This means
that the sponsoring bank is indirectly subject to liquidity risk through the maturity
mismatch between the conduit’s long-term assets underlying mortgage-backed securi-
ties and its very short-term liabilities – asset-backed commercial paper – which need
to be rolled over overnight (Claessens et al., 2012).
Moreover, the original bank usually purchases some of its own mortgage-backed
securities from one of its special purpose vehicles, which end up on the asset side of its
balance sheet. It funds these securities through repos (which stands for “repurchase
agreements”), which are short-term liabilities collateralized by them and, like asset-
backed commercial paper, also need to be rolled over, often overnight.51 This means
that the bank itself is directly subject to liquidity risk through its maturity mismatch
between the long-term assets underlying the mortgage-backed securities it bought and
its short-term funding through repos, which are uninsured liabilities (ibid.).
The fact that securitization does not eliminate liquidity risk has been recently
emphasized by a number of authors. As Brunnermeier (2008) puts it: “leading up
to the crisis, commercial and investment banks were heavily exposed to maturity
mismatch both through granting liquidity backstops to their off-balance sheet vehicles
and through their increased reliance on repo financing. Any reduction in funding
liquidity could thus lead to significant stress for the financial system (...)” (see also,
for instance, Calvo (2013), Shin (2009) and Stein (2013)).
While it does not eliminate it, it can reduce it, but only if it is done in the right way.
One of the main problems in the recent crisis was that banks faced only the “pipeline”
risk of holding mortgages for a few months until they were passed on to another
51A repo transaction is actually over-collateralized.
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entity (Brunnermeier, 2008). Their liquidity puts to conduits were only implicit, and
when they did take back these entities on their balance sheets during the crisis for
reputational reasons, they were inadequately prepared to take on those new risks
(Reinhart, 2011; Schleifer & Vishny, 2011).
Despite major differences in the complexity of the securitization process, Chicago
mortgage bonds in the 1920s suffered from similar inefficiencies. Moral hazard was
greatly increased by the fact that banks only provided implicit guarantees to investors
in such bonds. When the liquidity crisis manifested itself, for reputational reasons
banks often did take back some of those securities, while being in fact unprepared to
take on such new risks.
In order for banks to increase the liquidity of mortgages through securitization,
therefore, they need to be liable for the credit risk associated with them. Covered
bonds are more transparent and constitute claims not only on the underlying assets
but on the actual cash flow of the institution that issues them (Calomiris, 2008). This
can significantly reduce moral hazard while still increasing the salability of loans and
their risk distribution to different types of investors.
More fundamentally, banks still need to be aware of liquidity risk. Central banks
can in theory help during a liquidity crisis by following Bagehot’s rule and lending
on good (though not perfect) collateral. Although central banks’ role during crises
is essential, it is always difficult for it to gauge the precise quality (credit risk) of an
asset, especially if the asset is a long-term one, creating more uncertainty about its
long-term value (Goodhart, 1999, 2010). For this reason, the Federal Reserve’s role
in the recent crisis has been controversial: by actually lending against such doubtful
collateral as mortgage-backed securities it has once again raised the question as to how
a central bank can measure asset risk.52
Because central bank help will likely never be entirely adequate, it is important
52And by purchasing such securities outright, it clearly cut across the boundary between monetary
and fiscal policy.
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for banks to attend to the inherent liquidity of their portfolios. Of course, nowadays
assets’ liquidity is increasingly intertwined with their quality as markets are formed
and disappear in terms of the perceived quality of such assets. Nevertheless, some
assets are inherently less liquid than others, and longer-term assets tend to be less
liquid either because they are paid back in a long time or because of the uncertainty
attached to their longer maturity. Conversely, some assets are inherently more liquid
than others, such as cash assets and (usually) government bonds.
No bank will ever be perfectly hedged in terms of its maturity profile, but promoting
liquidity through countercyclical cash ratios may be a good start. In this thesis,
cash did not matter in the sense that differences in mortgage holdings made a larger
difference. But it is possible to speculate that had banks holding more mortgages
also held more cash, they would not have run into such difficulty in the face of bank
runs.53 Although Basel I and Basel II had a clear focus on capital rather than liquidity,
Basel III has started to introduce measures to regulate the latter (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2008). Yet it has mainly focused on so-called “liquidity coverage
ratios,” which may be inadequate as their vagueness could lead to new forms of risk-
shifting. Cash may be a simpler and more transparent way of assessing a bank’s
liquidity. And, in turn, increased liquidity in the system may reduce the risk of runs,
as runs can also partly be triggered by fears of banks’ illiquidity, not just by fears
regarding their potential insolvency (Calomiris et al., 2012; Shin, 2009).54
One more radical solution to the liquidity problem would be insure all bank debt
(Gorton & Metrick, 2012), to completely eliminate the risk of runs. There is a practical
problem with this solution, and a more fundamental one. The practical problem is
that, as the recent crisis has demonstrated, banks find new ways of funding themselves
which regulators are not always aware of. The more fundamental issue is that deposit
insurance removes an essential tool for disciplining bank management: the possibility
53Note that governments bonds mattered more than cash, as can be seen in Table 1.4.
54Note that Calomiris et al. (2012) also see cash ratios as important buffers against credit risk.
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of bank runs. Deposit insurance creates important moral hazard issues which may
induce banks to take on both more credit and liquidity risk.
The impact of deposit insurance on developed financial systems needs to be better
researched. Studies have already been conducted in this area (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt &
Detragiache, 2000; Demirgu¨c¸ & Laeven, 2008), but their authors acknowledge that
much more systematic work needs to be carried out. In particular, future work will
need to include the recent crisis as an important data point. There is significant
variation in the deposit insurance schemes adopted by various countries to be exploited,
and dependent variables should not only include banking crises but also, for instance,
leverage. Of course, deposit insurance usually comes with a package of regulations,
which makes it difficult to dissociate the effects of deposit insurance per se from other
effects. Nevertheless, these difficulties, which can be mitigated through the use of
appropriate controls, should not deter us from undertaking research, which, at this
particular time, seems especially pressing.
Bibliography
V. Acharya & A. Bisin (2010). ‘Counterparty Risk Externality: Centralized versus
Over-The-Counter Markets’. mimeo.
F. Adair (1923). ‘Housing Loans’. Real Estate Finance 1.
M. Adams (1928). ‘Handling the Delinquent Borrower’. Real Estate Finance 6.
F. L. Allen (1931). Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties.
Harper and Brothers, New York.
F. H. Anderson (1927). ‘Essential and Practical Covenants of First and Second Mort-
gages’. Real Estate Finance 5.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008). Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk
Management and Supervision. Bank of International Settlements.
A. C. Bayless & M. H. Bodfish (1928). ‘Costs and Encumbrance Ratios in a Highly
Developed Real Estate Market’. The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics
4(2).
R. B. Beach (1926). ‘Financing Above the First Mortgage’. Real Estate Finance 4.
C. F. Behrens (1952). Commercial Bank Activities in Urban Mortgage Financing.
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
A. Bennardo, et al. (2013). ‘Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information
Sharing’. Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance Working Paper 211.
F. R. Bennett (1928). Real Estate Mortgage Bond Practice in Chicago. Masters Thesis,
Northwestern University, Chicago.
R. F. Bingham (1930). ‘New Methods of Financing Real Estate’. Annals of Real Estate
Practice 1930.
A. Bisin & D. Guaitoli (2004). ‘Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts’. Rand
Journal of Economics 35(2).




Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1937). Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Federal Reserve System.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1956). All Bank Statistics, 1896-
1955. Federal Reserve System, Washington, D. C.
J. Bogen (1934). ‘The Affiliate System’. In J. M. Chapman & H. P. Willis (eds.), The
Banking Situation : American Post-War Problems and Developments. Columbia
University Press.
J. I. Bogen & H. P. Willis (1929). Investment Banking. Harper & Brothers, New York.
P. Bolton & O. Jeanne (2009). ‘Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The
Role of Seniority’. Review of Economic Studies 76.
M. Bordo & J. Landon-Lane (2010). ‘The banking panics of the United States in the
1930s: some lessons for today’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26(3).
P. V. Bowen (1930). ‘Effect of the Stock Crash on the Mortgage Situation’. National
Real Estate Journal (6).
P. V. Bowen (1931). ‘Present-Day Problems of Real Estate Financing’. National Real
Estate Journal (19).
L. K. Boysen (1927). ‘Safe Mortgage Banking’. Real Estate Finance 5.
L. K. Boysen (1929). ‘A Bank’s Real Estate Loan Department’. National Real Estate
Journal (11).
H. R. Brigham (1928). ‘The Junior Financing of Homes’. National Real Estate Journal
March 5.
M. K. Brunnermeier (2008). ‘Deciphering the Liquidity Credit Crunch 2007-08’. NBER
Working Paper 14612.
M. K. Brunnermeier & M. Oehmke (2013). ‘The Maturity Rat Race’. Journal of
Finance 68(2).
C. W. Calomiris (2008). ‘The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and
What’s Next’. Working Paper.
C. W. Calomiris (2010). ‘The political lessons of Depression-era banking reform’.
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26(3).
C. W. Calomiris & G. Gorton (1991). ‘The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts,
and Bank Regulation’. In R. G. Hubbard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial
Crises. The University of Chicago Press.
C. W. Calomiris, et al. (2012). ‘A Theory of Bank Liquidity Requirements’. Working
Paper.
Bibliography 145
C. W. Calomiris & R. G. Hubbard (1990). ‘Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and
“Credit Rationing”’. The Economic Journal 100.
C. W. Calomiris & C. M. Kahn (1991). ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements’. The American Economic Review 81(3).
C. W. Calomiris & J. R. Mason (1997). ‘Contagion and Bank Failures During the
Great Depression: the June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic’. American Economic
Review 87(5).
C. W. Calomiris & J. R. Mason (2003). ‘Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress
During the Depression’. American Economic Review 87(5).
C. W. Calomiris & D. C. Wheelock (1995). ‘The Failures of Large Southern Banks
During the Great Depression’. Columbia University Working Paper .
C. W. Calomiris & B. Wilson (2004). ‘Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: the
1930s Capital Crunch and the Scramble to Shed Risk’. Journal of Business 77(3).
G. Calvo (2013). ‘Puzzling Over the Anatomy of Crises’. Working Paper.
M. Carlson (2001). ‘Are Branch Banks Better Survivors? Evidence from the Depres-
sion Era’. Federal Reserve Board Working Paper 2001(51).
S. B. Carter, et al. (2006). Historical Statistics of the United States. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
J. M. Chapman & H. P. Willis (1934). The Banking Situation, American Post-War
Problems and Developments. Columbia University Press, New York.
Chicago Tribune (n.d.). Various issues. Chicago Tribune, Chicago, Ill.
S. R. Child (1925). ‘A Uniform Mortgage Law for All the States’. Real Estate Finance
.
S. Claessens, et al. (2012). ‘Shadow Banking: Economics and Policy’. IMF Staff
Discussion Note .
H. S. Cody (1922). ‘Real Estate Loans and the Housing Shortage’. National Real
Estate Journal (16).
W. A. Cope (1929). ‘Helping the Home Seeker Buy His Home’. National Real Estate
Journal May 13.
M. M. Cornett, et al. (2011). ‘Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the
financial crisis’. Journal of Financial Economics 101.
T. Culberston (1923). ‘Bond Issue Loans’. Real Estate Finance 2.
H. Degryse, et al. (2011). ‘On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical
Investigation’. Working Paper.
Bibliography 146
K. E. Demirgu¨c¸, A. & L. e. Laeven (2008). Deposit Insurance around the World. The
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
A. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & E. Detragiache (2000). ‘Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking
System Stability? An Empirical Investigation’. Working Paper.
D. Diamond (1991). ‘Journal of Political Economy’. Monitoring and Reputation: The
Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt 99.
D. W. Diamond & P. H. Dybvig (1983). ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’.
Journal of Political Economy 91(3).
D. W. Diamond & R. G. Rajan (2011). ‘Banks and Liquidity’. America, Economic
Review 91.
V. J. Dunton (1926). ‘The Cost of Financing Through Building and Loan and Through
First and Second Mortgage’. Real Estate Finance 4.
B. Eichengreen & K. Mitchener (2003). ‘The Great Depression as Credit Boom Gone
Wrong’. BIS Working Paper 137.
H. Emery (1929). ‘Why the Real Estate Market Needs Stimulating’. National Real
Estate Journal (1).
M. Esbitt (1986). ‘Bank Portfolios and Bank Failures During the Great Depression:
Chicago’. Journal of Economic History 46(2).
M. H. Fama & M. H. Miller (1972). The Theory of Finance. Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, New York.
N. C. Farr (1930). ‘How Chicago Will Market Its Real Estate Issues’. National Real
Estate Journal May(26).
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1934). Federal Home Loan Bank Review. Federal
Home Loan Banks.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1936). Federal Home Loan Bank Review. Federal
Home Loan Banks.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1952). The Federal Home Loan Bank System, 1932-
195. Federal Home Loan Banks, Washington, D. C.
Federal Reserve Board (1918). Index-Digest of the Federal Reserve Act and Amend-
ments, 2nd edition. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
A. J. Field (2013). ‘The Interwar Housing Cycle in the Light of 2001-2011: A Com-
parative Historical Approach’. NBER Working Paper 18796.
P. Fishback, et al. (2001). ‘The Origins of Modern Housing Finance: the Impact of
Federal Housing Programs During the Great Depression’. Working Paper.
Bibliography 147
P. Fishback, et al. (2009). ‘The Influence of the Home Owners Loan Corporation in
Housing Markets During the 1930s’. Working Paper.
P. Fishback, et al. (2013). Well Worth Saving: How the New Deal Safeguarded Home
Ownership. University of Chicago Press., Chicago.
E. M. Fisher (1928). ‘Real Estate Subdividing Activity and Population Growth in
Nine Urban Areas’. Michigan Business Studies 1(9).
E. M. Fisher (1951). Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and Financing.
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
D. M. Frederiksen (1894). ‘Mortgage Banking in Germany’. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 9(1).
M. Friedman & A. J. Schwartz (1963). A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
T. E. Fruehling (1934). ‘First Mortgage Bond Financing as Conducted by a Small
State Bank’. Master’s thesis, University of Chicago.
C. M. Gambs (1977). ‘Bank Failures - An Historical Perspective’. Monthly Review
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 62.
E. Gatev, et al. (2009). ‘Managing Bank Liquidity Risk: How Deposit-Loan Synergies
Vary with Market Conditions’. Review of Financial Studies 22(3).
A. Ghent (2012). ‘The Historical Origins of America’s Mortgage Laws’. Research
Institute for Housing America Special Report .
W. N. Goetzmann & F. Newman (2010). ‘Securitization in the 1920’s’. NBER Working
Paper 15650.
V. T. Goggin (1930). ‘Capital Cost’. Annals of Real Estate Practice 1930.
C. A. Goodhart (1999). ‘Myths about the Lender of Last Resort’. International
Finance 2(3).
C. A. Goodhart (2008). ‘Liquidity risk management’. Banque de France Financial
Stability Review 11.
C. A. Goodhart (2010). ‘The changing role of central banks’. BIS Working Papers
326.
G. Gorton & A. Metrick (2012). ‘Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo’. Journal
of Financial Economics 104:425.
G. Gorton & A. Metrick (2013). ‘The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The
Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort’. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 27(4).
Bibliography 148
L. Grebler, et al. (1956). Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and
Prospects. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
J. M. Gries & J. Ford (1932). The Presidents Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership, called by President Hoover, Home Finance and Taxation. National
Capital Press, Washington, D. C.
M. Guglielmo (1998). Illinois State Bank Failures in the Great Depression. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Chicago.
R. A. Halliburton (1939). The Real Estate Bond House. PhD Thesis, Columbia
University, Franklin, IN.
G. R. Hemingway (1923). ‘Safety of Mortgage Securities’. Real Estate Finance 2.
Herbert Seibert & Co. (1929). Security Dealers of North America. Standard & Poor’s,
New York City. Mid-Year 1929 Edition.
B. Holmstro¨m & J. Tirole (1997). ‘Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the
Real Sector’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 62.
W. J. Hoppe (1926). ‘Assignment of Rents as Additional Security for Second Mort-
gages’. Real Estate Finance .
C. B. Hopper (1927). ‘Trust Deeds Versus Mortgages’. Real Estate Finance 5.
H. Hoyt (1933). One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago, The Relationship of
the Growth of Chicago to the Rise in its Land Values, 1830-1933. The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Illinois Auditor of Public Accounts (n.d.). Statement Showing Total Resources and
Liabilities of Illinois State Banks. Journal Printing Company, Springfield. Various
years.
Investment Bankers Association of America (1931). ‘Report’. National Real Estate
Journal (20).
D. Jackson (1929). ‘Use of Stocks and Bonds in Financing Real Estate’. National Real
Estate Journal (5).
F. C. James (1938). The Growth of Chicago Banks. Harper and Brothers Publishers,
New York.
E. A. Johnson (1936). ‘The Record of Long-Term Real Estate Securities’. The Journal
of Land and Public Utility Economics 12(1).
F. L. Johnson (1923). ‘How Banks and Mortgage Companies Can Help the Realtor’.
Real Estate Finance .
L. A. Jones (1928). A Treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Real Property, 8th ed. The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis.
Bibliography 149
M. Kacperczyk & P. Schabl (2010). ‘When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper
during the Financial Crisis of 20072009’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(1).
C. M. Kahn & D. Mookherjee (1998). ‘Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive
Contracts’. The RAND Journal of Economics 29(3).
G. Koester (1939). ‘Chicago Real Estate Bonds, 1919-1938: II, Market Behavior’. The
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics 15(2).
M. LaCour-Little, et al. (2011). ‘What Role Did Piggyback Lending Play in the
Housing Bubble and Mortgage Collapse?’. Journal of Housing Economics 20(2).
P. LaGanga & G. A. Vento (2009). ‘Bank Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision:
Which Lessons from Recent Market Turmoil?’. Journal of Money, Investment and
Banking 10.
B. Lev & S. Sunder (1979). ‘Methodological Issues in the Use of Financial Ratios’.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 1:187.
R. E. Lloyd (1994). ‘Government-Induced Market Failure: A Note on the Origins of
FHA Mortgage Insurance’. Critical Review (New York) 8(1).
W. N. Loucks (1929). ‘The Philadelphia Plan for Home Financing’. The Institute for
Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities Research Monograph 2.
J. L. Lucia (1985). ‘The Failure of Bank of United States: A Reappraisal’. Explorations
in Economic History 22.
J. R. Mason (1998). ‘American Banks During the Great Depression: A New Research
Agenda’. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review 80(3).
C. Mayer, et al. (2009). ‘The Rise in Mortgage Defaults’. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 23(1).
J. B. McFerrin (1939). Caldwell and Company: A Southern Financial Empire. Chapel
Hill.
S. Mcleay & D. Trigueiros (2002). ‘Proportionate Growth and the Theoretical of
Financial Ratios’. Abacus 38(3).
R. McNally (n.d.). Rand McNally Bankers Directory. Rand McNally and Co., New
York. Various years.
T. Messer-Kruse (2004). Banksters, Bosses and Smart Money: A Social History of
the Toledo Bank Crash of 1931. Ohio State University Press, Columbus.
S. Middleton (1930). ‘Policy Dangers in the Operation of A Large First Mortgage Real
Estate Bond Business’. Annals of Real Estate Practice 1930.
C. C. Miller (1929). ‘New York Exchange to Make Real Estate a More Liquid Asset’.
Real Estate Finance (24).
Bibliography 150
C. C. Miller (1930). ‘An Organized Real Estate Securities Exchange’. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 148(1).
K. J. Mitchener (2005). ‘Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Instability during the
Great Depression’. Journal of Economic History 65(1).
K. J. Mitchener & G. Richardson (2013). ‘Shadowy Banks and Financial Contagion
during the Great Depression: A Retrospective on Friedman and Schwartz’. Ameri-
can Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 103(3).
A. K. More (1929). ‘How to Combat Depression in Real Estate’. National Real Estate
Journal (25).
J. E. Morton (1956). Urban Mortgage Lending: Comparative Markets and Experience.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
National Association of Real Estate Boards (1923). ‘Financing the American Home
Purchase Realtors’ Study, First Authoritative Collection on Realty Financing Pub-
lished’. Archival material, News item, Chicago, Ill.
C. Parlour & U. Rajan (2001). ‘Competition in Loan Contracts’. American Economic
Review 91(5).
N. W. Peach (1941). The Security Affiliates of National Banks. The Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore.
H. D. Pettibone (1962). ‘Holman D. Pettibone Papers, 1926-1962’.
Z. Pozsar & M. Singh (2011). ‘The Nonbank-Bank Nexus and the Shadow Banking
System’. IMF Working Paper .
S. Radelet & J. Sachs (1998). ‘The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis’. NBER
Working Paper 6680.
C. D. Ramirez (1999). ‘Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for
Corporate Investment? Evidence from Bank and Insurance Company Affiliations’.
Journal of Economic History 59(2).
S. N. Reep (1925). ‘Financing Above the First Mortgage’. Real Estate Finance 3.
S. N. Reep (1928). Second Mortgages and Land Contracts in Real Estate Financing.
Prentice-Hall, New York.
V. Reinhart (2011). ‘A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial
Crisis in 2008’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(1).
G. Richardson (2007). ‘Categories and Causes of Bank Distress During the Great
Depression, 1929-1933: the Illiquidity versus Insolvency Debate Revisited’. Explo-
rations in Economic History 44:588.
Bibliography 151
G. Richardson & W. Troost (2009). ‘Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics
during the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve
District Border, 1929-1933’. Journal of Political Economy 117(6).
R. G. Rodkey (1935). ‘State Bank Failures in Michigan’. Michigan Business Studies
7(2).
R. G. Rodkey (1944). Sound Policies for Bank Management, A Discussion for Bank
Officers and Directors. The Ronald Press Company, New York.
J. D. Rose (2011). ‘The Incredible HOLC? Mortgage Relief during the Great Depres-
sion’. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43(6).
A. M. Sakolski (1966). The Great American Land Bubble: The Amazing Story of
Land-Grabbing, Speculations, and Booms from Colonial Days to the Present Time.
Johnson Reprint Corp, New York.
A. Schleifer & R. Vishny (2011). ‘Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics’. Journal
of Economic Perspectives 25(1).
W. S. Schmidt (1930). ‘Safeguarding Real Estate Securities’. Real Estate Finance 8.
M. Schularick & A. M. Taylor (2012). ‘Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Pol-
icy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 18702008’. American Economic Review
102(2).
H. S. Shin (2009). ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the
Global Financial Crisis’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1).
G. Smith (1925). ‘Do Insurance Companies Favor Investment Mortgages?’. Real Estate
Finance 4.
L. Smith (1927). ‘Overproduction’. National Real Estate Journal May(16).
K. Snowden (2010). ‘The Anatomy of a Residential Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to
the 1930s’. NBER Working Paper 16244.
K. A. Snowden (1995). ‘Mortgage Securitization in the United States: Twentieth
Century Developments in Historical Perspective’. In M. D. Bordo & R. Sylla (eds.),
Anglo-American Financial Systems: Institutions and Markets in the Twentieth Cen-
tury. Irwin Professional Publishing, Burr Ridge, Ill.
K. A. Snowden (2003). ‘The Transition from Building and Loan to Savings and
Loan, 1890-1940’. In H. P. T. R. J. Engerman, S. L. & K. Sokoloff (eds.), Finance,
Intermediaries and Economic Development. Cambridge University Press.
W. Stabler (1926). ‘Where the Building Industry Stands Today’. National Real Estate
Journal (15).
J. N. Stalker (1925). ‘Report on Field Trip’. Real Estate Finance 4.
Bibliography 152
J. M. Stein (2013). ‘Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and
Policy Responses’. Remarks at “Restoring Household Financial Stability after the
Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter,” Research Symposium
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
W. H. Steiner (1934). ‘The Functions of the Investment Banker’. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 171.
P. Temin (1976). Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression. W. W. Norton
& Company, New York.
R. Thomas (1935). ‘Bank Failures Causes and Remedies’. Journal of Business of the
University of Chicago 8(3).
M. Tippett (1990). ‘An Induced Theory of Financial Ratios’. Accounting and Business
Research 21(81).
United States (1864). ‘National Banking Act’.
United States (1913). ‘Federal Reserve Act’.
University of Illinois Bulletin (1929). ‘An Analysis of Earning Assets of Chicago
Banks’.
University of Illinois Bulletin (1931). ‘Investment Banking in Chicago’.
U.S. Congress (1913). Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, First Session, on H.R. 7837 (S. 2639),
a Bill to Provide for the Establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, for Furnishing an
Elastic Currency, Affording Means of Rediscounting Commercial Paper, and to Es-
tablish a More Effective Supervision of Banking in the United States, and for Other
Purposes. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1921). Hearings before the Select Committee on Reconstruction and
Production, United States Senate, Sixty-Sixth Congress, Third Session, pursuant to
S. Res. 350, Authorizing the Appointment of a Committee to Inquire into the Gen-
eral Building Situation and to Report to the Senate before December 1, 1920, such
Measures as may be Deemed Necessary to Stimulate and Foster the Development of
Construction Work in all its forms. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1926a). Consolidation of National Banking Associations, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States
Senate, Sixty-ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 1782 and H. R. 2, Bills to Amend
an Act Entitled “An Act to Provide for the Consolidation of National Banking As-
sociations,” Approved November 7, 1918; to Amend Section 5136 as Amended, Sec-
tion 5137, Section 5138, Section 5190, Section 5200 as Amended, Section 5202 as
Amended, Section 5211 as Amended, of the Revised Statutes of the United States;
and to Amend Section 9, Section 13, Section 22, and Section 2? of the Federal
Reserve Act, and for Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
Bibliography 153
U.S. Congress (1926b). Inquiry on Membership in Federal Reserve System, Joint Hear-
ings before the Committees on Banking and Currency, Congress of the United States,
Sixty-eighth Congress, pursuant to Public Act No. 503, an Act to Provide Additional
Credit Facilities for the Agricultural and Livestock Industries of the United States;
to Amend the Federal Farm Loan Act; to Amend the Federal Reserve Act; and for
Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1927). Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House
of Representatives, Sixty-Ninth Congress, First Session on H.R. 7895, A Bill to
Amend Paragraph (d) of Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, as Amended, to
Provide for the Stabilization of the Price Level for Commodities in General. Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1931). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-First Congress, Third Session, per-
suant to S. Res. 71, A Resolution to Make a Complete Survey of the National and
Federal Reserve Banking Systems. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1932). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-Second Congress, First Session on S.
2959, a Bill to Create Federal Home Loan Banks, to Provide for the Supervision
Thereof, and for Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1933). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking
and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-Third Congress, First Session on S.
1317, a Bill to Provide Emergency Relief with Respect to Home Mortgage Indebt-
edness, to Refinance Home Mortgages, to Extend Relief to the Owners of Homes
Occupied by them and who are Unable to Amortize their Debt Elsewhere, to Amend
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, to Increase the Market for Obligations of the
United States and for Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1934a). Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
United States Senate, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session on S. 3603, a Bill
to Improve Nation-Wide Housing Standards, Provide Employment and Stimulate
Industry; to Improve Conditions with Respect to Home Mortgage Financing, to
Prevent Speculative Excesses in New Mortgage Investment, and to Eliminate the
Necessity for Costly Second-Mortgage Financing, by Creating a System of Mutual
Mortgage Insurance and by Making Provision for the Organization of Additional
Institutions to Handle Home Financing; to Promote Thrift and Protect Savings; to
Amend the Federal Home Loan Bank Act; to Amend the Federal Reserve Act; and
for Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1934b). Public Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Select Committee
on Investigation of Real Estate Bondholders’ Reorganizations, House of Represen-
tatives, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Congress (1937). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Seventy-Fifth Congress, First
Bibliography 154
Session on H.R.6968, to Amend the Securities Act of 1933, as Amended, by Adding
Thereto a New Title, Providing for the Regulation of the Solicitation, in Interestate
and Foreign Commerce and through the Mails, or Proxies, Deposits, and Assents
in Connection with Certain Reorganizations, Voluntary Readjustments and Debt
Arrangements; and for Other Purposes. Government Printing Office.
D. Van Hoose (2010). The Industrial Organization of Banking, Bank Behavior, Market
Structure and Regulation. Springer, Berlin.
R. B. Vickers (2011). Panic in the Loop: Chicago’s Banking Crisis of 1932. Lexington
Books, Plymouth.
S. A. Welldon (1910). Digest of State Banking Statutes. Government Printing Office,
Washington.
D. C. Wheelock (1991). The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary
Policy, 1924-1933. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
D. C. Wheelock (2008). ‘The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons
from the Great Depression’. Federal Reserve of St Louis Review 90(3).
E. N. White (1983). The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System,
1900-1929. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
E. N. White (1984). ‘A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930’. Journal of
Economic History 44(1).
E. N. White (1986). ‘Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment
Banking Activities of National Banks’. Explorations in Economic History 23.
E. N. White (2009). ‘Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust
of the 1920s’. NBER Working Paper 15573.
D. L. Wickens (1933). ‘Elements Contributing to Farm-Mortgage Debt Distress’.
Journal of Farm Economics 15(1).
D. L. Wickens (1937). Financial Survey of Urban Housing: Statistics on Financial
Aspects of Urban Housing. Government Printing Office, Washington.
E. Wicker (1996). The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
B. A. Wigmore (1995). The Crash and its Aftermath : a History of Securities Markets
in the United States, 1929-1933. Greenwood Press, London.
A. E. Wilmarth (2005). ‘Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S.
Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921-33? A Preliminary Assessment’. The
George Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper 171.
